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ABSTRACT

in order to address the environmental concerns raised by the existence of a
continent-wide free trade zone, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), Canada, United States and Mexico created an environmental side
agreement, the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC)
NAAEC established the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), a
trilateral body created to help the NAFTA Parties achieve the goal of free trade
while at the same time avoiding or lessening environmental industrial
degradation.
Although imperfect, the NAAEC embodies several processes that were
innovative. The key innovation is the Citizen Submission Process that allows
citizens and NGOs to make submissions asserting that a Party is failing to
effectively enforce its environmental laws. This is a tremendous advance, which
for the first time in the history of such agreements allows for public participation
in the enforcement of environmental law.
The main focus of this thesis is a discussion and critique of the Citizen
Submission Process. In order to situate the discussion in the appropriate context,
the thesis has six parts.
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INTRODUCTION

The relationship between trade and the environment is an important and
sometimes controversial topic. When Mexico became involved in negotiating a
free trade agreement with Canada and the United States, interest in the topic
grew. Of particular importance to many of those involved was to ensure that the
agreement included an effective process whereby citizens would have real input
and influence in the workings of the agreement, given the obvious public
importance of the issues involved.

The tripartite negotiations ended in the historic agreement, the North American
Free Trade Agreement1 and two side agreements, one of which was the North
American Agreement For Environmental Cooperation.2 This agreement created a
trilateral commission, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC),
comprised of a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public Advisory Committee.

The CEC established two processes for resolving environmental disputes. The
Dispute Resolution Process is exclusively for the use of the Parties, and the
Citizen Submission Process allows citizens and NGOs to make submissions
asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws. This
1 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government o f Canada, the Government
of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2,
32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994) (hereinafter NAFTA).
2 North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation, Canada, Mexico, United States, 13
September 1993, 32 I.L.M. 480. (Entered into force 1 January 1994) (hereinafter NAAEC).

1
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is a tremendous advance, which for the first time in the history of such
agreements allows for public participation in the enforcement of international
environmental law.

The main focus of this thesis is a discussion and critique of the Citizen
Submission Process. In order to situate the discussion in the appropriate context,
the thesis has six parts. First, I will describe the origins and historical context of
the NAAEC by reviewing the events that led to the creation of NAFTA. In
addition, this section will describe the relevant environmental aspects or
characteristics of NAFTA and attempt to discern the connection between NAFTA
and the creation of an environmental side agreement, the NAAEC. Second, I will
provide a review of the NAAEC itself, identifying its goals, and how the CEC is
organized, followed by a critique of its effectiveness. Third, the Dispute
Resolution

Process

is

reviewed

and

discussed;

recommendations

for

improvement of the process are suggested.

The next chapter provides an analysis of the Citizen Submission Process. This
includes an analysis of the process itself to determine its strengths and
weakness and also a review of three important decisions to provide a context for
discussion. Penultimately, I put forward a critique of the Citizen Submission
Process and make proposals for its modifications so it will be better able to
ensure the fair and full enforcement of the environmental laws of the three
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Parties. Finally, there is a brief review of all the submissions filed before the
Secretariat as of October 2001.

As an environmental lawyer in Mexico, I was involved in several of these matters,
two of which were significant files, namely the Cozumel Pier Project and the
Abandoned Lead Smelter in Tijuana. From Mexico’s north border of the Rio
Bravo (or Rio Grande as it is known in Canada and the United States) to
Mexico’s southern border with Guatemala, Mexico faces many daunting
environmental problems. It was my work for the Mexican government which
initiated my interest in the role of the public in environmental matters.

This thesis is only a modest contribution to the area of environmental law. It is
important to the extent that it highlights the significance of citizen involvement in
environmental protection and the need for changes to existing agreements to
allow greater and more meaningful public participation. The environmental
problems of Mexico in particular, and North America in general, are exceptionally
complex. Solutions to the thorny issues which confront these countries and their
people will not be solved by the government and industry alone, but will require
the active participation of the general public.
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CHAPTER 1. NAFTA AND THE ENVIRONMENT.

1.1. North American Free Trade Agreement: Historical Background.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect on
January 1, 1994. This agreement establishes a set of rules for trade between the
United States, Mexico and Canada. NAFTA is another treaty arising from the
change in the international environment generated since the end of World War II
that established a system to regulate the growing trade and financial markets
promoted by the so-called Bretton Woods System.3

This Bretton Woods System created the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund and led to the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).4 The GATT, as an “international contract” between governments,
helped to create the environment necessary to promote international trade
among its contracting partners.

As a result of the growing number of treaties that created trade relationships and
free trade zones and agreements, in January 1989 the United States and
Canada established their own regional Free Trade Agreement (FTA).5 The FTA
was the first step that the Reagan Administration took to create a commercial
3 J. Jackson,” The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations”
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989) at 2.
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 58 U.N.T.S. 187, [hereinafter
GATT]
5 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, January 1 1989, Can, T.S. 1989 3 [Hereinafter
FTA]

4
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trading zone in North America. By the spring of 1990, American President
George Bush and Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari started official
negotiations to create another free trade zone between Mexico and the United
States.6 Canada’s Prime Minister Brian Mulroney asked to be included in the
negotiation of what would become the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).

The FTA had established the framework for NAFTA, which entered into force on
January 19947 Many provisions of NAFTA were almost identical to those of the
FTA, such as the chapter dealing with investment and anti-dumping rules.
Nevertheless, several major issues such as the environment, labour, and market
disruptions surrounded the debate over the NAFTA agreement and fuelled
controversy. During the FTA’s negotiations the environment was not as important
an issue8 as it was during NAFTA’s negotiations.9

The main concern of all environmentalists was Mexico, since Mexico faces
severe environmental degradation. Years of rapid population growth and
industrialization, without adequate environmental investment and enforcement,

6 J. Holbein, “The Administration of Chapter 19 Bi-national Proceedings under NAFTA”, (1997) 5
U.S.-Mex. L.J. at 57.
7 NAFTA supra note 1.
8 The FTA paid little attention to the questions of environmental protection. Nevertheless
Canadian environmental groups did raise many of the same questions that were asked later in
NAFTA negotiations, but apparently with little effect. Pearson, S. C., “ The Trade and the
Environment Nexus: What is New Since ’72? In Robert F. Housman, Durwood Zaelke et al. ed.,
Trade and the Environment Law, Economics, and Policy, (Washington DC: Island Press, 1993)
23 at 29.
9 Johnson P. M. & A. Beaulieu, The Environment and NAFTA: Understanding and Implementing
the New Continental Law, (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1996) at 1.
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have left a legacy of polluted waters and large quantities of improperly stored
waste. One concern raised by opponents of NAFTA was that increased trade
would lead to further environmental degradation in Mexico, as companies would
move their operations to Mexico to avoid strict environmental enforcement in the
United States.

It is important to note that before the NAFTA negotiations started Mexico already
was a member of the GATT and already had trade relationships with several
countries around the globe. Possibly in anticipation of further free trade
negotiations, Mexico had initiated under President Miguel de la Madrid an
intensive transformation of Mexican legislation that included international trade,
foreign investment and the environment. By March 1988, Mexico enacted its first
serious environmental law, the Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y la
Proteccion al Ambiente10 and by 1992 the Mexican environmental legislation
included regulations for hazardous waste,

noise pollution, air pollution,

environmental impact, the National Water Law and its regulations, the regulations

10 Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y la Proteccion al Ambiente, published in the Diario Oficial
de la Federacion January 28 1998. (Hereinafter General Law)
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on the Transportation of Hazardous Materials and Waste11 and more than 52
Mexican Official Standards or NOMS.12

Despite these efforts by Mexico to create an environmental legal framework as
well as to create a bi-lateral network with the United States, many American
NGO’s still had reservations and the debate brought forth a range of issues
including:

•

Fears of pollution spilling over into the United States from increased
Mexican industrial activity;

•

Concerns that the high standards of environmental protection achieved in
the United States after many hard fought legislative and legal battles
would be compromised in the NAFTA negotiations and reduced to that of
Canadian or Mexican standards;

•

Distress over the perceived lack of opportunities for the environmental
community to shape the trade policy development process; and

11 Mexico's principal environmental law is the General Law of Ecological Balance and
Environmental Protection, which has been in effect since 1988. The law provides a general
framework within which all states laws and federal regulations must comply, including regulations
governing air pollution, hazardous waste and materials transport, environmental impact
assessment and motor vehicle emissions. These regulations are implemented via media-specific,
quantitative standards called Mexican Official Standards (NOMs). There was a major revision to
the General Law in December 1996, which provided for decentralization of enforcement,
increased sanctions, more citizen participation, and information dissemination on government
plans and programs.
These standards, that are largely based on U.S. standards, establish the maximum quantities
allowed for any given pollutant and/or the way such measures should be taken. Bustani, Alberto
& Mackay, W.P., “NAFTA: Reflecting on Environmental Issues During the First Year”, (1995) 12
Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L.
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•

Questions about the rigor of Mexico’s environmental standards and
enforcement program with fears of a “pollution haven” emerging south of
the Rio Grande .13

As noted by Esty14, the above concerns were approached in several ways,
especially by the U.S Environmental Protection Agency, which created a Trade
and Environment Committee under its national Advisory Committee on
Environmental Policy and Technology. The Environmental Protection Agency
addressed concerns by performing a comprehensive environmental review of the
prospective NAFTA that included an analysis of the possible environmental
effects of closer trade relationships.

Esty also noted that other concerns, such as the possibility of encouraging
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures,
known as the “pollution havens". Another concern he expressed was the
possibility of downward harmonization of environmental standards. Esty’s
position was that both concerns should be addressed in the NAFTA treaty itself15
or by creating a trilateral environmental side agreement.

In order to persuade the Congress to renew fast-track authority for the free trade
agreement, the Bush Administration

issued a formal

response to the

13 Esty, C. Daniel, “ Integrating Trade and Environmental Policy Making: First Steps in the North
American Free Trade Agreement" in Robert F. Housman et al supra note 8 at 48.
14 Ibid.. at 49-51.
15 It is important to mention that many of those concerns are part of any free trade agreement
between developed and developing countries and are part of the battle between trade and the
environment. See especially Johnson supra note 8 at 35 -7 5 for an interesting discussion of this
subject regarding trade and environmental issues for the 1990’s.
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environmental concerns that had been raised by the House of Representatives.16
President Bush committed to a final trade agreement that would address
environmental issues, including measures that would permit the United States to:
(1) exclude products that did not meet its environmental standards; (2) implement
environmental standards that were stricter than those of the exporting country;
and (3) comply with international environmental agreements, such as the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora and the Montreal Protocol, regardless of the potential inconsistencies
between those agreements
established17.

and

the trade and

investment

regulations

With this plan, the Bush Administration tried to address the

environmental concerns expressed by the Congress and NGO’S in a parallel
track separate from the actual trade negotiations, and the three parties agreed to
do so.18
As a result of the commitments by President Bush, in October 1993 three
institutions were created to help deal with the extensive environmental problems
on the U.S.-Mexico border as part of the NAFTA implementing legislation
package that was prepared for submission to Congress.

Two were created

under the La Paz Agreement between the United States and Mexico.19 First, the

16 See Response of the Administration to Issue Raised in Connection With the Negotiation of a
North American Free Trade Agreement as mentioned by Moreno, I. S, Rubin J. W & Smith R. F III
et al, “Free Trade And The Environment: The NAFTA, the NAAEC, And Implications For The
Future”, (1999) 12 Tul. Envt’l. L.J. at 414.
17 Ibid.
18 Housman, Robert, “The North American Free Trade Agreement’s Lesson for Reconciling Trade
and the Environment", (1994) Stan. J. Intn’l. L. at 381. (Hereinafter Housman Free Trade)
19 Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Mexico
Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation Commission and a North
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Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) to coordinate the efforts
of Mexico and the United States on the border region. Second, the North
American Development Bank (NADBank) to provide loans and loan guarantees
to projects certified by the BECC. Third, the International Water Boundary
Commission (IBWC), which focuses on water rights and infrastructure serving the
border region.

However, the debate over how President Bush addressed environmental
concerns during the negotiations continued. As noted by Audley, many
environmentalists thought that President Bush ignored environmental concerns
when he developed his agenda for trade policy. His critics charged that he first
resisted the link between trade and the environment, then relegated the
environment to parallel tracks not tied to the trade negotiations, and finally
cloaked NAFTA in “green language” in the final days of the negotiations.20
Despite the critics, by the summer of 1992 the NAFTA discussion concluded and
the three countries signed the agreement that came into force on January 1,
1994. Nonetheless the debate over the environment continued to have political
repercussions in the United States, and was far from over.21

American Development Bank, signed in Washington, D.C. Nov. 16 1993; at Mexico, D.F., Nov.
18,1993, 3 2 .1.L.M 1545 (1993).
20 Audley, John, “ Why Environmentalists Are Angry about the North American Free Trade
Agreemenf in Robert F. Housman, Durwood Zaelke et al, supra note 8 at 192.
21 Ibid.
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1.2 Integration of Environmental Issues within NAFTA.

1.2.1 Introduction

After the discussions between Canada, the United States and Mexico about the
creation of a free trade zone were concluded, the three countries reached an
agreement that not only addressed trade but also the environment. The NAFTA
has been declared the “greenest” trade agreement ever22 It is the first trade
agreement to recognize the relationship between trade and the environment.
Unlike the GATT and FTA, which contain scant reference to the environment23,
NAFTA recognizes the environment as a key issue in its Preamble and also in
Chapters 1, 7, 9 and 20.

In this section of the thesis, I will analyse the

environmental issues addressed in the Preamble and various chapters of
NAFTA.

1.2.2 Preamble.
The preamble establishes the intentions of the Parties in signing the agreement
and three of its clauses are expressly concerned with the environment:

22 Van Pelt J. L., “Countervailing Environmental Subsidies: A solution to the Environmental
Inequities of North American Free Trade Agreemenf, (1994) 29 Tex. Int’l L.J. at 123.
23 The Preamble of the GATT is limited to economic and trade objectives and its text does not
specifically refer to the environment. Nevertheless the environment is recognized indirectly in the
general exceptions in GATT Article XX (b) and (g). These provisions grant exceptions from GATT
obligations for measures which are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life of health” or
which are related “to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restriction on domestic production or consumption”. On the
other hand, the FTA is focused on economic objectives with the exception of a reference to
“preserving the Parties flexibility to safeguard the public welfare" that may include environmental
protection. Articles 603 and 609 refer to the environment as a legitimate domestic objective for
standard related measures or procedures.
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‘The Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican
States and the Government of the United States of America, resolved to:

UNDERTAKE each of the preceding in a manner consistent with
environmental protection and conservation...

PROMOTE sustainable development;
STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement of environmental laws
»25

By explicitly recognizing the relationship between trade and the environment and
promoting sustainable development, the NAFTA parties agreed that the
environment is an important aspect of the trade agreement26 and that they took
into consideration this relationship before entering into the agreement.

24 Despite that NAFTA mentions "sustainable development” there is no definition given in NAFTA.
For that we must look in the Declaration of Principles of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development where “sustainable development” is defined as: " development
[which] must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of
present and future generations”
NAFTA supra note 1 preamble. Declaration of Principles of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, Principles 1 and 3 at 8 U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/26 (1992).
26 Despite this, some argue that talk about sustainable development is more rhetoric than a real
commitment to such a principle since NAFTA does not contain any Article for setting aside funds
for environmental concerns or infrastructure improvement that would assure protection of the
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However, some authors suggest that the general provisions of the Preamble are
not enforceable and the experience with other trade agreements has shown that
dispute settlement panels rarely rely on them.27 Nevertheless, according to the
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, preambles can be used as a
legitimate basis to interpret an agreement28 By mentioning the relationship
between trade and the environment, NAFTA’s parties took a step in the right
direction.

1.2.3 NAFTA’s Relationship with International Environmental Treaties.

Many environmentalists lobbied for the creation of an important exception in
NAFTA regarding its relationship to other important international environmental
agreements.

Neither GATT nor the FTA addresses their relationships with any other
international environmental agreements. This is understable, given the fact that
the GATT was created in 1947 and at that time environmental issues were not
important issues of the day.29 Recognizing that it was necessary to protect some
international environmental agreements from trade challenges, NAFTA Article
environment for future generations, see especially Bailey, James E., “ Free Trade and the
Environment - Can NAFTA Reconcile the Irreconcilable? (1993) 8 Am.U. J.lnt’l. L. Pol’y. at 847
27 Johnson supra note 8 at 67.
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 23 May 1969,in force January 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S.331. Article 31 recognizes the preambles of international treaties as a legitimate basis of
interpretation.
29 Thomas, C. & Tereposky, G.,” The NAFTA and the Side Agreement on Environmental Co
operation: Addressing Environmental Concerns in a North American Free Trade Regime”, (1993)
27 J.W.T. 6 at 9.
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10430 established

its

relationship

with

environmental

and

conservation

agreements as follows:
“1. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and the
specific trade obligations set out in:

a) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora, done at Washington, March 3, 1973, as
amended June 22,1979,

b) the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, done at Montreal, September 16, 1987, as amended June
29, 1990,
c) the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, done at
Basel, March 22, 1989, on its entry into force for Canada, Mexico
and the United States, or

d) the agreements set out in Annex 104.1

such obligations shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency,
provided that where a Party has a choice among equally effective

30 However, in part 1 Objectives at Article 102 the parties establish the general objectives of this
agreement but do not include or mention the environment.
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and

reasonably available

means

of

complying

with

such

obligations, the Party chooses the alternative that is the least
inconsistent with the other provisions of this Agreement.

2. The Parties may agree in writing to modify Annex 104.1 to
include any amendment to an agreement referred to in paragraph
1, and any other environmental or conservation agreement”. 31

The agreements set out originally in Annex 104.1 are the Agreement on
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Border Area (better
known as the La Paz Agreement32) and the Agreement Between Canada And
The United States Concerning The Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Waste*3. As stated in Article 104 section 2, the Parties may agree in writing to
modify Annex 104.1 to include any amendment to an agreement referred to in
paragraph 1, and any other environmental or conservation agreement.

Based on Article 104 (2), the Clinton Administration was able to obtain the
consent of Canada and Mexico to modify and include in Annex 104.1 the
Convention on the Protection of Migratory Birdsi34 and the Convention Between
the United States and Mexico for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game
31 NAFTA Article 104.
32 The 1983 La Paz Agreement Between Mexico and the United States on Protection of
Environment in the Border, 14 August 1983,22I.L.M. 1025.
33 The Agreement Between Canada And The United States Concerning The Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Waste, signed October 26,1986, T.I.A.S. No. 1109.
34 Convention on the Protection of Migratory Birds, between the United States and the United
Kingdom (on behalf of Canada), August 16,1916, 39 Stat. 1702, T.I.A.S. No. 628
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Mammals.35 Nevertheless, there is a concern from environmental groups36 about
the possibility of including other agreements because it is necessary that all
Parties agree, and apart from formal negotiations there is no other mechanism to
modify annex 104.1.

It is important to keep in mind that NAFTA is an international agreement focused
on trade; therefore NAFTA’s main goal is to achieve the free flow of goods and
investment between the three parties. Thus it is necessary to prevent the
creation of any artificial barriers for trade, including those that use the
environment as a pretext. One of NAFTA’s great achievements is establishing a
process to resolve disputes concerning trade and the environment. As
established in Article 2005, in any dispute where the responding Party claims that
its action is subject to the exception of Article 104 (when a Party is trying to
comply with its commitments with one of the international environmental
agreement established in Annex 104.1.37) and requests in writing that the matter
be considered under NAFTA, the complaining Party may, in respect of that
matter, thereafter have recourse to dispute settlement procedures solely under
this Agreement.

35 Convention Between the United States and Mexico for the Protection of Migratory Birds and
Game Mammals, February 7,1936, 50 Stat. 1311, T.I.A.S. No. 912.
36 Housman in FreeTrade supra note 18 at 399.
37 NAFTA Article 2005.
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This Article is an advance since it is the first attempt of any trade agreement to
try to avoid the problems that the infamous Tuna Case brought to international
trade relationships.38

Nevertheless, there are still some concerns from environmental groups and
some authors39 that real environmental measures may be jeopardized because it
is net clear what “choice among equally effective and reasonably available” or
“least inconsistent’ really means. There is also concern about giving to a panel of
trade experts the power to determine if other international environmental
agreements are well invoked or correctly interpreted.40

1.2.4. Investment and the Environment.

One of the main concerns of the Canadian and American labour unions and
environmentalists was that many investors would relocate their facilities to
38 The US imposed an embargo on tuna fish on Mexico, Venezuela and other countries. The
embargo was imposed based on the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) that prohibits the
importation of tuna caught using fishing techniques resulting in the incidental killing of dolphins in
excess of US standards. Mexico challenged the US embargo through the GATT, in what is known
as the Tuna I case, arguing that the MMPA requirements for harvesting of tuna fish, as well as
the methods used to calculate such compliance, were a violation of GATT obligations. Mexico
argued that the MMPA violated the national treatment obligation of similar imported products
established in Article III and Article XI that prohibits quantitative restrictions, and that there were
not any environmental exemptions pursuant Article XX. The Tuna I panel determined that
because the MMPA import prohibitions were targeted at protecting dolphin life and health in
waters outside the US jurisdiction the exceptions to Article XX B could not be applied since the
US regulations did not meet the conditions set out in the exemptions, and implied that the
extraterritorial application of the law was against its GATT obligations. The decision generated
several critiques from environmental NGOS since in their view trade relationships were give
greater consideration than the environment and protection of animal life. Their impression was
that GATT rules were not environmentally friendly. See Rueda, Andres, “ Tuna, Dolphins, Shrimp
& Turtles: What About Environmental Embargoes Under NAFTA?” (2000) Geo. Int’l Env. L. Rev.
647 for an interesting discussion about the Tuna I and Tuna II cases.
39 See generally Housman in FreeTrade supra note 18 at 10.
40 Ibid. at 10-12.
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Mexico due to its lower environmental standards and the lack of enforcement41,
which leads to lower environmental costs.

It is worth mentioning that one

important aspect of this issue is not the possible differences in the levels of
legislation, standards and regulations, since many of the Mexican Official
Standards (NOMS) are based on American and Western European standards.
The real problem is the lack of enforcement42

In order to avoid the possible advantage of Mexico in this issue, taking into
consideration a proposal from Canada43, the three parties created what is known
as the “Pollution Haven Clause" in Article 1114 section 2 as follows:

“Article 1114: Environmental Measures

41 This concern is obviously more economical than environmental, which left some people with a
feeling that many “ so-called” environmentalists were hypocrites since they were not really
worried about the environment but the loss of jobs. The perceived problem began with the
creation in Mexico of the “maquiladora” program by the late 60’s that opened several facilities in
the U.S.-Mexican border. However, as mentioned by Moskowitz, the environment was not really
an issue in the Mexico- U.S. relationships as he notes that “ many maquiladoras and other
industries left tons of hazardous waste in Mexico. However that was not a priority in the bi-lateral
relationship. Perhaps this is because drugs and immigrants come into the United States while
hazardous waste go out”. Moskowitz, Adam L. “ Criminal Environmental Law: Stopping the Flow
of Hazardous Waste to Mexico", (1991) 22 Cal. W. Int’l. L.J. at 159.
42 As a result of my experience as an environmental lawyer in Mexico I had the opportunity to
face the reality of enforcement. For example, in the State of Quintana Roo located in the Yucatan
peninsula, one of the main problems the environmental authorities faced was the lack of boats
that would help them to reach many areas that are covered by lakes, rivers, swamps and the sea.
By March 2000 the PROFEPA state delegation had only two boats to cover the whole region, in
Mexico City and its metropolitan area where there are more than 10,000 industries there are not
enough environmental inspectors and some of them are not well trained. On December 1998 one
of the environmental inspectors that was performing an environmental audit in one of my client’s
facilities was a veterinarian and he told me that he did not know the law but that working, as an
inspector was the only job he could get.

43 Housman in Trade and the Environment supra note 8 at 396-397
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2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment
by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures.
Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer
to

waive

or

otherwise

derogate

from,

such

measures

as

an

encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention
in its territory of an investment of an investor. If a Party considers that
another Party has offered such an encouragement, it may request
consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult with a
view to avoiding any such encouragement” . 44
This provision is an advance in recognizing that differences in environmental
standards between trade partners can create artificial advantages to the Party
with the least strict legislation, similar to a jurisdiction with low taxes. However,
some authors believe that this provision still has its flaws45, since the
consultations between the parties are not binding and the lack of enforcement
still creates an advantage to Mexico. Another critique is that this Article preserves
the status quo but46 does not encourage addressing the actual differences in the
level of protection and therefore the differences will force the parties to
harmonize standards to the lowest common denominator.47

44 NAFTA supra note 1 Article 1114 (2). Emphasis added.
45 Hustis, Brenda S., “The Environmental Implications of the North American Free Trade
Agreement”, (1993) 28 Tex. Intn'l. L. J. at 593.
46 Housman in FreeTrade supra note 18 at 397.
47 Bailey supra note 26 at 849.
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Despite these concerns as mentioned by Johnson and Beaulieu48, this pressure
to lower environmental norms is not possible. On the contrary, it will be an
upward harmonization since NAFTA Chapters 7 and 9 include provisions related
to the upward harmonization of the parties Sanitary and Phytosanitary49 (S&P)
and standard related measures.50

Section (1) of Article 1114 establishes the right of every Party to create its own
level of protection and legislation stating that nothing in Chapter 11 “shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any
measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to
ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive
to environmental concerns.”51

Recognizing the sovereignty and the intrinsic

differences between the parties, NAFTA allows every Party to maintain and
create its own legislation and level of protection.52

1.2.5 Sanitary and Phytosanitay Measures
In NAFTA’S Chapter 7, the agreement recognizes the liberty of every Party to
adopt its own Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.53 Article 712 establishes
48 Johnson supra note 9 at 111 -118.
49 NAFTA supra note 1 Article 714 (1) the parties should undertake “to the greatest extent
practicable” equivalence in their respective S&P measures without reducing the level of protection
of human, animal or plant health or life.
50 Ibid. Article 906 (2).
51 Ibid. Article 1114(1).
52 Mexico initiated several legislation reforms in the late 1980’s, including reforms on International
Trade, Foreign Investment and the Environment.
53 S&P measures are defined in NAFTA supra note 1 Article 724 as follow:
“sanitary or phytosanitary measure means a measure that a Party adopts, maintains or
applies to:
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that one of the basic rights and obligations of each Party is to establish its own
S&P measures to protect human, plant and animal health or life, even measures
more stringent than an international standard, guideline or recommendation.54
Despite the liberty of every Party to establish its own S&P measures, such
measures are limited in several ways.

First, any S&P measures must be applied in a non-discriminatory way between
its goods and like goods of another Party or goods of any Party and like goods of

(a) protect animal or plant life or health in its territory from risks arising from the
introduction, establishment or spread of a pest or disease,
(b) protect human or animal life or health in its territory from risks arising from the
presence of an additive, contaminant, toxin or disease-causing organism in a food,
beverage or feedstuff,
(c) protect human life or health in its territory from risks arising from a disease-causing
organism or pest carried by an animal or plant, or a product thereof, or
(d) prevent or limit other damage in its territory arising from the introduction,
establishment or spread of a pest,
including end product criteria; a product-related processing or production method; a
testing, inspection, certification or approval procedure; a relevant statistical method; a
sampling procedure; a method of risk assessment; a packaging and labelling requirement
directly related to food safety; and a quarantine treatment, such as a relevant
requirement associated with the transportation of animals or plants or with material
necessary for their survival during transportation. “

54 NAFTA Article 712 :
“1. Each Party may, in accordance with this Section, adopt, maintain or apply any
sanitary or phytosanitary measure necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant
life or health in its territory, including a measure more stringent than an international
standard, guideline or recommendation.
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section, each Party may, in protecting
human, animal or plant life or health, establish its appropriate levels of protection in
accordance with Article 715."
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another country.55 This must be done in order to comply with the national
treatment and most-favored nation status that are the two bases of any free trade
treatment since GATT.

Second, every Party shall ensure that every S&P measure adopted or
maintained is applied to the extent that such a measure does not constitute
unnecessary obstacles to trade.56 Article 712 section 5 establishes that in order
to prevent any S&P measures constituting an unnecessary obstacle, every Party
shall apply the measures only to the extent necessary to achieve its appropriate
level of protection and taking into consideration “technical and economic
feasibility of the measures”.57 However, these requirements are not defined.

Also, to adopt any S&P measures, as established by Article 712 (3), all parties
shall ensure that any measure that it adopts, maintains or applies is:
a) based on scientific principles, taking into account relevant factors
including, where appropriate, different geographic conditions;

b) not maintained where there is no longer a scientific basis for it; and
c) based on a risk assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances.”58

55 Ibid. section (4) ." Each Party shall ensure that a sanitary or phytosanitary measure that it
adopts, maintains or applies does not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between its goods
and like goods of another Party, or between goods of another Party and like goods of any other
country, where identical or similar conditions prevail.”
56 NAFTA supra note 1 Article 712 (5).
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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This Article recognizes the problematic relationship between S&P measures and
science, since many standards created or applied are created more as disguised
protection for trade than protection of the environment or human life or plant
health as established by NAFTA’s Article 712.59 Nevertheless, there are still
some phrases such as “scientific principles” that are not defined.60 It is important
to mention that the relationship between science and environment has not
always been good and in some cases the relationship has had disastrous
results.61

As established by Article 715 section 1, in establishing any S&P measure all
parties shall undertake a risk assessment and in conducting a risk assessment
each Party shall take into account:

a) relevant risk assessment techniques and methodologies developed by
international or North American standardizing organizations;

b) relevant scientific evidence;

c) relevant processes and production methods;

59NAFTA supra note 1 Article 712 section 6:
“No Party may adopt, maintain or apply any sanitary or phytosanitary measure with a
view to, or with the effect of, creating a disguised restriction on trade between the
Parties.”
60 Madnick, Michael, “NAFTA: A Catalyst for Environmental Change in Mexico", (1993) 11 Pace
Envt’l. L. R. at 382.
61 To review an important case where the relationship between science and environment resulted
in several criticisms see the EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)
(Complaints by the United States and Canada) (1997) WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R (Appellate
Body Report).See note 65 and accompanying text.
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d) relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods;

e) the prevalence of relevant diseases or pests, including the existence of
pest-free or disease-free areas or areas of low pest or disease
prevalence;

f) relevant ecological and other environmental conditions; and

g) relevant treatments, such as quarantines.

In undertaking risk assessment, the parties shall take into account not only the
risk but also the economic factors62 and the need to minimize negative trade
effects.63 If relevant information is unavailable, Article 715 section 4 allows the
parties to adopt provisional S&P measures.64

62 NAFTA supra note 1 Article 715 (2) “ a) loss of production or sales that may result from the
pest or disease; b) costs of control or eradication of the pest or disease in its territory. “
Ibid. section (3):
” a) should take into account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects; and b)
shall, with the objective of achieving consistency in such levels, avoid arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions in such levels in different circumstances, where such distinctions
result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against a good of another Party or
constitute a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties.”
64 Ibid. section “ (4) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) through (3) and Article 712(3)(c), where a
Party conducting a risk assessment determines that available relevant scientific evidence or other
information is insufficient to complete the assessment, it may adopt a provisional sanitary or
phytosanitary measure on the basis of available relevant information, including from international
or North American standardizing organizations and from sanitary or phytosanitary measures of
other Parties. The Party shall, within a reasonable period after information sufficient to complete
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Finally, Article 713 recognizes that the International Standards and Standardizing
Organization plays a role in the creation of new S&P measures, but that despite
the standards created by international organizations, every Party has the liberty
to create its own S&P measures that are even higher than those international
standards. Each Party is free to use existing standards as possible guides.65

These Articles raised some concerns for environmentalists since many of the
concepts are not well defined. The concern is that ambiguity in the language may

the assessment is presented to it, complete its assessment, review and, where appropriate,
revise the provisional measure in the light of the assessment.”
65 Article 713. International Standards and Standardizing Organizations
“1. Without reducing the level of protection of human, animal or plant life or health, each
Party shall use, as a basis for its sanitary and phytosanitary measures, relevant
international standards, guidelines or recommendations with the objective, among others,
of making its sanitary and phytosanitary measures equivalent or, where appropriate,
identical to those of the other Parties.
2. A Party's sanitary or phytosanitary measure that conforms to a relevant international
standard, guideline or recommendation shall be presumed to be consistent with Article
712. A measure that results in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different from
that which would be achieved by a measure based on a relevant international standard,
guideline or recommendation shall not for that reason alone be presumed to be
inconsistent with this Section.
3. Nothing in Paragraph 1 shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting,
maintaining or applying, in accordance with the other provisions of this Section, a sanitary
or phytosanitary measure that is more stringent than the relevant international standard,
guideline or recommendation.
4. Where a Party has reason to believe that a sanitary or phytosanitary measure of
another Party is adversely affecting or may adversely affect its exports and the measure
is not based on a relevant international standard, guideline or recommendation, it may
request, and the other Party shall provide in writing, the reasons for the measure.
5. Each Party shall, to the greatest extent practicable, participate in relevant international
and North American standardizing organizations, including the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, the International Plant Protection
Convention, and the North American Plant Protection Organization, with a view to
promoting the development and periodic review of international standards, guidelines and
recommendations.”
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create another disastrous result such as occurred in the Hormone Case.66 The
ambiguous text of Article 107 does not help in determining if a Party took into
consideration technical or economic feasibility concerns before creating and
applying its S&P measures. This will leave to the arbitration panels to determine
if a Party considered these matters and if the decisions were right or not.67
Leaving this to the arbitration panels may create contradictory and inconsistent
decisions among the panels.

By requesting that any S&P shall be based on a “risk assessment” NAFTA is
adopting a policy of scientific proof to create proper S&P measures. Some S&P
measures are based on a precautionary approach, such as the zero tolerance
policy on carcinogenic pesticide residues in processed foods or drugs. However,

66 In the Hormone Case a WTO Appellate Body dealt with a complaint from Canada and the
United States against the European Community (EC) relating to an EC prohibition of imports of
meat and meat products derived from cattle, which had been treated for growth promotion
purposes with either natural hormones or synthetic hormones. This EC directive allows
importation from third countries of meat and meat products from animals to which these
hormones have been administrated but only for therapeutic and zoo technical purposes. The
Appellate Body decided that the EC import ban was inconsistent with the WTO Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) because it was not based on a risk
assessment and, the level of protection compared with substances similar to hormones were
inconsistent. The Appellate Body decision was criticized because it created serious obstacles to
the ability of governments to establish their own appropriate level of risk. Also the possibility of
establishing high levels of protection and even precautionary measures was put at risk by placing
limitations on the use of “minority” scientific opinions to justify protective measures. See Report
of the EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (Complaint by the United
States) (1997), WTO Doc WT/DS26/AB/R/USA (Appellate Body Report) See also Quick,
Reinhard and Andreas Bluthner, “ Has the Appellate Body Erred? An Appraisal and Criticism of
the Ruling in The WTO HORMONES CASE”, (1999) 2:4 J. Int’l Economic L. and Wagner, J.
Martin,” The WTO”S Interpretation of the SPS Agreement Has Undermined the Right of
Governments to Establish Appropriate Levels of Protection Against Risk”, (2000) 31:3 Law &
Policy in International Business for interesting discussions about the case. Also see Vermulst, P.,
Mavroidis, P. & Waer, P., “The Functioning of the Appellate Body After Four Years, Towards Rule
Integrity”, (1999) 2:4 J. W. T. for another point o view of the WTO decision in this case and other
cases.
67 Housman, Robert & Orbuch, P., “ Integrating Labour and Environmental Concerns into the
North American Free Trade Agreement: A Look Back and Look Ahead”, (1995) 8 American U. J.
Intn'l. L. Pol'y. 749 at 740-741 (hereinafter Integrating Concerns) as well as Bailey supra note 26
at 852.
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by recognizing that any S&P measures should have a basis in scientific proof,
some zero tolerance measures may be challenged.68 Another concern is that
some S&P measures can be phased in over periods of time, taking into account
its partners exports interests. Before the measures come into play, people’s
health and the environment may be at risk.69

1.2.6 Technical Barriers to Trade

Similar to the S&P measures, chapter 9 of NAFTA recognizes the liberty of each
country to create, maintain and apply its own standards for the protection of
human, animal and plant life or health and for the protection of the environment
and any other measure to ensure its enforcement or implementation, including
measures to prevent the importation of any good that fails to comply with such
measures.70 In the creation of these measures each Party has the right to
establish its own level of protection in accordance with the requirements of Article
907 (2).71

Article 907 (2) contains similar requirements to those discussed for the S&P
measures. In establishing a level of protection that it considers appropriate and
conducting an assessment of risk, a Party should avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable

68 Ibid. at 741 -743.
69 NAFTA supra note 1 Article 712 (5) “ Where a Party is able to achieve its appropriate level of
protection through the phased application of a sanitary or phytosanitary measure, it may, on the
request of another Party and in accordance with this Section, allow for such a phased application,
or grant specified exceptions for limited periods from the measure, taking into account the
requesting Party's export interests.”
70 Ibid. Article 904 (1).
71 Ibid. Article 904 (2).
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distinctions between similar goods or sen/ices72 where the distinctions: (a) result
in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against goods or service providers of
another Party; (b) constitute a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties;
or (c) discriminate between similar goods or services for the same use under the
same conditions that pose the same level of risk and provide similar benefits.73

In developing the risk assessment, Article 907 (1) establishes that a Party may in
pursuing its objectives take into account: (a) available scientific evidence or
technical information; (b) intended end uses; (c) processes or production,
operating, inspection, sampling or testing methods; or (d) environmental
conditions.74

These provisions are also a point of concern for environmentalists75 due to the
lack of clarification in determining how the “scientific evidence” will be measured
and who will measure such evidence or what the definition of “environmental
conditions” will be.

Finally, the parties recognize the following as legitimate objectives for protection:

72 As recognized by the Article 904 (3) Non-Discriminatory Treatment “ Each Party shall, in
respect of its standards-related measures, accord to goods and service providers of another
Party: (a) national treatment in accordance with Article 301 (Market Access) or Article 1202
(Cross-Border Trade in Services) and (b) treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like
goods, or in like circumstances to service providers, of any other country. Unnecessary Obstacles
4. No Party may prepare, adopt, maintain or apply any standards-related measure with a view to
or with the effect of creating an unnecessary obstacle to trade between the Parties. An
unnecessary obstacle to trade shall not be deemed to be created where: (a) the demonstrable
purpose of the measure is to achieve a legitimate objective; and (b) the measure does not
operate to exclude goods of another Party that meet that legitimate objective.”
73 Ibid. Article 907 (2).
74 Ibid. Article 907 (1).
75 Housman “Integrating Concern” supra note 67 at 743-745. See also Bailey supra note 26 at
854-857.
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(a) safety;

(b) protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the environment or
consumers, including matters relating to quality and identifiability of goods
or services; and

(c) sustainable development.

As a corollary to this section, it is worth mentioning that the parties to NAFTA
establish the basic rules, not only to create S&P measures to protect human
health and reach sustainable development, but also to establish the process by
which such measures should be created. The main goal of such a process is to
prevent the creation of false barriers to trade.

1.2.7 Dispute Settlement

Chapter 20 includes provisions relating to the avoidance or settlement of all
disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the Agreement, except for
matters covered in Chapter 11 (Investment), Chapter 14 (Financial Services) and
Chapter 19 (Antidumping and Countervailing Duty final determinations). When
general disputes concerning NAFTA are not resolved through consultation within
a specified period of time, the matter may be referred at the request of either
Party to a non-binding panel under Article 2008.76 According to Article 2005
paragraphs 1,2, 3 and 4, disputes regarding any matter arising under NAFTA and
76 Ibid. Article 2004.
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GATT, any agreement negotiated thereunder, or any successor agreement, may
be settled in either forum at the discretion of the complaining Party.

The dispute resolution Panel should be comprised of five members, two selected
by each Party and the Chair selected by the first four panellists. The panellists
are selected from a roster, however a Party may suggest a panellist that is not a
member of such roster.77 Every Party has the right to submit written submissions
within 20 days after the panels are selected. The parties also have the right to
attend a hearing before the Panel and submit supplementary written submissions
within 10 days after the hearing.78
If the parties agreed to do so, a scientific review board may be selected to
present a report on the information that seems appropriate. Ninety days after the
panel selection has been completed, the panel should present to the parties an
initial report of the panel’s decision for their comments and review. Within 30
days of the panel presentation of the initial report, a final report should be issued.

Because of the ambiguity surrounding the precepts of the S&P and standardrelated measures, the parties agreed to establish special rules for dealing with
these measures. The protection of S&P and standard-related measures is an
advance over GATT and previous agreements.79 If the parties disagree on the

77 Ibid. Article 2011.
78 Ibid. Article 2012.
79 See Esty supra note 13 at 54.
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definition of a standard, they must resolve their dispute according to the dispute
resolution process established in Chapter 20.80

Another important feature of the provisions is that if any dispute arises regarding
environmental, health or safety standards, the complaining Party bears the
burden of proof. 81In addition, any Party may request the panel to seek
information and technical advice that it deems appropriate.82 However, the
agreement is silent on the level of burden imposed by NAFTA to the challenging
Party (prima facie or reasonable doubt).83

As noted by Bailey84 and Housman85, in Article 2015 the dispute settlement
process recognizes the role that science may play in this type of dispute by
establishing the following:

“Article 2015: Scientific Review Boards

1. On request of a disputing Party or, unless the disputing Parties
disapprove, on its own initiative, the panel may request a written report of

SO

Ibid. Article 2005 3. “In any dispute referred to in paragraph 1 where the responding Party
claims that its action is subject to Article 104 (Relation to Environmental and Conservation
Agreements) and requests in writing that the matter be considered under this Agreement, the
complaining Party may, in respect of that matter, thereafter have recourse to dispute settlement
procedures solely under this Aoreement.Temphasis added]. See footnote 75 and accompanying
text.

81 Ibid. Article 723.6.
82 Ibid. Article 2014.
83 Housman in FreeTrade supra note 18 at 409.
84 Bailey supra note 26 at 859-861.
85 Housman in “Integrating Concerns” supra note 67 at 746-748.
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a scientific review board on any factual issue concerning environmental,
health, safety or other scientific matters raised by a disputing Party in a
proceeding, subject to such terms and conditions as such Parties may
agree.

2. The board shall be selected bv the panel from among highly qualified,
independent experts in the scientific matters, after consultations with the
disputing Parties and the scientific bodies set out in the Model Rules of
Procedure established pursuant to Article 2012(1).

3. The participating Parties shall be provided:

(a) advance notice of, and an opportunity to provide comments to the
panel on, the proposed factual issues to be referred to the board; and

(b) a copy of the board's report and an opportunity to provide comments
on the report to the panel.
4. The panel shall take the board's report and any comments by the
Parties on the report into account in the preparation of its report”. 86

The only concern voiced by some authors about the dispute settlement process
is the limited role of the review board. The review board can review factual
questions but not give suggestions or contribute recommendations that may
bring about an environmentally sound decision. Also, some feel that the panel
members may not understand clearly the environmental concepts or issues in
86 NAFTA supra note 1 Article 2015 [emphasis added].
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dispute, since most of them will be experts on trade or international law but not
on environmental law.87

1.3

Conclusions.

Despite many concerns, major advances have been made. NAFTA is the first
major trade agreement that takes into consideration the relationship between
trade and the environment, and recognizes the importance of this relationship.

Not only does NAFTA recognize the important relationship between trade and
the environment, it is the first trade agreement to recognize that it is important to
protect certain international environmental agreements from trade challenges.
Before NAFTA, environmental agreements were often sacrificed in the name of
free trade. However, in NAFTA the parties recognized that the commitments
established in other environmental agreements must be protected from any
dispute related to trade in order to reach the goals of these agreements.

NAFTA’s dispute settlement process recognizes that some measures that a
Party may take are taken to fulfill its obligations with other agreements, especially
environmental agreements such as the Montreal Protocol. This has been
achieved by creating special rules and exceptions to deal with these measures
and protect them and thereby ensure their effectiveness. One of the special rules
permits a panel to seek information and technical advice from experts, helping
87 Housman in Integrating Concerns supra note 67 at 748.
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the panellists who are generally experts on trade but not on the environment.
These advances will permit the parties to deal better with S&P measures in the
case of a dispute, prevent the elimination of valid environmental measures and
detect artificial and technical measures which are an unnecessary barrier to
trade.

Nevertheless, the Parties agreed that additional steps needed to be taken to
protect the environment and therefore created an environmental side agreement
to deal with the environmental concerns raised by NAFTA.
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CHAPTER 2

THE NAAEC AND THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL

COOPERATION.

2.1 The NAAEC: The Historical Background.

The historical background of the NAAEC is understandable only in the context of
NAFTA’s historical and political development in the three countries, especially
the United States. American NGOs, labour unions and other groups criticized the
Bush administration for not addressing more environmental issues in NAFTA.
This was an important issue during President Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign;
he stated that in order to support NAFTA it was necessary to resolve outstanding
environmental and labour issues.

The Bush plan to resolve environmental issues with the creation of the Response
o f the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection With the Negotiation of a
North American

Free

Trade Agreement8 was

not enough

for

many

environmentalist groups in the United States; one, the Public Citizen, even
started a lawsuit against the United States Offices of Trade Representative
(USTR), because the USTR did not make an environmental impact statement.
Although the District Court and the Appeal Court dismissed the case89 the
opposition to NAFTA within some groups was clear.

88 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
89 Dimento J. & Dougham P.M., “Soft Teeth in the Back Mouth: The NAFTA Environmental Side
Agreement Implemented", (1998) 10 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. at 663.
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Environmentalists criticized Bush for taking a minimalist approach on the
environment and relegating the environmental issues in NAFTA to a “parallel
track” that would not slow or even stop any trade negotiations.90 This difference
in opinion between the Bush administration and the environmentalist groups
involved in the NAFTA discussions left the environmentalists three options to let
their voice be heard.

The first was to take a position of total opposition to the trade agreement as
proposed by Bush, but this was not really viable, since the negotiations were very
advanced. Second, was to use NAFTA as a vehicle to implement environmental
principles. However, with the lack of real participation by environmentalists in the
NAFTA negotiations, that was not possible. Finally, the third option was to try to
establish a more important role in working with the government and thereby find
the appropriate strategy to implement NAFTA and minimize the possible harm to
the environment.91

This third option, to take a more active role in the implementation of the NAFTA
legislation and to try to create an environmental side agreement that would help
to make the whole NAFTA package” greener”, was accomplished by the creation
of a Trilateral Commission for the Environment. This was the only possible

90 Audley, supra note 20 at 193.
91 Ibid.
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solution since by mid-1992 the NAFTA negotiations were almost finished92 and
both Mexico and Canada were reluctant to re-open NAFTA for further
discussions.93 The side agreement was a separate agreement and was
considered the last opportunity to address all the environmental issues.

On September 17, 1992, the discussion started between the parties to develop a
trilateral commission on the environment that would help in the implementation of
the environmental side agreement94 and also help facilitate the approval of
NAFTA before the U.S Congress. Pressure came from several environmentalists,
NGOS, and unions, especially in the United States and Canada, and this
pressure was evident during the presidential campaign. It was not until October
1992 that Governor Clinton mentioned at North Carolina University that he
supported NAFTA, but only if this agreement was accompanied by two side
agreements on the environment and labour matters.95 This position gave Clinton
the support from several NGO’s that helped him to eventually win the presidential
campaign; however, the pressure from NGO’s, unions and other political players
continued.

A reflection of this pressure was the decision of President-elect Bill Clinton, that
he would not press for the adoption of NAFTA without concluding complementary

92 Dimento supra note 89 at 665.
93 Johnson & Beaulieu supra 9 at 30.
94 Winham, R. G., “Enforcement of Environmental Measures: Negotiating the NAFTA
Environmental Side Agreement", (1994) 3 J.Envt. & Dev. 1 at 31.
95 Audley supra note 20 at 199.
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agreements to protect environmental and labour interests.96 Members of the U.S
Congress who said NAFTA would not be approved unless environmental and
labour side agreements were included supported him.97 However, Clinton made
the decision to not reopen NAFTA and even made such promises to Mexican
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari on January 199398; however, he left open the
option to create a strong North American Commission on the Environment and
argued that this agreement would green NAFTA from the outside, not from the
inside.

The critiques from several NGO’S were that despite attempts to address
environmental issues in NAFTA, the green language in NAFTA was still
inadequate.99 Therefore, public support in the three countries was low. Clinton
was pressured in his political campaign to commit to creating an environmental
protection commission with power to prevent and clean up pollution and allow
citizens to challenge objectionable environmental practices by the parties.100
Clinton’s position was clearly reflected in the United States’ draft of the side
agreement.

A draft prepared by the National Economic Council (NEC) proposed to create a
trilateral environmental commission to promote environmental cooperation rather

96 Ibid.. at 30.
97 Dimento supra note 89 at 667.
98 See Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 31
99 Ibid. at 122.
100 Winham supra note 94 at 31.
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than have any powers to enforce the law or establish sanctions.101 Later, in May
1993 the parties met again to discuss a new project for the proposed North
American Commission on the Environment (NACE)102 that established six
elements necessary to implement President Clinton’s ideas to protect the
environment. These elements are the following103:

1) Establish a tri-lateral commission composed of a ministerial council with a
relatively independent director and a secretariat with fact-finding powers.
2) The members of the Commission and the Secretariat receive immunity
and privileges necessary to independently perform their functions.
3) Citizens receive the power to submit complaints that a Party has failed to
enforce its environmental legislation and in such cases the Secretariat
would have the power to prepare reports on citizens’ submissions and to
initiate dispute settlement proceedings.
4) In the case of dispute settlement proceedings, the Secretariat and any
Party would need to prove that another Party had demonstrated a
persistent and unjustifiable pattern of non-enforcement of its internal
environmental legislation.
5) The scope of the dispute settlement process would include only the
domestic environmental legislation.

101The NEC suggestion gave powers to the Commission only to receive citizen’s complaints or
report on NAFTA objectives, see Winham ibid.
Patton, K.W., “Dispute Resolution Under the North American Commission on Environmental
Cooperation”, (1994) Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. at 96.
103 Winham supra note 94 at 32.
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6) If the parties or the council are unable to resolve a dispute, a Party would
be able to suspend an appropriate level of benefits under NAFTA.

This proposed draft reflected the common practice of the United States to impose
unilateral trade sanctions on its trade partners. Sanctions were rejected by
Canada and Mexico, whose trade is basically with the United States. Such an
agreement would leave them eventually open to suffer trade sanctions principally
generated by the American environmental NGOs. Both countries suggested a
different approach for the creation of the NACE. The suggestion to impose trade
sanctions was described by Canadian and Mexican negotiators as well as by
U.S. critics as overly aggressive and counterproductive, because it would create
more tension between the parties.104

Both Canadians and Mexicans suggested a weaker and less independent
commission which involved not giving immunities to the Secretariat members and
did not include the possibility for the citizens to file before the Commission any
petition or concern. Mexico proposed that only the Parties, not the Secretariat,
should be able to bring an allegation that a Party had unjustifiably, persistently
and systematically failed to enforce its domestic legislation “ in order to attract or
retain investment.”105 The Mexican position was clear in opposing giving power to

104 Patton supra note 102 at 97.
105 Ibid. The Mexican proposal seemed to be aimed at any possible sanctions by American
NGO’S. Its proposal made it very difficult to impose possible sanctions to any Party, since it was
necessary to prove an unjustifiable, persistent and systematic failure to enforce its law and that it
was done with the purpose to attract or retain investment, either, which would be impossible to
prove.
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a supra national entity to interfere with a national government’s duty to enforce
national laws. Mexico also opposed renegotiating any NAFTA provision.106

The Canadian proposal also included the idea that the agreement should be
enforced by promoting within the Party’s jurisdiction access to administrative,
quasi-administrative or judicial procedures. These procedures included some
rights: to request that an investigation be initiated, to bring suit for damages, to
pursue injunctions, to initiate private prosecutions, and to seek review of tribunal
action.107 The Canadian draft also included a proposal on transboundary
pollution and application of the side agreement to the sub-national level.108

Regarding the scope of the legislation covered by the agreement, the Canadian
document suggested including an annex that detailed every law affected by the
agreement. Canada suggested the creation of an enquiry committee nominated
by the Parties to investigate when the Parties were unable to resolve their
differences about the consistent pattern of violations. Mexico suggested that the
Secretariat could make public recommendations to a Party and Canada did not
support any sanction for the persistent lack of enforcement of the internal
legislation. In conclusion, both Canadian and Mexican drafts were considerably
weaker than that suggested by the United States.

106 Patton supra note 102 at 98,
107 Ibid. at 99.
108 Ibid. This proposal was included by Canada because most of its the environmental laws are
handled at the provincial level.
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Many environmentalist groups and business groups criticized the U.S. draft for
different reasons. The environmentalists argued that the procedure to impose
trade sanctions was flawed and that the necessity to obtain the vote of two
parties to impose sanctions could make the imposition of such sanctions very
difficult in reality.109 However, the power to impose trade sanctions was also
considered counterproductive, because penalizing a Party for not enforcing its
environmental legislation could result in that country not creating stricter
environmental laws or standards.110

The business coalition criticized the trade sanctions proposal. They suggested
that trade sanctions could lead to harassment of private companies by
governments. They also suggested reducing the powers of the Commission and
not giving investigative powers to the Secretariat. They suggested that the role
the Commission should play in the side agreement be more of a cooperative one
rather than a role that might cause a confrontation between the parties. As a
commentator mentioned, while many environmentalist groups supported the use
of sanctions to enforce environmental law, much of the trade policy community
and business community was opposed to the use of trade sanctions to enforce a
parties’ internal legislation. In addition, they believed that the supra-national
enforcement of the parties’ domestic laws is not an appropriate role for the

109 Ibid.
110 Ibid. at 100.
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NACE.111 In May 1993 the Clinton Administration reversed its position on
including enforcement measures in the agreement.112

By June, the Canadian government called for another round of negotiations and
suggested that instead of trade sanctions, fines against the governments could
be a better alternative. The alternative of fines received a good response from
the business community.113 However, this proposal started a new discussion to
decide how to enforce payment of the fines.114 In Canada it is possible since
Canadian courts have the power to enforce international orders; in Mexico and
the United States, that was not possible for constitutional and political reasons.115
Nevertheless, Canada succeeded in establishing the imposition of fines only in
the case of Canada, instead of possible trade sanctions by the Commission.

However, because of the pressure from the U.S. government and in order to
avoid compromising the negotiations any further, Mexico accepted the trade
sanctions proposal, but with the condition that before imposing any trade
sanctions the parties should be involved first in a more cooperative process.
Sanctions would only be used if there was no other solution to the dispute

111 Snape. W, “NACE: Some Functions and Form", in “Shaping Consensus: The North American
Commission on the Environment and NAFTA” Workshop April 7 1993 (Sarah Richardson Ed.
1993) at 37.
112 Dimento supra note 89.
113 Winham supra note 94 at 34.
114 Raustiala, Kal, “The Political Implications Of The Enforcement Provisions Of The NAFTA
Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC As A Model For Future Accords", (1995) 25 Envt. L. at
38.
115 Ibid.
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between the parties. It was agreed that an arbitration panel is the only way to
decide if trade sanctions should be imposed on a Party.

Further, the power of the Commission and the Secretariat was lessened
considerably, since the commission can only make public a factual record and
cannot initiate any dispute settlement or sanction process. However, the draft
agreed upon allowed citizens and NGO’s to file complaints against any Party for
lack of enforcement.

Finally, on August 13,1993 the trade ministers of the United States, Canada, and
Mexico

announced

that

they

had

completed

the

environmental

side

agreement.116 On September 13, 1993 the environment ministers of the three
countries

signed

the

North

American

Agreement

on

Environmental

Cooperation117 in Washington.

2.2 The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.

The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation118 is comprised
of a Preamble and seven parts. Part one is related to the general objectives of
the NAAEC. Part two contains the Obligations that the three parties agreed to
fulfil in order to accomplish the NAAEC objectives. Part three deals with the
116 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 123.
117 Supra note 2.
118 Ibid.
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creation and organization of the Commission of Environmental Cooperation and
its structure, which includes the Council, the Secretariat and the Joint Public
Advisory Committee, as well as the procedures of each body of the Commission.
In Part four the NAAEC establishes the obligation of the parties to cooperate for
the interpretation and application of the agreement itself as well as to provide
information that the Council or the Secretariat may require.

Part five establishes the Consultation and Resolution of Disputes process. In this
part the parties agreed to follow the NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute resolution
process which establishes several steps, such as consultations, request for
arbitration panel, selection of an arbitration panel, monetary sanctions and finally
trade sanctions. Part six “General Provisions” deals with enforcement principles,
protection of information, funding of the Commission and general definitions.
Finally, part seven “Final Provisions”, establishes the final provisions of the
NAAEC such as the date of entry into force, the process of accession and
amendments. There are also five annexes regarding the enforcement of the
dispute settlement process and specific rules for each country.

In order to give an idea of the general content of the NAAEC, I will analyze each
part of the agreement, including the Commission of Environmental Cooperation
and its structure and objectives, and give some comments and critiques on each
section.
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2.2.1 Preamble.

In its preamble, the NAAEC establishes several of the intentions of all the parties
to be accomplished with this agreement. The preamble recognizes that the
agreement was created as a complement to the NAFTA or, as it is known, as a
NAFTA side agreement. The agreement recognizes that the parties are
convinced of the importance of the environment and its protection as a main goal
in their territories, and the important role of cooperation between the Parties in
achieving sustainable development.119

The agreement also recognizes the sovereignty and the environmental
differences between its parties. The Parties recognize that, according to the
general principles of international law120, every state has the sovereign right to
exploit its own resources pursuant to its own environmental policies121 and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within its jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.122

119 Ibid. preamble paragraph 1.

“CONVINCED of the importance of the conservation, protection and enhancement of the
environment in their territories and the essential role of cooperation in these areas in
achieving sustainable development for the well-being of present and future generations.”
120 Ibid.
121 This principle is also mentioned in several treaties such as the Stockholm Declaration adopted
by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 5 June 1972, UN. Doc. A/Conf.
48/14 Rev. 1, reprinted in (1992) 11 I.L.M. 1416 hereinafter Stockholm Declaration.
122 NAAEC supra note 87, Preamble paragraph 2.

“REAFFIRMING the sovereign right of States to exploit their own resources pursuant to
their own environmental and development policies and their responsibility to ensure that
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This intention is also connected to two other intentions as established in the
Preamble. Paragraph seven establishes the following:

“NOTING the existence of differences in their respective natural
endowments, climatic and geographical conditions, and economic,
technological and infrastructural capabilities.”123

By recognizing the differences between the Parties, the Parties took an important
step toward creating a better context for cooperation.

This precept recognizes that each Party is different, not only with respect to its
environment but also in its capacity to address environmental problems that may
arise. The economic differences that exist between the Parties may affect how
each country solves any given environmental problem.

Paragraph 8 of the NAAEC preamble establishes its recognition of the Stockholm
Declaration and Rio Declaration as important environmental declarations.124 By
recognizing the importance of both the environment and

trade some

commentators125 mention that the NAAEC expresses a commitment to inherently

activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid. paragraph 8 “REAFFIRMING the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment of
1972 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992.”
125 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 141.
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conflicting principles which

reflects the intrinsic difficulty of integrating

environmental concerns into the law of international trade and the environment.
The essence of the conflict may be that to promote industry and trade will
inevitably hurt the environment.

The NAAEC’s preamble takes into consideration the importance of public
participation

in conserving,

protecting and enhancing

the

environment.

Additionally, the NAAEC recalls the tradition of environmental cooperation
between the parties126 in creating a Commission to facilitate the conservation,
protection and enhancement of the environment in their territories.127 These
steps are especially important. The Commission may both help the parties to
reach their goals and allow the public to participate in the process.

There are a couple of important points to make with respect to the preamble.
First, by recognizing in the preamble the importance of public participation to
conserve and protect the environment, the parties addressed some of the main
concerns many NGO’s and politicians had during the discussion of the creation
of the NAAEC, especially in the United States and Canada.

126 Ibid. paragraph 9 “ RECALLING their tradition of environmental cooperation and expressing
their desire to support and build on international environmental agreements and existing policies
and laws, in order to promote cooperation between them. “
127 Ibid. paragraph 10 “CONVINCED of the benefits to be derived from a framework, including a
Commission, to facilitate effective cooperation on the conservation, protection and enhancement
of the environment in their territories.”
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Second, it is important to mention that some of the intentions established in the
preamble are no more than good intentions since instruments such as the
Stockholm and Rio Declarations are not treaties but international declarations.
Therefore, there is not any legal obligation to accomplish such intentions and
declarations.

2.2.2 Part One: Objectives

In Part One, the Parties established ten objectives that they are seeking to
accomplish with the NAAEC. These objectives are as follow:

a) foster the protection and improvement of the environment in the territories
of the Parties for the well-being of present and future generations;
b) promote sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually
supportive environmental and economic policies;
c) increase cooperation between the Parties to better conserve, protect, and
enhance the environment, including wild flora and fauna;
d) support the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA;
e) avoid creating trade distortions or new trade barriers;
f) strengthen cooperation on the development and

improvement of

environmental laws, regulations, procedures, policies and practices;
g) enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental laws and
regulations;
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h) promote transparency and public participation in the development of
environmental laws, regulations and policies;
i) promote economically efficient and effective environmental measures; and
j)

promote pollution prevention policies and practices.128

Of the ten objectives mentioned above, we can divide them into four major areas:
1) Environment, Economy and Trade; 2) Conservation of Biodiversity; 3)
Pollutants and Health and; 4) Law and Policy. In my opinion, the most notable
are those related to the environment and the protection of each Party’s
environment and the participation of the three parties in achieving sustainable
development. Also significant are those related to the trade relationships
between the countries, namely to support the environmental goals and objectives
of the NAFTA, and avoid the creation of trade distortions or new trade barriers.

The objective of avoiding trade distortions or new trade barriers is important to
note. As a side agreement of NAFTA, this agreement recognizes that the
protection of the environment should not be used to create trade barriers, and
this is in accordance with NAFTA chapters 7 and 9.129 This means that the scope
of NAAEC’s environmental protection goals are restricted by trade, economy,
efficiency concerns and the sovereignty of its parties. In other words, the goals of
free trade are more important than the environmental goals in the NAFTA and
NAAEC legal regime.

128 NAAEC supra note 2, Article 1.
129 Supra notes 64 and 70 and accompanying text.
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All of the mentioned objectives are in one way or another addressed in the
NAAEC body itself; however, it is relevant to mention that this agreement is one
of the first to recognize the importance of public participation in the development
of environmental laws, regulations and policies. This is, in the author’s opinion,
the main advance of this agreement. However, this public participation is not as
effective as it could be, as I will discuss later.

2.2.3. Part Two: Obligations

In Part Two, the agreement establishes the general obligations that all parties
have in the agreement. They are divided as follows: a) general commitments that
each Party agreed to with respect to its territory; b) to establish their own high
levels of protection; c) to promote the publication of their own environmental
legislation; d) to effectively enforce their own environmental laws; e) to permit
interested persons private access to remedies and; f) to respect certain
procedural guaranties.

A) General Commitments

In Article 2, the parties established their general commitments and the activities
each Party agreed to perform with respect to its territory. The general
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commitments are focused in several subjects such as publicity, environmental
education, environmental research and environmental policy.130

In the case of publicity, each Party shall prepare and make publicly available
reports of the state of the environment. This commitment is, in the opinion of the
author, an advance since in this way the general public can know the
environmental situation of its city or country and this may indirectly promote
public participation. Related to publicity, is the commitment from the parties to
promote education on environmental matters. This objective is clearly aimed at
preventing pollution by creating an environmental awareness among the
population.

In the case of environmental policy, each Party shall review its environmental
emergency preparedness measures, assess environmental impact procedures
and promote the use of economic instruments for the efficient achievement of
environmental goals. This policy is directly related to environmental emergency
preparedness measures that the parties may review in order to prevent, not only
damages to its own environment, but also to the other parties’ environment.

130 NAAEC supra note 117 and Article 2. However it is important to mention that according to
Article 40,
“ Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to affect the existing rights and
obligations of the Parties under other international environmental agreements, including
conservation agreements, to which such Parties are Party.”
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Related to environmental policy, Article 2 (2), also establishes that the Parties
agreed that each Party shall consider implementing in its law recommendations
developed by the CEC’s Council as established in Article 10(5) B.131 The
recommendations concern public access to information and the establishment of
appropriate limits for specific pollutants. However, since every Party has the
liberty to establish its own level of protection, this recommendation to establish
limits for specific pollutants132 seems very unlikely to be achieved.

Besides the right to establish its own limits, the parties also agreed that each
Party has the right to prohibit the export to the territories of the other Parties a
pesticide or toxic substance whose use is prohibited within the Party's territory,
as established in Article 2 (3). However, in order to adopt such measures, every
Party shall notify the other parties of the adoption of these measures, either
directly or through an appropriate international organization. Also, parties should
permit the adoption and adaptation of other measures established in other
international environmental agreements.

As previously described, a key objective of the NAAEC is allowing public
participation into environmental policy and law enforcement. This commitment,
used in combination with the commitment of the parties to present a report on the
general state of the environment, may create an environmental awareness in the
public that will promote environmentally friendly industry. However, it is important

131 NAAEC supra note 2 Article 2 section 1.
132 Ibid. Article 10 5(B)
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to take into consideration that these reports are based on “official numbers”. Will
they be accurate? The information in the reports could be very different from
those in reality, since much information regarding illegal activities is not available
to the authorities.133

B) Levels of Protection

Article 3 of the NAAEC recognizes the right of every Party to establish its own
levels of domestic protections and environmental development policies and
priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its environmental law and
regulations. In this way, the agreement recognizes the differences of each Party
as set out in the Preamble. Also, Article 3 establishes that every Party shall
ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of environmental
protection and shall strive to continue to improve such laws and regulations.134
This addresses one of the main concerns that the American environmentalist
community had with respect to NAFTA135: the possibility of a downward pressure
on environmental laws and standards, and the creation of pollution havens.

The Mexican government estimates that in Mexico over 80,000 metric tons of municipal waste
are generated every day, up by a factor of eight over just 15 years ago. Yet it is also estimated
that only 70 percent of this waste is collected, and of this, only a small fraction is properly or
adequately transported or deposited in a modern, sanitary landfill Online: SEMARNAT
http://www.semarnat.gob.mx/sma/index.htm (dated accessed: December 8 2000).
134 NAAEC supra note 117Article 3.
135 Kelly, Michael J., “Bringing A Complaint Under The NAFTA Environmental Side Accord:
Difficult Steps Under A Procedural Paper Tiger, But Movement In The Right Direction”, (1996) 24
Pepperdine L. R. at 76.
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Nevertheless, as mentioned by some authors, the concept of “high levels” is very
vague and undefined136 and for that reason it is possible that the goal is more to
prevent a downward movement than to ensure enhancement of standards.137 It
remains to be seen if the NAAEC will help to reach this goal.

C) Publication

In Article 4, the NAAEC establishes that each Party shall ensure that its laws,
regulations, procedures and administrative rulings of general application
respecting any matter covered by this Agreement are promptly published or
otherwise made available in such a manner as to enable interested persons and
Parties to become acquainted with them .138 All parties must publish in advance
any such measure that it proposes to adopt and provide to interested persons
and Parties a reasonable opportunity to comment on such proposed measures.

This commitment is directly related to promoting public participation on
environmental decisions, and reflects the commitment of the U.S. government
that any law or regulations should be publicized, not only to the other Parties but

136 Chamovitz, Steve, “The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for
Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treaty Making”, (1994) 8 Temple Intl. &
Comp. L.J. at 261
137 Ibid.
138 NAAEC Article 4 (1) and (2) are identical to those established in NAFTA Article 1802 (1) and
(2).
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also to the country’s citizens, non-governmental organizations139 or investors,
and that there should be opportunity to submit comments.140

D) Government Enforcement Actions

In Article 5 141, the NAAEC establishes the obligation of each government to
enforce its own legislation with the main goal of achieving high levels of
environmental protection142. The term “appropriate governmental actions” is not
defined. However those actions are listed in a non-exhaustive list in Article 5. The
list of appropriate governmental actions can be divided first into those intended to
have a better control of information about the pollutants: in -site inspection,
record keeping and using licenses, permits or authorizations and initiating, in a
timely manner, judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings to seek
appropriate sanctions or remedies for violations of its environmental laws and

139 N A A EC Article 45 section (1) establish the following definitions:
“1.

For purposes of this Agreement:

"non-governmental organization" means any scientific, professional, business, non
profit, or public interest organization or association which is neither affiliated with, nor
under the direction of, a government.”
140 This changes the way environmental legislation has been created in North America, and
especially in Mexico, where during 1996, the Mexican Government invited NGO’S, citizens,
scholars, unions, investors and the industry to discuss and make recommendations and
suggestions to reform the General Law (Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y Proteccion al
Ambiente). Many of those recommendations were included in the new law and many of the
government suggestions that were criticized by the public were not included.
™ NAAEC Article 5.
142 Nevertheless there are concerns about the real power of this obligation under the NAAEC
because this Article only forces the Parties to enforce their existing environmental laws and not to
establish higher standards. As mentioned by Charnovitz a country that mindlessly enforces its
inadequate environmental law would maintain conformity with this obligation, and moreover a
Party that lowered its law to avoid NAAEC scrutiny would also remain in conformity. Charnovitz
supra note 136.
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regulations, and issuing administrative orders of a preventive, curative and
emergency nature.

Second, are those governmental actions seeking the voluntary participation of
industry: promoting environmental audits, seeking assurances of voluntary
compliance and compliance agreements, publicly releasing non-compliance
information and issuing bulletins or other periodic statements on enforcement
procedures.

Third, are instrumental actions looking for better-trained inspectors or arbitrators.
Finally, are all governmental actions related to disseminating environmental
information such as publicly releasing non-compliance information, and issuing
bulletins or other periodic statements on enforcement procedures.

In Article 5 section 2, the NAAEC establishes that all parties shall ensure that
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative enforcement proceedings are available
under its law to sanction or remedy violations of its environmental laws and
regulations143. In addition, this Article in section 3 establishes that sanctions and
remedies which provide for a violation of any Party's environmental laws144 and
regulations shall, as appropriate, take into consideration the nature and gravity of
the violation, any economic benefit derived from the violation by the violator, the

143 This obligation could be difficult to apply to Mexico, since the remedies under Mexican
legislation could be administrative or judicial but not quasi-judicial.
In this case, “environmental law” should only be considered as the law established in Article
45.2 in the General Provisions, a definition that is considered too narrow.
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economic condition f the violator, and other relevant factors. It also provides for
compliance agreements, fines, imprisonment, injunctions and the closure of
facilities, and for the cost of containing or cleaning up pollution.145

The commitment by the parties to ensure enforcement of their own
environmental law has been mentioned as the birth of a new international
environmental law principle, that is, that each nation has the international
obligation to each other to enforce its own internal law. However, this “new”
obligation is an old principle. International treaties have always established the
obligation

to

enforce

the

laws

necessary

to

implement the

treaty’s

commitments.146

The way every Party addresses its commitments may vary. For example, it is
difficult if not impossible to provide or encourage mediation and arbitration
services within the environmental law in Mexico due to the nature of the
environmental regulations. The Mexican government is responsible to apply the
law of Mexico and is the only body allowed to determine any sanction or impose
any remedy. The participation of arbitrators and mediators seems difficult, since
the capacity to give a legal interpretation is reserved only to the environmental
authorities and the judicial bodies. Moreover, since only environmental

145 NAAEC Article 5. Recognizes and gives effect to the parties internal legislation which sets at
the several elements that should be taken into account to remedy any violation. For example, the
Mexican Constitution established in its Articles 14,16,21 and 22 almost the same type of
considerations that any authority should take before applying any administrative sanction, and the
General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection also recognizes these
elements.
146 Charnovitz supra note 136 at 261.
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authorities can determine fines, remedial actions and in some cases, criminal
actions, this will not permit arbitration, because all the mentioned actions can
only be legally established by government and not by private means.

Nevertheless, there are concerns about the real force of this obligation under the
NAAEC, since this Article only binds the Parties to enforce its existing
environmental laws and not to establish higher standards. As mentioned by
Charnovitz, a country that mindlessly enforces its inadequate environmental law
would maintain conformity with this obligation, and moreover, a Party that
lowered its law to avoid NAAEC scrutiny would also remain in conformity.147

E) Procedural Guarantees

The parties agree to ensure that all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
proceedings should be fair, open and equitable, and to this end shall provide that
such proceedings comply with the due process of law.148 These proceedings
must also be open to the public, entitle the parties to the proceedings to support
or defend their respective positions, and to present information or evidence.
There is also a commitment to make such proceedings the least complicated and
to minimize delay149 and to have the right, in accordance with its law, to seek
review and where appropriate, correction of final decisions. Also, all parties shall
147 Ibid. at 279.
148 NAAEC Article 7.
149 This obligation is more a goal than a reality. From my experience, I can confirm that many
administrative and judicial proceedings in Mexico are taking more time than mandated by law,
and therefore many of its resolutions are made too late to be useful.
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ensure that tribunals that conduct or review such proceedings are impartial and
independent and do not have any interest in the matter in dispute.

Many of the procedural guarantees established in Article 7 are generally
considered to be part of the due process of law. However, this concept of due
process is vague and may be different in Mexico and in the United States or
Canada150 in part because of the differences between Civil and Common Law
systems.

F) Private Access to Remedies

NAAEC Article 6151 establishes the obligation that each Party shall ensure that
interested persons may request the Party’s competent authorities to investigate
alleged violations to its environmental law.152 This proposal is an advance toward
the enforcement of the environmental legislation in all countries.153 However, it is

150 J.F. Smith, “ Confronting Differences in the United States and Mexican legal Systems in the
Area of NAFTA”, (1993) 1 US-Mex. L.J.
151NAAEC Article 6.
“It is important to mention that according to Article 38, a private Party does not have a
right of action against another Party: “ No Party may provide for a right of action under its
law against any other Party on the ground that another Party has acted in a manner
inconsistent with this Agreement."
152 NAAEC Article 7 establishes the general Procedural Guarantees to do so. See supra note
165 and accompanying text.
153 In the case of Mexico, even before the NAAEC, in 1988 the General Law of Ecological
Equilibrium and Environmental Protection established the “denuncia popular"
(public
denouncement) that allows any citizen to denounce before the General Attorney for the
Environmental Protection (PROFEPA) any possible violation of the federal environmental
legislation. In many states the local environmental law also established a similar procedure. This
procedure creates the obligation for the authority to investigate the possible violation upon
litigious denouncement.
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limited to the persons who are legally interested under its law. It is not clear if
citizens of the other two Parties may request an investigation even if not directly
affected by the alleged environmental problem. It seem such remedies are
restricted to those living nearby the contaminated area or only to nationals of the
country that is accused of a lack of enforcement.154

Section 2 of Article 6 also establishes that each Party shall ensure that persons
with a legal interest under its law have appropriate access to information
regarding the enforcement of the Party’s environmental laws and regulations.
This right is given only to those that are legally interested in a particular matter,
and does not include every citizen, or social group or citizens from another Party,
unless they have a direct legal interest in the issue, which is recognized by law or
a court.155

These remedies include rights such as the right: (a) to sue another person under
that Party's jurisdiction for damages;(b) to seek sanctions or remedies such as
monetary penalties, emergency closures or orders to mitigate the consequences
of violations of its environmental laws and regulations;(c) to request the
competent authorities to take appropriate action to enforce that Party’s
environmental laws and regulations in order to protect the environment or to
avoid environmental harm; or (d) to seek injunctions where a person suffers, or

154 For example, in the case of Mexican legislation, Article 189 of the General Law of Ecological
Equilibrium and Environmental Protection allows any person, social groups, non-governmental
organization or association to denounce any possible violation of the environmental legislation.
1 In the case of Mexico, standing is given by law or recognized by a judge.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62

may suffer, loss, damage or injury as a result of conduct by another person under
that Party's jurisdiction, contrary to that Party's environmental laws and
regulations or from tortious conduct.156

It is necessary to mention that in order to comply with such obligations, all parties
are compelled, if they are not already fulfilling such obligations, to change not
only their environmental law, but also other legislation. For example, in the case
of Mexico, the environmental legislation indicates that whoever created the waste
is responsible for handling and disposal of hazardous waste. The legal basis to
sue the wrongdoers for any damage is contained in the Civil Code and in the
Civil Procedure Code, which allows for the granting of injunctions157, both of
which were amended to comply with the NAAEC.

2.2.4 Part Three: The Commission on Environmental Cooperation

In NAAEC’s Article 8 the parties created an international commission158, the
Commission of Environmental Cooperation (CEC). The CEC is a Commission

156 NAAEC Article 6 section 3.
157 Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y Proteccion al Ambiente (General Law of Ecological
Equilibrium and Environmental Protection) Article 151 and 203. See also Codigo Civil para el
Distrito Federal en Materia Comun y para todo el Pais en Materia Federal (Federal District Civil
Code in Local Jurisdiction and in all the Country for Federal Jurisdiction) Chapter 10.
158 Professor Charnovitz mentions that the status of the CEC is not completely clear, since there
is no provision stating that the Council or the Secretariat has legal personality, despite the fact
that the CEC internal organization resembles an international organization. Charnovitz supra note
136 at 265.
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similar to the Free Trade Commission, and is comprised of the Council, the
Secretariat and the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC).159

2.2.4.1 The Council

A) Structure and Procedures

The Council shall comprise cabinet level representatives or their designees160
and shall establish its own rules and procedures and meet at least once a year in
regular session or in special session at the request of any Party and is chaired
successively by each Party.161

The Council has the power to establish and assign responsibilities to ad hoc or
standing committees, working groups or expert groups; to seek the advice of
non-governmental organizations or persons, including independent experts; and
to take such other action in the exercise of its functions as the Parties may agree.
All Council decisions and recommendations of the Council shall be taken by

159 NAAEC Article 8:
“The Commission
1.

The Parties hereby establish the Commission for Environmental Cooperation.

2.
The Commission shall comprise a Council, a Secretariat and a Joint Public
Advisory Committee.”
160 NAAEC Article 9 (1 ).
161 Ibid. Article 9 (2). And section 4 establishes also that the Council shall hold public meetings in
the course of all regular sessions. Other meetings held in the course of regular or special
sessions shall be public where the Council so decides.
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consensus, unless the agreement provides otherwise162, and such decisions or
recommendations shall be made public, except as the Council may otherwise
decide or as otherwise provided in this Agreement.163

B) Council Functions

The Council has several functions as the governing body of the CEC. It serves164
as a forum for the discussion of environmental matters within the scope of the
NAAEC, oversees the implementation and develops recommendations on the
further elaboration of this Agreement, and eventually reviews its operation and
effectiveness in the light of experience. As well, the Council oversees the
Secretariat, addresses questions and differences that may arise between the
Parties regarding the interpretation or application of this Agreement, and
approves the annual program and budget of the Commission.165 According to
many people, the most important and successful function accomplished by the
Council is to promote and facilitate cooperation between the Parties with respect
to environmental matters.166

162 NAAEC Article 9 section 6.
163 One of the important decisions that the Council may decide is to make public a Factual
Record, as established in Article 15.
16“ NAAEC Article 10(1).
165 The approval by the Council of the budget may be seen as another form of political and
economic control of the Secretariat’s activities and thus it retains ultimate control of CEC
activities. See Johnson and Beaulieu supra 9 at 135.
166 Dimento supra note 89 at 692-694.
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The Council embodies the delicate balance the NAAEC must achieve trying to
reconcile the tensions between sovereignty and supranationality. Among its
functions, the Council may consider and eventually develop recommendations
regarding

several topics,167 such

as:

comparability of techniques

and

methodologies for data gathering and analysis; data management and electronic
data communications on matters covered by the NAAEC; pollution prevention
techniques and strategies; and the use of economic instruments for the pursuit of
domestic and internationally agreed environmental objectives. A very important
function is the promotion of public awareness regarding the environment,
transboundary and border environmental issues, such as the long-range
transport of air and marine pollutants, among others.

The Council, according to Article 10 (3), has a very important function in
strengthening cooperation on the development and continuing improvement of
environmental laws and regulations, including the promotion of the exchange of
information on criteria and methodologies used in establishing domestic
environmental standards. Without reducing levels of environmental protection,
the Council shall establish a process for developing recommendations on greater
compatibility of environmental technical regulations, standards and conformity
assessment procedures in a manner consistent with the NAFTA. The former
function addressed concerns that some environmentalists had over the possibility
of reducing levels of protection to achieve for compatibility. As a result, the

167 NAAEC Article 10 (2).
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Council shall look for compatibility of environmental technical regulations and
standards without lowering standards.

The Council shall encourage effective enforcement by each Party of its
environmental laws and regulations. This may be accomplished as result of the
named citizen submission process, the dispute settlement process168 or by other
means, as far as these means do not interfere with the sovereignty of the Parties.
Preserving sovereignty was an important subject during the drafting of the
NAAEC.169 The Council shall also encourage compliance with those laws and
regulations and technical cooperation between the Parties.170 The Parties are not
under any obligation to accomplish any of these recommendations, since this is
only a topic for Council consideration.

The Council also shall promote and develop recommendations regarding public
access to information concerning the environment held by public authorities of
each Party. This activity is contradictory, since the same Council may vote to
prohibit the CEC’s Secretariat from publishing a factual record as established by
Article 15. Another function that the Council has is promoting the establishment
of limits for specific pollutants, taking into account differences in ecosystems. It is
important to notice that the Parties recognize their environmental differences,
since, in order to promote the establishment of limits to specific pollutants, it is

168 Both processes are an important part of internal legislation enforcement, one with the
participation of NGOs and the other by the Parties.
69 See Section 2.1.
170 NAAEC Article 10 (4).
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necessary for example, to observe the differences between the rain forest in
Chiapas or the rain forest in British Columbia.171

In the more trade-related matters, the Council shall cooperate with the NAFTA
Free Trade Commission to achieve the environmental goals and objectives of
NAFTA, acting as a point of inquiry and receipt for comments from NGO’s and
persons concerning those goals and objectives, providing assistance in
consultations under Article 1114 of the NAFTA, and thereby contributing to the
prevention or resolution of environment-related trade disputes.172

As well, the Council shall assist the Free Trade Commission to achieve the
environmental goals and objectives of NAFTA by: (a) acting as a point of inquiry
and receipt for comments from non-governmental organizations and persons
concerning those goals and objectives; (b) providing assistance in consultations
under Article 1114 of the NAFTA when a Party considers that another Party is
waiving or derogating from, or offering to waive or otherwise derogate from, an
environmental measure as an encouragement to establish, acquire, expand or
retain an investment of an investor, with a view to avoiding any such
encouragement, considering on an ongoing basis the environmental effects of

171 Johnson and Beaulieu suggest that this function may be used in the future to allow the CEC to
represent the three Parties in an international conference regarding pollution control and to
present a NAFTA-NAAEC system or standard for certain pollutants, which the Parties chose as a
role model, supra 9 at 145.
172
This can be reached by (i) seeking to avoid disputes between the Parties, (ii) making
recommendations to the Free Trade Commission with respect to the avoidance of such disputes,
and (iii) identifying experts able to provide information or technical advice to NAFTA committees,
working groups and other NAFTA bodies.
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the NAFTA and; (c) otherwise assisting the Free Trade Commission in
environment-related matters.

In contributing to the prevention or resolution of environment-related trade
disputes, the Council shall seek to avoid disputes between the Parties, make
recommendations to the Free Trade Commission with respect to the avoidance
of such disputes, and identify experts able to provide information or technical
advice to NAFTA committees, working groups and other NAFTA bodies.

The Council also has the power to develop recommendations in the following
areas: (a) transboundary environmental impacts on certain proposed projects
that are “likely to cause significant adverse transboundary effects”;(b) notification,
sharing of relevant information and consultation between the Parties with respect
to such projects; and; (c) on measures to mitigate the adverse environmental
potential effects.173 As a result, in June 1997, the parties resolved to complete a
“legally-binding” agreement consistent with their Article 10 (7) obligations.174

173

Also Article 10 sections 8 and 9 establish other power, which allows the Council to develop
recommendations on transboundary pollution. As follows:
“8.
The Council shall encourage the establishment by each Party of appropriate
administrative procedures pursuant to its environmental laws to permit another Party to
seek the reduction, elimination or mitigation of transboundary pollution on a reciprocal
basis.
9.
The Council shall consider and, as appropriate, develop recommendations on the
provision by a Party, on a reciprocal basis, of access to and rights and remedies before
its courts and administrative agencies for persons in another Party's territory who have
suffered or are likely to suffer damage or injury caused by pollution originating in its
territory as if the damage or injury were suffered in its territory."
174 Commission of Environmental Cooperation, Council Resolution No. 97-03, Transboundary
Environmental Impact Assessment (June 12,1997). The first draft was published on fall of 2000.
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2.2.4.2 The Secretariat

The CEC Secretariat is the “executive arm” of the CEC, whose activities are
under the control of the Council. An Executive Director, who is chosen by the
Council for a three-year term, which may be renewed by the Council for one
additional three- year term, heads the Secretariat. This position is supposed to
rotate between the nationals of each Party, and the Council retains the power to
remove the Executive Director.175 The Executive Director has the power to
appoint and supervise the staff of the Secretariat, regulate their powers and
duties and fix their remuneration in accordance with general standards176
established by the Council. The Council also has the power to reject potential
appointments by a two-thirds vote. Despite the fact the NAAEC establishes that
the Executive Director and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from
any government or any other authority external to the Council, its is clear that
with the veto power that the Council has over the proposals, the Council remains

175 NAAEC Article 11 (1).
176 NAAEC Article 11 (2) establishes that “the standards shall provide that:
(a)

staff shall be appointed and retained, and their conditions of employment shall be
determined, strictly on the basis of efficiency, competence and integrity;

(b)

in appointing staff, the Executive Director shall take into account lists of
candidates prepared by the Parties and by the Joint Public Advisory Committee;

(c)

due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting an equitable proportion of
the professional staff from among the nationals of each Party; and

(d)

the Executive Director shall inform the Council of all appointments.”
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a powerful influence over the Secretariat’s personnel, and indirectly exercises
control over the Secretariat.

A) Functions
The Secretariat has four major functions assigned to it under the Agreement: 1)
preparation of the annual report for the Commission; 2) preparation of reports on
other matters; 3) certain duties relating to submissions on enforcements matters;
and 4) providing technical, administrative and operational support to the Council
or any committees or groups established by the Council and such other support
as the Council may direct.177

To perform all these activities the Secretariat shall submit for approval of the
Council the annual program and budget of the CEC, including provision for
proposed cooperative activities and for the Secretariat to
•

contingencies.

respond to

17 fl

B) Annual Report of the Commission

An important function of the Secretariat is to prepare an annual report of the CEC
in accordance with instructions from the Council. The Council revises a draft
report from the Secretariat. This is another mechanism of the Council’s control

177 Article 11 (7) Also establishes that: The Secretariat shall, as appropriate, provide the Parties
and the public information on where they may receive technical advice and expertise with respect
to environmental matters.
178 NAAEC Article 11 (6).
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over the Secretariat. This report covers not only the activities and expenses of
the Commission during the previous year but also the approved program and
budget. Moreover, it also covers actions taken by each Party in connection with
its obligations, relevant information submitted by NGO’s and persons179 as well
as any other recommendations made on any matter within the scope of this
Agreement, and any other matter that the Council instructs the Secretariat to
include.180

This report shall periodically address the state of the environment in the
territories of the Parties; however, there is not any clarification of the content of
the report or how often the Secretariat shall make such a report.

C) Secretariat Reports

One type of report that the Secretariat may prepare on its own initiative is a
report regarding any matter within the scope of the annual program as
established in Article 13. Since there are no restrictions on the matters that this
report may include, as long as it is within the scope of the annual program, this
could constitute an important power of investigation, and theoretically, in the
event of a rejection of an Article 14 submission, the Submitter still has this

,79 The annual report may include citizen submissions or other relevant information that the public
in general had submitted to the CEC for consideration.
180 NAAEC Article 12(7).
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recourse under Article 13.181 Due to the lack of explicit language and guidelines,
it remains unclear when a submission may merit the preparation of a report or
what should be the scope of the report if required. Nevertheless, all this will
depend on the willingness and independence of the Secretariat’s Executive
Director.

Another type of report that the Secretariat may prepare regards any other matter
related to the cooperative functions of the NAAEC. The Secretariat should report
to the Council of its intention to prepare such a report and it may proceed,
unless, within 30 days of such notification the Council objects by a two-thirds
vote to the preparation of the report.182 This Council veto control constitutes
another break in the Secretariat’s power. An indirect control over this report is
that the report shall not include issues related to any Party’s failure in enforcing
its environmental law and regulations, since such matters are addressed by way
of a different process.183

The NAAEC opens the door for the participation of NGO’s, academic persons or
experts in the preparation of this report, since the Secretariat shall obtain the
assistance of one or more independent experts of recognized experience in the
matter to assist in the preparation of the report as well as gathering any relevant
technical, scientific or other information, including information that is:
181 Gal-Or, N., “Multilateral Trade and Supranational Environmental Protection: The Grace Period
of the CEC, or a Well-Defined Role?”, (1996) 9 Geo. Intn’l. Envt. L.R. 53 at 74.
182 Ibid. Article 13(1).
183 The so-called “Citizen Submission Process" of Article 14 and 15 is analyzed in the next
chapter.
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(a)

publicly available;

(b)

submitted by interested non-governmental organizations and
persons;

(c)

submitted by the Joint Public Advisory Committee;

(d)

furnished by a Party;

(e)

gathered through public consultations, such as conferences,
seminars and symposia; or

(f)

developed by the Secretariat, or by independent experts engaged
pursuant to paragraph 1.

After finishing the report, the Secretariat shall submit its report to the Council,
which shall make it publicly available, normally within 60 days following its
submission, unless the Council otherwise decides.

As an example, under this Article, the Secretariat published a report about the
deaths of tens of thousands of migratory birds at the Silva Reservoir in Mexico’s
Turbio River Basin, following a submission filed on June 6 1995 by an NGO
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requesting an investigation into the cause of such deaths.184 These reports may
have some influence in the policies or decision-making within the countries, or at
least bring attention to the specific environmental problems or priorities.185
However, there is no obligation of any kind for the parties regarding these
reports.

2.2.4.3 The Joint Public Advisory Committee

The NAAEC created an interesting body, the Joint Public Advisory Committee
(JPAC) that opens the door for the participation of NGO’s or the public in general.
This advisory group186 is composed of fifteen members, with equal number of
members for each Party and whose members the parties appoint. However,
there is not any clarification about how the members are selected or appointed.

184 See Gal-Or supra note 181 at 74.
185 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 152.
186 The NAAEC in its Articles 17 and 18 also establishes the creation of two other committees,
the national advisory committee and the governmental committees:

“ Article 17:

National Advisory Committees

Each Party may convene a national advisory committee, comprising members of its
public, including representatives of non-governmental organizations and persons, to
advise it on the implementation and further elaboration of thisAgreement.

Article 18:

Governmental Committees

Each Party may convene a governmental committee, which may comprise or include
representatives of federal and state or provincial governments, to advise it on the
implementation and further elaboration of this Agreement.”
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The Council shall establish the rules of procedure for the Joint Public Advisory
Committee; however, it will choose its own chair. The Joint Public Advisory
Committee shall meet at least once a year at the same time as the regular
session of the Council and at such other times as the Council, or the
Committee’s chair with the consent of a majority of its members, may decide.187
Since the JPAC meets at the same time that the Council meets, it gives them the
opportunity to at least make the Council hear their opinion on topics that may be
important.188

The main role of the JPAC is to provide advice to the Council on any matter
within the scope of this Agreement, including the annual program and budget of
the Commission, the draft annual report, and any report the Secretariat prepares
pursuant to Article 13. As well as reporting on the implementation and further
elaboration of this Agreement, it may perform such other functions as the Council
may direct.189 The JPAC also may provide relevant technical, scientific or other
information to the Secretariat, including for the purposes of developing a factual
record under Article 15.190 However, only if the Council allows will a factual
record be available to JPAC.

2.2.4.4 Conclusions

187 NAAEC Article 16 (2) and (3).
188 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 139-140.
189 NAAEC Article 16 (4) and (6).
190 ibid. (5)
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In order to provide a general opinion about the CEC as an international
organization, it is necessary to mention some concerns about the CEC bodies
and its functions.

The Council, the body that rules and controls the CEC, has been highly criticized
by many authors and environmentalists. One of the main criticisms is that the
Council191, which rules and controls all the CEC's decisions, is composed of
political appointees rather than being an independent judicial body. However,
some commentators mention that the ministerial quality of the Council is an
important element for its credibility and success.192 The Council plays a political
role within the CEC and also exercises a control over the Secretariat’s activities,
and in general has several instruments to control all the CEC in general and the
Secretariat’s activities in particular.

Some of the powers that the Council has over the Secretariat and the CEC in
general are used to control their activities. For example, the Council must
approve many of the Secretariat’s activities, even those related to the Citizen
Submission Process. Despite the fact that the budget and the annual program
are prepared by the Secretariat, it is the Council who approves it. The members
of the Secretariat are civil servants that are supposedly free of any influence

191 Baron, D.S., NAFTA and the Environment-Making the Side Agreement Work, (1995) 12 Ariz.
J. Int’l & Comp. L. at 604.
192 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 132.
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external to the Council; however, the Council has the power to veto any
nomination.193 Also, the Council reviews and approves the CEC Annual Report.

The way the members of the JPAC are selected is a main concern, due to the
fact that each Party appoints the members, as is the lack of any basic provision
about their independence and qualifications.194 For example, the Mexican
appointees to the JPAC include environmentalists, business leaders, academics
and representatives from the industry; however, the qualifications of some of
them are not as good as one would expect, and the knowledge that some of
them have regarding international environmental law or the environment is
minimal at best.

The consensus on the JPAC among many commentators is that the role the
JPAC may play with the Council and the Secretariat is poorly defined and such
ambiguity could be used to control the JPAC’s activities within the CEC.
However, this same lack of definition could give the JPAC the opportunity to
provide the necessary information, advice and general input to the Council and
the Secretariat to help them better accomplish their goals.195

The CEC, is not really an independent body since its Council members are
members of the government, and therefore fully responsible to them. Further,
193

a

See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
194 J. Owen Saunders, “NAFTA and The North American Agreement On Environmental
Cooperation: A New Model For International Collaboration On Trade And The Environment”,
(1994) 5 Colo. J. Int’l. Envtl. L. Pol’y. 273 at 296.
95 As mentioned by Dimento, the opinion that the general public has about the Secretariat is, in
general, better than their opinion of the Council. Dimento supra note 89 at 700.
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these officials chose the Secretariat’s Executive Director and even the members
of the Joint Public Advisory Committee. Therefore, many of its decisions may be
more informed by politics than by the protection of the environment.

In conclusion, the CEC is not as independent as some may want, and even if the
Secretariat was composed of independent civil servants and advised by an
independent non-governmental Joint Public Advisory Committee, the CEC is still
controlled by a Council comprised of the three environmental ministries, which
will each likely follow their government’s policies.
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CHAPTER 3 NAAEC: DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEES

3.1 Introduction.

From the beginning of the discussions to create a NAFTA environmental side
agreement196, the Dispute Resolution Regime was a crucial part of such
discussions.197

The approach taken by the parties is a typical process to resolve controversies
within an international agreement. This process includes gradual steps beginning
with consultations, then moving to other attempts to resolve the controversy, and
then to arbitration panels, implementation of the arbitration panel and finally, as a
last resort, penalties for non-compliance. This process is, in general terms,
almost identical to that used in NAFTA chapter 20 that establishes the provisions
for dispute settlement between the parties. The NAAEC dispute settlement
process has two main distinctions: 1) The limited scope of environmental
disputes it covers, restricted to those where there has been “a persistent pattern
of failure “ by a Party “to enforce its environmental law”198; and 2) Its availability
only to the Parties of the NAAEC. In other words, the participation of any NGO’s

196 Saunders supra note 192 at 297
197 Ibid. Canada suggested a different approach that was included in the final draft of the NAAEC
that will include fines but not trade sanctions.
198 NAAEC Article 22 (1).
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or private citizen is not allowed, a departure from the previously mentioned
provisions199, which allow public participation within the CEC.

3.2 General Definitions.

The process to resolve any dispute begins with consultations between the
parties. Any Party may request, in writing, consultations with another Party
regarding whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure by that other
Party to effectively enforce its environmental law.200 Such a request for
consultations must be delivered not only to the Party but also to the CEC’s
Secretariat.201 In order to understand the process it is necessary to define exactly
what “persistent pattern of failure” means, and what exactly “environmental law”
means and includes.

A) Environmental Law Enforcement

It is important to emphasize that measuring “environmental law enforcement” is
extremely difficult. Many of the numbers published by the environmental
199 See generally sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5.
200 NAAEC Part Five.
201 NAAEC Article 22 (1) and (2) The consultation process established in Article 22 sections 1 to
4 also permits that:
“Unless the Council otherwise provides in its rules and procedures established under
Article 9(2), a third Party that considers it has a substantial interest in the matter shall be
entitled to participate in the consultations on delivery of written notice to the other Parties
and to the Secretariat. The target of the consultations is to invite the consulting Parties to
make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter through
consultations under this Article.”
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authorities are not accurate, since many of the violations are not detected.202 And
sometimes a determination is quite subjective and raises certain questions. For
example, if there are many fines and closings of industries due to violations of
the environmental regime in one country does this indicate a lack of enforcement
in that country? Or on the contrary, if there are few fines or closings does this
indicate a lack of enforcement? 203 The answer to these questions may vary from
country to country and even from

person to person. To avoid any

misunderstanding, the NAAEC established a series of practices that constitute
enforcement and describes other practices, which do not constitute lack of
enforcement.

First of all, Article 5 establishes that in order for all parties to achieve high levels
of environmental protection and compliance, each Party shall effectively enforce
its environmental laws and regulations through appropriate governmental actions
such as appointing and training inspectors, monitoring compliance and
investigating

suspected

violations,

on-site

inspections

and

by

seeking

assurances of voluntary compliance and compliance agreements.204

In general, the actions mentioned in Article 5 include not only governmental
actions to directly enforce the law but also actions to promote voluntary

202 For example, in Mexico City the environmental authorities estimate that there are at least 1000
illegal smelters which do not comply with any air emissions standards or any environmental
regulations. SEMARNAT supra note 133.
See generally Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 192 for an interesting discussion about
the difficulty to establish a parameter for lack of enforcement or enforcement, since such activities
may be influenced by economic, social or political decisions.
204 See supra 131 and accompanying text for the entire list of actions.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

82

compliance by the subjects of the environmental legislation. In addition, it also
states that to establish the appropriate sanctions and remedies for any violations,
the authorities should take into consideration the nature and gravity of the
violation, any economic benefit derived from the violation by the violator, the
economic condition of the violator, and other relevant factors.

In order to clearly understand the meaning of such a failure, it is necessary to
relate Article 5 with Article 45 in order to clarify the dispute settlement
and

process,

to find a definition. However, the NAAEC does not establish an exact

definition of what is meant by a failure to effectively enforce environmental laws,
although Article 45 (1) established a negative and indirect one, a contrario
sensus definition. This definition is as follows:

“Article 45: Definitions

1.

For purposes of this Agreement:

A Party has not failed to “effectively enforce its environmental law” or
to comply with Article 5(1) in a particular case where the action or inaction
in question by agencies or officials of that Party:

(a)

reflects a reasonable exercise of their discretion in respect of
investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory or compliance matters; or
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(b)

results from bona fide decisions to allocate resources to
enforcement in respect of other environmental matters determined
to have higher priorities.”205

The first exclusion that the Secretariat and eventually any arbitration panel will
face is whether any action or inaction by the authorities or agency reflects a
reasonable exercise of discretion. This Article recognizes that discretion plays an
important role in enforcement and compliance negotiations, in many areas of law
and environmental laws in particular. As mentioned by some authors, most of the
discovered infractions do not lead to legal actions by the regulating authorities206;
therefore the use of discretion is unavoidable.

In dealing with some

environmental law violations the authorities often use their discretion and
sometimes negotiate with the violators in order to reach the ultimate goal of the
law, the protection of the environment.

It is also important to take into consideration that many laws, environmental or
non-environmental, establish some level of discretion that the authorities may
use, known as explicit discretion.207 However, there are some cases or situations
in which the authorities do not have that explicit discretion but where they have
an implicit discretion, and the authority is exercised de facto. Therefore, any

205 NAAEC Article 45 (1)
206 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 199.
207 Ibid. at 202.
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arbitration panel also may take into consideration these concepts in order to
establish the existence of reasonable discretion.

However, the NAAEC does not establish an exact definition of what is meant by
reasonable discretion. It is necessary to analyze case by case to find if any of the
appropriate governmental actions established in Article 5 to achieve high levels
of environmental protection and compliance were undertaken, and if those
actions really meet the goal of enforcing the environmental law and achieving
high levels of protection.

On the other hand, the analysis may determine whether the discretion used by
the authorities to implement or not implement an action was reasonable or not.
As mentioned by Johnson and Beaulieu, the arbitration panel “will have much
leeway in determining what constitutes a “reasonable exercise of discretion.”208

The second exception to the application of the NAAEC enforcement provisions is
for government inaction based on “bona fide decisions to allocate resources to
enforcement in respect of other environmental matters determined to have higher
priorities”.

This exception has been described not only as innovative but also

as puzzling209 since it is not clear whether it means that a Party complained
against can justify a poor level of enforcement activity for the following reasons:
1) that the overall level of resources that can be devoted to enforcement is

206Ibid. at 203.
209 Ibid. at 204.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85

limited210; 2) that within the environmental protection budget there is a set
financial amount allocated to enforcement; or 3) that within the environmental
enforcement budget the government chooses other more important priorities than
the subject matter of compliance. This last justification is especially difficult to
argue against, since every country has the sovereignty to determine the
importance of every project and establish priorities among them.

Despite its mention as an exception, it is naturally expected that every country in
determining its priorities and therefore establishing the budget to accomplish its
priorities is doing that in the hope, bona fide, to accomplish its goals and not
intentionally damaging other important aspects of its obligations. In other words,
it will be difficult to prove that any Party is not acting in good faith when
establishing its environmental priorities. Some authors211 and environmental
groups are concerned about the possibility that because of a smaller budget the
Mexican government will be allowed to achieve lower levels of environmental
enforcement compared to the United States or Canada.212 In the event of a

210 Ibid. My experience as a practitioner in Mexico helped me to realize that many of the violations
of the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (Ley General del
Equilibrio Ecologico y Proteccion al Ambiente) and its regulations, cannot be prosecuted due to
the lack of resources. I experienced such a problem especially in the Quintana Roo state in the
south east of Mexico, where its landscape with tropical forest, the Caribbean sea and some small
rivers and wetlands made it very difficult for the environmental authorities to verify many
violations regarding flora and fauna protection. Until May 2000 the federal environmental authority
in that state did not have sufficient boats to cover and reach several parts of the state as I was
told “unofficially" by the delegate of the Procuraduria Federal de Proteccion al Ambiente
(PROFEPA).
11 Nicolas Kublicki, “ The Greening of Free Trade: NAFTA, Mexican Environmental Law and
Debt Exchange for Mexican Environmental Infrastructure Development" (1994), 19 Columbia J. of
Env. L. R. 59 at 80-100. Prof. Kublicki establishes that all three parties should be subject to a
uniform standard of review of their enforcement performance.
212 See generally Raustiala, Kal, “International Enforcement Of Enforcement” Under The North
American Agreement On Environmental Cooperation", (1996) 36 Va. J. Int’l. L.
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dispute, any panel will face an almost impossible task to determine whether a
particular government decision was not made in good faith.

B) Persistent Pattern

Finally, in order to initiate the dispute settlement process it is necessary to prove
the existence of a “persistent pattern” of ineffective environmental enforcement,
defined as a “sustained or recurring course of action or inaction beginning after
the date of entry into force of this Agreement”.213 This means that persistent
patterns before January 1,1994 will not be under review, although some authors
believe that such acts should be considered.214 Failure by a Party to enforce its
laws after January 1 1994 or a lack of enforcement before January 1994 could
both provide evidence of a persistent pattern. Overall, the word ’’persistent’
implies an element of duration over time, the meaning of the word “pattern" is not
clear.

The panel may need to review each case on an individual basis. A pattern of
ineffective enforcement may be indicated by a failure to enforce a particular law
through out the country. Or a pattern may be established by evidence of a failure
to enforce environmental laws or regulations in a particular region. The lack of
clarity about this concept will allow the settlement panels to establish the general
rules, or to establish rules on a case-by-case basis. And since this procedure can

213 NAAEC Article 45 (1).
214 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 208.
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potentially

yield

monetary penalties

or trade

sanctions,

the

threshold

requirements to begin this process should be met without any doubt. However,
because of the lack of clarity in its definitions, the standard required seems very
difficult to determine.215

C) Environmental Law

Finally, to initiate the dispute settlement procedure, it is necessary to determine
the meaning of

"environmental law”. Environmental law is defined in Article 45

of the NAAEC as follows:

“For purposes of Article 14(1) and Part Five:

(a)

“ environmental law” means any statute or regulation of a Party,
or provision thereof, the primary purpose of which is the protection
of the environment, or the prevention of a danger to human life or
health, through

(i)

the prevention, abatement or control of the release,
discharge, or emission of pollutants or environmental
contaminants,

215 Kelly supra note 135 at 82.
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(ii)

the control of environmentally hazardous or toxic chemicals,
substances, materials and wastes, and the dissemination of
information related thereto, or

(iii)

the protection of wild flora or fauna, including endangered
species, their habitat, and specially protected natural areas

in the Party's territory, but does not include any statute or
regulation, or provision thereof, directly related to worker safety or
health.

(b)

For greater certainty, the term “environmental law” does not
include any statute or regulation, or provision thereof, the primary
purpose of which is managing the commercial harvest or
exploitation, or subsistence or aboriginal harvesting, of natural
resources.

(c)

The primary purpose of a particular statutory or regulatory provision
for purposes of subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall be determined by
reference to its primary purpose, rather than to the primary purpose
of the statute or regulation of which it is part”.216

216 NAAEC Article 45. [ emphasis added]
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This definition merits some comments. First, the definition excludes any codes of
conduct and other non-binding guidelines, which do not have the legal force of
statute or regulation. Second, the definition does not include any international
treaty that is not self-executed as environmental law217, at least in the United
States and Canada. On the contrary, in Mexico, according to the Mexican
Constitution, any international treaty signed by the President and ratified by the
Senate Chamber is considered enforced law in Mexico and therefore self executed in Mexico.218 Third, the parties did not include any provision that
regulates the managing of commercial harvest or exploitation, or subsistence or
aboriginal harvesting of natural resources, despite its environmental content. The
reason may be economic or political, economic independence in the case of
natural resources and political concerns in the case of aboriginal people.

3.3 Initiation of Procedures.

The process is initiated by requesting consultation before the Council where the
parties are obligated to make every effort to arrive at a mutually satisfactory
resolution of the matter. If the consulting Parties fail to resolve the matter
pursuant to Article 22 within 60 days of delivery of a request for consultations, or
such other period as the consulting Parties may agree, any Party may request in
writing a special session of the Council. The requesting Party shall state in the
217 Charnovitz supra note 136 at 180.
218 Constitution Politics de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Mexican Constitution) Article 133.
See also L. Ortiz Ahlf, Derecho International Publico, 2 Ed. (Mexico Oxford University Press,
2000) at 9.
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request the matter complained of and shall deliver the request to the other
Parties and to the Secretariat. The Council has twenty days in which to
convene.

21Q

In this stage of the process the Council may: (a) call on such technical advisers
or create such working groups or expert groups as it deems necessary; (b) have
recourse to good offices, conciliation, mediation or such other dispute resolution
procedures; (c) assist the parties to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the
dispute, or ;(d) make recommendations. Such recommendations shall be made
public if the Council decides by a two-thirds vote.

The Council also has the

power to decide that a matter is properly covered by another agreement or
arrangement to which the consulting Parties are Party. If so, it shall refer the
matter to the consulting parties for appropriate action under that agreement or
arrangement.220

If the matter has not been resolved between the parties within sixty days after the
Council has convened, the complaining Party may request in writing that the
Council convene an arbitral panel. Such a decision should be made by a twothirds vote. This panel should consider the matter when the alleged persistent
pattern of failure to enforce environmental law relates to a situation involving
workplace, firms, companies or sectors that produce goods or provide services:
(a) traded between the territories of the Parties; or (b) that compete, in the

219 NAAEC Article 23 (1) and (2).
220 Ibid. (3) and (4).
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territory of the Party complained against, with goods or services produced or
provided by persons of another Party.

3.4 The Trade Relationship

This procedure has an important characteristic--a closer relationship to trade
than to the environment, despite the fact that this dispute settlement procedure
was created under the umbrella of an environmental agreement. The dispute
settlement process can only be initiated by a Party, and only in the case where a
trade relationship exists which relates to the alleged persistent pattern of failure.
In other words, only when the environmental misconduct can be related to trade.
If there is no trade connection, no panel can convene and no formal dispute
settlement can take place.221

The trade connection is the main difference between the formal dispute
settlement process established in Article 22 and the one mentioned in Articles 14
and 15 of this agreement, and this difference is the main reason that in the formal
dispute settlement process only the Parties can participate. On the other hand,
any NGO’s or private persons can participate in the citizen submission process
because there is no trade connection requirement.

Another important characteristic of the dispute settlement procedure is that it is
not necessary to prove that because of the persistent pattern of failure in
221 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 178.
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enforcing its environmental law one Party is actually harming the industry of
another Party and therefore receiving more benefits because of its lack of
internalization of the environmental cost. Some authors have defined this
practice as ecological dumping, because the exports are sold below their true
cost since the environmental costs are not properly internalized through
adequate government enforcement.222

However, despite the fact that the dispute settlement process is aimed directly at
the so-called “environmental dumping”, it has an important difference from others
which deal with dumping, such as those mentioned under NAFTA or WTO. It is
not necessary for the complaining Party to show any injury to its producers of
goods or services in the sector where the lack of enforcement by another Party is
alleged, only the potential damage.

Because the dispute settlement procedure is narrowed to those cases of
“environmental dumping” and not to other important environmental cases, there
is the possibility of developing a double standard practice.223 This double
standard practice consists of the creation of two types of classes under
environmental laws: 1) that which includes industries or companies producing
goods and sen/ices that compete with those of the NAAEC parties, and 2) that
which comprises those industries or companies that do not. This unfair practice
may evolve within the partners to NAFTA and that will obviously constitute not
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only an advantage in trade with others like the European Union but also, and
more importantly, have disastrous consequences to the environment in the
territory of that Party.

3.5 The Panel.

A) Panel Selection

The panellists are selected from a roster established and maintained by the
Council. The roster is constituted by up to 45 individuals appointed by consensus
for terms of three years and they may be reappointed. In order to be appointed
as a possible panellist, each individual shall have expertise or experience in
environmental law or its enforcement, or in the resolution of international disputes
or arbitration or other relevant scientific, technical or professional expertise or
experience. Panellist are selected only on the basis of objectivity, reliability and
sound judgment; they must be completely independent and not affiliated with any
Party, the Secretariat or the JPAC, and shall comply with the code of conduct
established for such purpose by the Council.224

In order to select the five-member panel, both parties must agree on the
selection of the chairman within 15 days after the Council voted to convene the
panel. If the parties do not agree within this period of time, the complaining Party
shall select the chair from a list of panellists who are not citizens of that Party.
224 NAAEC Article 25.
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After the chair has been selected each Party shall select two panellists who are
citizens of the other disputing Party. If a Party does not select its panellists within
15 days, such panellists shall be selected by lot from among the roster.225

Despite the fact that there is a roster of panellists, every Party may suggest other
panellists that comply with the requirements of Article 25. However, any disputing
Party also has the power to challenge any individual not on the roster who is
proposed as a panellist by a disputing Party within 30 days after the individual
has been proposed. If a disputing Party believes that a panellist is in violation of
the code of conduct, the disputing Parties shall consult and, if they agree, the
panellist shall be removed and a new panellist shall be selected in accordance
with this Article.226

B) Panel Procedure

225 Ibid. Article 27. In the case that a third Party participates, Article 27 section 2 establishes that
the following procedures shall apply:
“(a) The panel shall comprise five members.
(b) The disputing Parties shall endeavour to agree on the chair of the panel within 15
days after the Council votes to convene the panel. If the disputing Parties are unable
to agree on the chair within this period, the Party or Parties on the side of the dispute
chosen by lot shall select within 10 days a chair who is not a citizen of such Party or
Parties.
(c) Within 30 days of selection of the chair, the Party complained against shall select two
panellists, one of who is a citizen of a complaining Party, and the other of whom is a
citizen of another complaining Party. The complaining Parties shall select two
panellists who are citizens of the Party complained against.
(d) If any disputing Party fails to select a panellist within such a period, such panellist
shall be selected by lot in accordance with the citizenship criteria of subparagraph

(c>-"

Ibid. sections 3 and 4.
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Once the arbitration panel is selected, the panellists must follow the Model Rules
of Procedure established by the Council. Such procedures shall provide a right to
at least one hearing before the panel and the opportunity to make initial and
rebuttal written submissions. No panel may disclose which panellists are
associated with majority or minority opinions, although the disputing parties may
agree otherwise.227

The terms of reference for the arbitration panel shall be to examine, in light of the
relevant provisions of the Agreement, including those contained in Part Five,
whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure by the Party complained
against to effectively enforce its environmental law, and to make findings,
determinations and recommendations in accordance with Article 31(2). These
terms of reference can change if the disputing Parties otherwise agree within 20
days after the Council votes to convene the panel, or if requested by a Party or if
the panel decides it is necessary to seek information and technical advice from
any person or body that it deems appropriate, provided that the disputing Parties
so agree.228

Unless the disputing parties otherwise agree, the panel has 180 days after the
last panellist was selected to present an initial report. Such report should be
based on the submissions and arguments of the parties and on any information
that the experts may submit to them. The initial report may contain the finding of

227 NAAEC Article 28 sections 1 and 2.
228 NAAEC Article 30.
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facts, its determination as to whether there has been a persistent pattern of
failure by the Party complained against to effectively enforce its environmental
law, and any other determination requested by the terms of reference.

If

requested, its recommendations for the resolution of the dispute normally “shall
be that the Party complained against adopt and implement an action plan
sufficient to remedy the pattern of non-enforcement.”229

The parties have thirty days to submit written comments to the panels on its initial
report, which should be taken into consideration by the panel before presenting
to the disputing parties the final, report including any separate opinions on
matters not unanimously agreed. The final report has to be completed within 60
days of the presentation of the initial report.230 The Council shall publicize the
Final Report five days after receiving it.

3.6 Implementation and Enforcement of Final Report.

The initial objective of the dispute settlement process, where a panel determines
that there has been a persistent pattern of failure by the Party complained
against to effectively enforce its environmental law, is to develop a satisfactory
plan to resolve the enforcement failure. The disputing Parties may agree on a
mutually satisfactory action plan, which “normally shall conform with the

229 NAAEC Article 31.
230 NAAEC Article 32.
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determinations and recommendations of the panel”.231 The disputing Parties
shall promptly notify the Secretariat and the Council of any agreed resolution of
the dispute.

If the parties fail to agree on the action plan, an action plan can be designated in
one of two ways. First, where a disputing Party requests that the panel be
reconvened, the panel must determine whether any action plan proposed by the
Party complained against is sufficient to solve the pattern of non-enforcement. If
it is sufficient, then the panel must approve the plan. If not, the panel must
suggest a plan according to the law of the Party complained against. The panel
may, where warranted, impose a monetary enforcement assessment in
accordance with Annex 34. Second, where none of the disputing parties request
that the panel be reconvened, the last action plan submitted by the Party
complained against is deemed to have been adopted by the panel.232

The Parties shall agree whether the action plan is properly implemented. Either
Party may reconvene the panel to determine if the action plan is being properly
implemented or not within 180 days after the adoption of the final action plan.233
If the panel determines that the plan is properly implemented, the dispute is

231 NAAEC Article 33.
232 NAAEC Article 34 (1)b and (3)
233 NAAEC Article 35.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98

finalized. If not, the panel is required within 60 days after it has been reconvened,
to impose a monetary assessment on the Party complained against.234

The Party complained against has 180 days to pay the monetary assessment to
the Council, money that the Council shall use to improve the environmental law
enforcement of the Party complained against. In the event of continuing noncompliance, either with respect to paying the penalty or with respect to
implementing the final action plan, a complaining Party may suspend NAFTA
benefits against the offending Party235 unless that Party is Canada, where the
panel decision may be filed by the CEC before a Canadian Court for
enforcement. It will be treated as a court order, not subject to review or appeal.236

In the case of trade suspension, in other words in the case of disputes between
Mexico and the United States, in considering what tariff or other benefits to
suspend pursuant to Article 36(l) or (2), the complaining Party shall first seek

234 The amount is equivalent to up to 0.007 percent of the total trade in goods between the
parties. NAAEC Annex 34(1).
35 NAAEC Annex 36 B. establishes that:
“1. Where a complaining Party suspends NAFTA tariff benefits in accordance with this
Agreement, the Party may increase the rates of duty on originating goods of the Party
complained against to levels not to exceed the lesser of:
(a)

the rate that was applicable to those goods immediately prior to the date of entry
into force of the NAFTA, and

(b)

the Most-Favored-Nation rate applicable to those goods on the date the Party
suspends such benefits,

and such increase may be applied only for such time as is necessary to collect, through
such increase, the monetary enforcement assessment.”
236 NAAEC Annex 36 A.
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suspended benefits in the same sector or sectors as that in respect of which
there has been a persistent pattern of failure by the Party complained against to
effectively enforce its environmental law. If the complaining Party considers it is
not practicable or effective to suspend benefits in the same sector or sectors,
benefits in other sectors may be suspended, in an amount not greater than the
amount of the monetary enforcement assessment originally imposed.237 A
complete diagram of the process is in Appendix 1.

3.7 Criticisms of the Dispute Resolution Process.

After reviewing the NAAEC’s dispute settlement process, some comments about
the process are appropriate. It is important to mention that the process is almost
identical to that established in NAFTA chapter 20, and therefore follows the same
procedure to resolve any dispute that may arise between parties to an
international treaty. This process starts with consultations then establishes an
arbitration panel and eventually allows for the imposition of fines and trade
sanctions. However, some authors have criticized the way the CEC dispute
resolution process deals with the environment.

237 NAAEC Article 36.
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1. Use of Sanctions

The most widely debated issue among the parties and commentators during the
discussions to create NAFTA’s side agreement was whether the dispute
settlement process would utilize trade sanctions. The process represents one of
the first attempts to enforce environmental legislation, not only in domestic fora,
but also at the international level, and establishes real sanctions for the violations
in the form of fines or even trade sanctions. However, despite the fact that the
possibility to trigger the dispute settlement process and to eventually impose
trade sanctions is very remote, the utilization of trade sanctions to reach
environmental goals has been described as potentially problematic.238

First, in the event that a Panel imposes a fine or imposes duties on exports, the
price would be paid by the consumers and not by the governments, who are
responsible.239 However, the fines are not really penalties since they are returned
to the same Party complained against to improve the environment or the
environmental law enforcement in that country. The money does not really leave
the country. 240

Second, the allocation of such fines will be decided by the CEC and not by the
local authorities, despite the fact that those authorities are the experts in the
238 Johnson, Richard, “ Commentary: Trade Sanctions and Environmental Objectives in the
NAFTA", (1993) Geo. Int’l. L. Rev. at 577.
239 Bugeda, Beatriz, “Is NAFTA up to its green expectations? Effective law enforcement under
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation", (1999) U. Richmond L. R 1591 at
1596.
240 Kelly supra note 135 at 89.
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application of its own law and have knowledge about the best allocation for any
money. By interfering with this process, the CEC will prioritize certain domestic
programs, ignoring local political and cultural concerns for the environment,
thereby interfering with the nation’s free exercise of sovereignty.241 The drafters
of the agreement forgot to recognize that any government is the expert on its
own law, and any CEC’s interpretation and judgement of a domestic law may not
be accurate.242

Third, trade sanctions may have unequal effects between the parties, since
Mexico and Canada rely more heavily on trade with the United States than vice
versa243 The effects of trade sanctions would have more discouraging effects in
Mexico than in the United States, since a larger part of Mexico’s economy will be
affected.244

Fourth, the Commission has very little power. Contrary to what Mr. Clinton
suggested during his presidential campaign245 the Commission only has a limited
power to provide remedies and does not have any power to stop pollution. The
NAAEC provides for panels with the authority to impose monetary “assessments”
but there is no power to stop pollution.

242 Chamovitz supra note 136 at 268.
243 Patton, supra note 102 at 111.
244 Johnson R. supra note 238 at 588.
245 Charnovitz supra note 136 at 275.
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Also, not only does the CEC not have any power to stop pollution but it also does
not have any power to clean up any pollution. If the CEC collects monetary
assessments, it may be used to enhance environmental law enforcement, but not
to pay for the clean-up of hazardous waste sites.

2. Clarity of the Process

The process has been classified as lengthy, cumbersome and full of legal
uncertainties246, for its jumble of procedural hurdles and political trap doors.247
The process is full of ambiguities in many important definitions, like “pattern”,
obligations like “effectively enforce” and exceptions such as “bona fidef decisions
or “reasonable exercise of discretion”. Many of those terms are left to the
arbitration panel to define, and the possible determinations that such panels may
reach are unpredictable, and in some cases may be different from those goals
that the parties were seeking during the negotiation of the agreement.

Because the process is sharply circumscribed and only applies to domestic laws
and only in those cases in which there is a trade relationship, there are several
other concepts that are not defined. For instance, it is not clear if the panel’s
decisions should be taken into consideration for future dispute settlements or not.
Since the panels are selected case by case, there is the danger that the panels

246 Johnson and Beaulieu supra note 9 at 238.
247 Kelly supra note 135 at 96.
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may reach different conclusions about the definitions of the same ambiguous
concepts, thus creating uncertainty.

It is a protracted and cumbersome process. It will take at least 755 days from the
initiation of a complaint to the eventual determination of a trade sanction, when
the same procedure under NAFTA chapter 20 takes only 255 days. This long
procedure may allow the Party complained against to “artificially” end the alleged
violation, by imposing a major fine or closure to an industry. Some countries use
this practice especially when they are accused of violating human rights; in order
to avoid international criticism or trouble they liberate a political prisoner.248

3.

Panels Power

The panels do not have subpoena power to help them obtain the information
necessary to resolve the controversy.249 The absence of the power to collect
information on-site will leave the panels hoping that the parties involved supply
the necessary information. That will depend on the good will of the parties
involved, especially the Party complained against, which may not submit all the
information necessary to prove the existence of a consistent pattern of lack of
enforcement. That lack of power will leave the CEC and the Panels second-

24aCharnovitz supra note 136 at 284
249 Ibid. at 281.
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guessing local decisions, raising concerns about accountability and risking
harmonization to the lowest common denominator.250

The restricted power of the panels to obtain information may be especially
problematic since many of its findings may not be accurate and therefore create
problems about the correct interpretation and application of any environmental
law and standards. It may also prevent knowing the truth about a particular
environmental problem since all the facts may not be known.

4. Public Participation

The dispute settlement process in the NAAEC is almost identical to that
established in NAFTA chapter 20, including consultations, arbitration panel and
eventual fines and trade sanctions. This is similar to most international dispute
settlement processes. On the other hand, the main difference between the
NAAEC’s dispute settlement process and that established in Article 14 and 15 of
the NAEEC is that it is limited only to parties and not open to the general public.
On the contrary, the Citizen Submission Process established in Articles 14 and
15 is open only to the general public, including citizens and NGO’s who are
allowed to make submissions before the Secretariat and criticize a Party for
failing to enforce its environmental law.

250 Patton supra note 102 at 110.
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Since the arbitration process is only open to parties and not citizens or NGO’s,
they are not allowed to submit or present before the CEC or arbitration panels
any important information, proofs or other documents that may be useful to
determine the truth behind the dispute.

In conclusion, it is important to mention that because of the difficulties of proving
a “persistent pattern of failure by the Party complained against to effectively
enforce its environmental law” as well as to establish a trade connection, it
seems that it will be very difficult to initiate any dispute settlement process.
Moreover, in the improbable event of a dispute settlement process being
initiated, it seems unlikely that trade sanctions or fines will be imposed on any
Party. As mentioned by one author, the “teeth” that were provided to the NAAEC
may never bite.251

251 Saunders supra note 192 at 302.
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CHAPTER 4. NAAEC- CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS

4.1 Introduction.

The NAAEC establishes a process that allows any citizen or NGO to participate
in environmental law enforcement and indirectly to help the Parties to reach the
Agreement’s goals. This process permits the CEC’s Secretariat to investigate
when a Party is accused of failing to enforce its own environmental laws, and has
captured the most attention of environmental groups, private sector and legal
specialists in North America.252

First, I will describe the Article 14 and 15 process in order to determine what the
requirements are to file a citizen submission before the CEC and to determine
how the process develops to its final stage. Later, I will evaluate the process and
give some suggestions for its improvement.

4.2 The Submission: Article 14 (1).

Pursuant to Article 14 of the NAAEC, any nongovernmental organization or
person253 may file a submission with the Secretariat claiming that a Party to the

252 Bugueda supra note 239 at 1596.
253 Any non-governmental organization or person established or residing in the territory of a Party
to the Agreement may make a submission on enforcement matters for consideration by the
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NAAEC is “failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws.” The scope of the
Article 14 process is limited in three ways: 1) it is related only to environmental
laws; 2) it is related to failures to “effectively enforce” such environmental laws; 3)
it applies only to failures fitting into the first two categories that are ongoing.
These three concepts are reviewed only briefly below, as they were discussed
earlier.254

A) Environmental Law

The agreement defines environmental law to include laws whose primary
purpose is the protection of the environment or the prevention of a danger to
human life or health, as established in Article 45 (2). It excludes at least two
types of provisions from treatment under the citizen submission process. The first
is the exploitation and harvesting of natural resources. Despite the fact that these
activities may have significant adverse impact on the environment 255, they are
excluded.

The second type of provision excludes consideration of whether international
instruments qualify as environmental law. The Secretariat has concluded that
international treaties should not be taken in consideration unless they have been

Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (“Secretariat”). The term “non
governmental organization” is defined in Article 45(1) of the Agreement.
See chapter 3 section 3.2.
255 Markell, L.D.,” The Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s Citizen Submission
Process”, (2000) 12 Geo. Intl. Envtl. L.R., 54
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imported into domestic law by way of a statute or a regulation pursuant to a
statute.256

B) Effective Enforcement

The NAAEC does not establish a definition of what is considered a “failure to
effectively enforce” environmental laws. However, there is a definition a contrario
sensus of what is not considered a failure to enforce environmental laws. As
established in Article 45(1), these are defined as actions that reflect a reasonable
exercise of discretion in respect of investigatory, prosecutorial, and regulatory or
compliance matters, or actions that result from bona fide decisions to allocate
resources to enforcement in respect of other environmental matters determined
to have higher priority. If a Party complies with Article 45(1), they will be
considered to have effectively enforced their environmental law.

C) Temporal Requirement

The submission should assert that a Party “is failing" to effectively enforce its
environmental law. To prove such a requirement it is necessary to establish only
those acts that occurred after January 1 1994, since the agreement does not
apply retroactively. However, if an alleged violation of an environmental law
occurred pre-1994, it may be a relevant focus for a factual record if the alleged
violation is relevant to whether a Party effectively enforced its environmental law
256 See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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post-1994.

D) Threshold Criteria

In addition to the three limitations Article 14(1) contains in its opening sentence, it
lists six threshold criteria that a submission must meet in order to trigger further
consideration. A submission must:

A) be in writing in a language designated by that Party in a notification to
the Secretariat;
B) clearly identify the person or organization making the submission;
C) provide sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the
Submission;
D) appear to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing
industry;
E) indicate that the matter has been communicated in writing to the
relevant authorities of the Party and indicate the Party’s response; and
F) be filed by a person or organization residing or established in the
territory of a Party.257

257 The Submission should be in English, Spanish or French and any Submission should not
exceed 15 pages of typed, letter-sized paper, excluding supporting information.
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The submission must assert that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its
environmental law and should focus on any acts or omissions of the Party to
demonstrate such failure. 258 In doing so, the Submitter must detail a succinct
account of the facts on which such an assertion is based, and must provide
sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the submission, including
any documentary evidence on which the submission may be based.

As established in the Revised Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement
Matters Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation259 (Guidelines), the Submitter must also identify the
applicable statute or regulation, or provision thereof, as defined in Article 45(2) of
the Agreement. A requirement of the General Ecological Equilibrium and
Environmental Protection Law of Mexico, is that the Submitter must identify the
applicable chapter or provision of this law as required by the Secretariat.260

Any submission must “appear” to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather
than at harassing industry. In determining this, the Secretariat will consider
such factors as whether or not the submission is focused on the acts or
omissions of a Party rather than on compliance by a particular company or

258 For purposes of determining if a submission meets the criteria of Article 14 (1) of the
Agreement, the term “Environmental Law” is defined in Article 45(2) of the agreement.
Council Resolution 99-06 Adoption of the Revised Guidelines for the Submission for
Enforcement Matters under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation Article 5.2
260 The Secretariat even requested that the Submitters of the Rio Magadalena submission further
specify which laws were allegedly not being effectively enforced. See Markell supra note 255 at
557.
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business, especially if the Submitter is a competitor that may stand to benefit
economically from the submission, or if the submission appears frivolous.

As established in NAAEC Article 14(1), before filing any submission before the
CEC, the Submitters must indicate that the matter has been communicated in
writing to the relevant authorities of the Party in question, indicate the Party’s
response, if any, and if applicable present a copy of such response.
Submitter must include,

with

the submission,

copies

The

of any relevant

correspondence with the relevant authorities.261

If the Secretariat determines that all formal criteria have not been satisfied, it
shall issue a notification to the Submitter asking for a new Submission that
conforms to the formal requirements within 30 days. During this period, the
Secretariat may consider new or supplemental information from the Submitter. If no
new or supplemental information is received by the Secretariat within this time
period, or if the Secretariat determines that no response from the Party is merited in
light of the additional information provided by the Submitter, the process will be
terminated and the Secretariat will so notify the Submitter. However, if the
Secretariat determines that the Submission meets the formal requirements, it
conducts a second review to determine whether the Submission merits a
response.262

261 The relevant authorities are those agencies of the government responsible under the law of
the Party for the enforcement of the environmental law in question. Guidelines 5.5.
262 NAAEC Article 14 (2).
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4.3 The Party’s Response to The Submission Article 14 (2) and (3).

Under Article 14(2), the Secretariat must consider whether the Submission
alleges harm to the Submitter. In determining if the submission alleges harm to
any person or the organization that filed the submission, the Secretariat should
take into consideration whether the alleged harm is due to the asserted failure to
effectively enforce environmental law. The Secretariat should also consider
whether the alleged harm relates to the protection of the environment or the
prevention of danger to human life or health (but not directly related to worker
safety or health), as stated in Article 45(2) of the Agreement. Some
commentators have suggested that the notion of harm should be interpreted
broadly for purposes of the Agreement.263

The Secretariat should also review whether the Submission would advance the
goals of the NAAEC and determine if all private remedies have been pursued. To
determine this, the Secretariat will be guided by: (a) whether requesting a
response to the submission is appropriate and whether the preparation of a
factual record on the submission could duplicate or interfere with private
remedies that are being pursued or have been pursued by the Submitter; and (b)
whether reasonable actions have been taken to pursue such remedies prior to
making a submission, bearing in mind that barriers to the pursuit of such
remedies may exist in some cases.
263 Professor Gal-or suggests that “ [B]y recognizing the public nature of the environmental
concerns and harms as well as the public interest to legal standing, the Secretariat has met the
expectations of many environmental activists.” Supra note 181 at 89.
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Finally, the Secretariat should review whether the Submission is drawn
exclusively from mass media reports. If so the submission should be terminated.
Again, there is no time limit for the Secretariat in making this determination.

If the Secretariat determines that no response is merited, it may consider asking
for new or supplemental information during this period or terminate the process.
It is important to note the large discretionary authority given to the Secretariat,
since the Secretariat has the option to simply not consider a submission without
justifying its decisions.264

On the other hand, if the Secretariat determines that the requirements of Article
14(2) are met, according to Article 14 (3), the Secretariat should request a
response from the Party accused. It should notify the Council and the Party and
forward to the Party a copy of the Submission and any supporting documents.
The Party shall advise the Secretariat within 30 days, or in exceptional
circumstances, within 60 days: (1) whether the matter was previously the subject
of a judicial or administrative proceeding; and (2) of any other information the
Party wishes to submit, such as whether private remedies in connection with the
matter are available to the person or organization making the Submission and
whether they have been pursued265. If the matter raised is the subject of a

264 Kelly supra note 135 at 80.
265 NAAEC Article 14 (3).
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pending judicial or administrative proceeding, the Secretariat will terminate the
process.

4.4 Preparation of a Factual Record.

After the Party has responded (or failed to respond within the 30-day response
period), the Secretariat will then consider both the submission and the response
to determine whether it will recommend to the Council the development of a
factual record.266 Again, there is no deadline for this decision. There is no
opportunity for the Submitter to reply to the Party’s response and no formal
criteria for the Secretariat’s decision, although the Guidelines do require the
Secretariat to state the reasons for its decision.267 If the Secretariat decides that
no development of a factual record is warranted, it can terminate the process.
However, if the Secretariat recommends the preparation of a factual record, it
must seek Council approval, which must in turn be by a two-thirds majority
vote.268

If the Council approves preparation of a factual record, the Secretariat is directed
to consider any information that is (a) publicly available; (b) submitted by
interested nongovernmental organizations or persons; (c) submitted by the

266 Guidelines 9.5.
267 Guidelines 10.1.
268 NAAEC Article 15 (1) and (2).
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JPAC; or (d) developed by the Secretariat or by independent experts as
established in NAAEC.269

A factual record is similar to a report on the whole situation aimed at helping the
environmental community become aware of the complaint and problems
submitted before the CEC. The factual record should contain: a summary of the
submission that initiated the process; a summary of the response, if any,
provided by the concerned Party; a summary of any other relevant factual
information; and the facts presented by the Secretariat with respect to the
matters raised in the submission270 and will incorporate, as appropriate, the
comments of any Party.

After the preparation of the factual record, the Council may, by a two-thirds
majority vote, make the factual record publicly available, normally within 60 days
following its submission to the Council271 However, if the Council decides not to
make the factual record available to the public, there is no access to the factual
record by any member of the public including the Submitter.

4.5 The Process.

There are two ways to evaluate the process: by evaluating the process itself or
by analyzing the submissions filed before the CEC.
269 Ibid. Article 15(4).
270 Guidelines 20.
271 Ibid. See appendix 2 for a complete diagram of the Citizen Submission Process.
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4.5.1 Evaluation of the Process

Among the formal requirements, one that is especially complicated and not
defined by NAAEC is the requirement that the complaint be “aimed at promoting
enforcement rather than at harassing” leaving the Secretariat to determine with
all the information available if any citizen submission is “frivolous.”272 The term
frivolous is not defined and it is not clear how the Secretariat will determine
whether the submission is frivolous.

There is no time limit regarding the preparation of the factual record, and no
provision specifically allowing the Submitter to provide additional information. The
lack of time limits is an important failure since in the case of environmental
damages a quick response is critical. Many of the submissions have been waiting
too long for a response from the accused Party, the Secretariat or the Council.
The period of time between the dates a Submitter filed a submission and the final
decision from the Council could take as long as two years.

The lack of deadlines makes the process too long and sometimes the
environment will suffer if decisions or actions are not taken promptly. The period
of time since the beginning of a submission and the decision of the Council on
whether open or not a factual record has been increasing since 1996, from 22
months in the case of the Cozumel Reef submission to 37 months in the Quebec
272 Guidelines 5.4. (B).
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Hog Farms case. The increased time could be explained by two factors, one the
increasing complexity of submissions or by the increasing number of
submissions filed before the Secretariat since 1998. Whatever the case, 36
months is too long a time. It is necessary to reduce the period of time by creating
deadlines to submit a response from the Party accused and also deadlines for
the Secretariat’s activities to review the response, to prepare a factual record and
for the Council to decide whether to open a factual record or not.

Another criticism that the Submission process has received273 concerns its
transparency and openness for participation. The Submitter participation in the
process starts and finishes when a citizen submission is filed before the
Secretariat. After the submission is filed the Submitter can participate only if the
submission is not clear or requires more information. However, once the
Secretariat decides to request a response, the Submitter is not allowed to
participate any further. Only the Secretariat and the Party accused are entitled to
participate in the process. However, in the last phase of the process the other
Parties of NAFTA are allowed to participate, but not the Submitter or any third
person that may have an interest, such as the owner of the industry or project
under review.

Not only is the Submitter not allowed to participate but also most of the important
decisions are made behind closed doors and without providing any reasons. For
example, if the Council decides to not open a factual record despite the
273 Bugueda supra note 239.
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Secretariat’s suggestion, the Council is not obliged to give any particular reason
for its decision. Also, the Party accused is allowed to vote on whether or not to
open a factual record and whether to publicize the factual record. The lack of
transparency may create suspicion about the process and make people think that
the decisions are more political than environmentally oriented. It may be
necessary to change the way the Council reaches its decisions or at least make
them more open.

Another important concern about the process is the effectiveness of the factual
record. The factual record is nothing but a simple report. The Secretariat does
not make a judgement or determine if the Party accused failed to properly
enforce its environmental law. The factual record is only a summary of the facts
presented by the Submitter and the Party involved and the process finishes with
the publication of the factual record. This is unlikely to be an effective sanction.

The only sanction that a Party may suffer from the publication of a factual record
is “criticism” from the general public who become aware of the factual record.
However, the possible benefit that the environment may receive is uncertain. It is
not possible to stop any project pending completion of the citizen submission
process. In the event that a factual record is opened it is likely that by the time
the process is finished the project may also have finished, and the harm to the
environment will have already occurred.
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It is necessary to give a more powerful effect to a factual record since even if a
factual record is opened for an alleged failure of enforcement of a country’s
environmental laws, the record seems difficult to use against the accused Party
given the restrictions inherent in the dispute resolution process established in
NAAEC’s section Five. As mentioned by Bugueda274, to use a factual record in
the dispute resolution process, it is necessary that one Party request its initiation;
secondly, the dispute resolution process is limited to “situation^] involving
workplace, firms, companies, or sectors that produce goods or provide services”
275. In other words, the factual record must be related to trade and the
environment.

On the other hand, the citizen submission process is open to

cases where there is no trade relationship and the submission therefore should
be focused on the acts or omissions of a Party rather than on compliance by a
particular company or business, especially if the Submitter is a competitor that
may stand to benefit economically from the submission. Therefore the possibility
of using a factual record as proof in a dispute resolution process is limited and to
use a factual record to start the process is likely impossible.

4.5.2 The Submissions

Another way to evaluate the Public Citizen Submission Process of Articles 14
and 15 is by reviewing the submissions submitted before the CEC. We will

" 'Ib id . 1603.
275 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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analyze the process by analyzing some of the most important submissions filed
as of October 25, 2001.

Since the establishment of the CEC in 1994, 29 Submissions have been filed
with the Secretariat, of which 18 have been terminated and 11 are still pending.
Of the 18 terminated cases, the Secretariat terminated six Submissions because
they did not satisfy the formal requirements under Article 14(1). Three
Submissions were terminated under Article 14(2)276 since in the opinion of the
Secretariat the submissions did not merit a response from the accused Party. In
five cases the Secretariat did not recommend the preparation of a factual record.
In two cases, BC Hydro and Cozumel, the Council instructed the Secretariat to
prepare a factual record. While in one case (Quebec Hog Farms) the Council
refused to prepare a factual record despite the fact that the Secretariat
recommended that it do so. Finally, the Submitters withdrew their Submission in
one case. Of the 11 pending cases, the Secretariat is currently reviewing the
Submissions with respect to the Article 14(1) requirements in two cases. In five
cases, the Secretariat has not yet decided whether to recommend the
preparation of a factual record under Article 15(1). The Council is currently
reviewing three Submissions in which the Secretariat has recommended
preparation of factual records. Preparation of one factual record by the
Secretariat is pending.

276 See Appendix 3 for a description of the submissions as of October 25,2001.
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In order to assess the results generated by the citizen submission process thus
far we will analyze three submissions filed before the CEC and analyze the
results of each submission.

4.5.2.1 Submission 96-001 on Protection of Reefs in Cozumel,
Mexico

On January 18, 1996, the Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental (Mexican
Center for Environmental Law) and two other environmental organizations, the
Comitd para la Proteccidn de los Recursos Naturales (Natural Resource
Protection Committee) and the Grupo de los Cien Internacional (International
Group of One Hundred), filed a submission against Mexico.277 The submission
concerned the construction of a cruise ship pier on the island of Cozumel in the
Mexican State of Quintana Roo, in the Caribbean Sea.

The Submitters alleged that the construction and operation of the cruise ship pier
would have significant adverse environmental impacts on nearby coral reef
ecosystems, the best known of which is the Paraiso (Paradise) Reef. As such,
the Submitters argued that, under Mexico’s national ecology law, work on the
cruise ship pier must be halted until a proper environmental impact assessment
was completed.278

277 See CEC webpage SEM-95-002 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=3.
278 Ibid.
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The Secretariat determined that the Submitters had alleged a sufficient factual
and legal basis to require Mexico to respond. Following a review of Mexico’s
response, the Secretariat recommended that the Council order the preparation of
a factual record.279 On August 2,1996, the Council adopted the recommendation
and instructed the Secretariat to prepare a factual record.280

The factual record, which was completed and released to the public on October
24, 1997, provided a detailed account of the Mexican laws relating to the
protection of Cozumel’s reefs, and of Mexico’s apparent disregard of those laws
in its effort to approve and complete the Cozumel Pier Project. 281 The factual
record, however, stopped short of expressly finding that Mexico had violated the
NAAEC. It also failed to set forth any specific recommendations or requirements
for M exico.282 As a result, there is considerable debate and uncertainty as to the
meaning of the findings and the significance of the factual record.283

The debate is especially important in measuring the actual value of the factual
record and the response from the authorities, the owners of the pier and the

279 ibid.
280 ibid.
281 Ibid.
282 Ibid.
283 See Susan Ferris, “Oversight Groups Co-exist Uneasily with NAFTA Feeling Powerless,
Environmentalists Grow Frustrated’, A t l a n t a J. a n d C o n s t., (August 2, 1998). This Article
contains a quote from Dora Uribe, an attorney from Cozumel, which states that the “only
conclusion [one] can make... is that this is another bureaucracy with no power.” On the other
hand Gustavo Alanis, President of the Mexican Center for Environmental Law, has declared that
the Cozumel record represented “an enormous victory for international environmental rights.
Public Workshop on the Public History Submissions on Enforcement Maters under Articles 14
and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation” (Commission on
Environmental Cooperation, Montreal December 7 - 8 2000) notes taken by the author during the
workshop.
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general public. Contrary to what the environmental community may think or what
the Director of the Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental Gustavo Alanis
said284 the impact of the factual record has been minimal.

As part of the experience I had as an environmental lawyer in Mexico I was
involved with the Cozumel Pier Project between November 1999 and July
2000.285 During that time, I had the opportunity to interact with the State
Delegation of the PROFEPA. Until early July 2000 there were more than ten
administrative files opened against the owner of the project. Of these
administrative files more than eight were opened between 1995 and 1997, thus
many of them were opened as a result of the factual record.

Nevertheless, the administrative files opened against the Cozumel Pier Project
were still open at least until mid July 2000 because many of them were “cold
files" or in other words they were inactive. It may be that they were literally
“locked away” for political reasons and remerged when a new governor was
elected. Neither the owner of the Pier Project or PROFEPA did anything to solve
the environmental problems that were flagged by the Submitters. The inactivity of
the authorities and the amount of files that were kept unfinished, leads one to
believe that the effect of the factual record was almost nil. Moreover, the
inactivity of PROFEPA is particularly shameful, if we take into consideration that

284 Bugueda supra note 239 at 1611.
285 This experience allowed me to find out the response the authority had to the Cozumel Pier
situation. However, the author does not have the documents necessary to support all assertions
made by the authority, the General Attorney of Environmental Protection (herein after PROFEPA)
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many of those files were directly related to the environmental impact
assessment, which was the main point of critique that the Submitters alleged
against the Mexican government. Not only did the former owner of the project do
nothing to improve the situation he even stopped some activities that a university
laboratory was doing to prevent any harm to the coral reefs, activities that were
part of the conditions established in the environmental impact authorization for
the project.

As a corollary to this submission it is important to mention that when I became
aware of these problems with the Cozumel Pier Project I asked why PROFEPA
did nothing for two years. I was not given an answer. Nevertheless, one answer
is clear: What has been the result of the factual record opened against Mexico?
The answer is very little that is positive.

4.5.2.2 Submission 97-003 on Pollution from Hog Farms in
Quebec, Canada

On April 9, 1997, the Centre Qu6b£cois Du Droit de L ’ Environment (CODE) and
other NGOS filed a submission against Canada and the Province of Quebec
alleging non-enforcement of Quebec’s Environmental Quality Act and Quebec’s
Regulation

Respecting the Prevention of Water Pollution in Livestock

Operations.286 The Submitters alleged that the government of Quebec had failed

286 Ibid.
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to enforce certain environmental protection standards regarding agricultural
pollution originating from animal production facilities, mainly hog farm s.287

On May 8, 1997, the Secretariat determined that the submission complied with
Article 14(1) of the NAAEC. On July 9, 1997, the Secretariat made the Article
14(2) determination and requested that Canada file a response.

Canada’s

response included two main arguments.288

First, Canada asserted that Quebec was effectively enforcing its Environmental
Quality Act and the Regulation Respecting the Prevention of Water Pollution in
Livestock Operations.269 Second, Canada maintained that the preparation of a
factual record by the CEC would be inappropriate because: Canada, particularly
Quebec, effectively enforces the Environmental Quality Act and the Regulation
Respecting The Prevention Of Water Pollution In Livestock Operations-, all the
environmental measures put forward in the agricultural sector met the objectives
and obligations contained in the NAAEC, particularly Articles 2, 4 and 5; the
government of Quebec had just adopted new regulations with respect to
agricultural pollution and new measures to improve the enforcement of the
Environmental Quality Act. In this context Canada argued that, it is not
appropriate to prepare a factual record since the new measures were part of the
process to improve the Act and the regulations in accordance with Article 3 of the
Agreement. Finally, preparing a factual record would not produce any new
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information nor would it shed any new light in view of the information provided in
the response.

On October 29, 1999, the Secretariat recommended that the Council order the
preparation of a factual record290 On May 16, 2000 the Council decided by a twothirds vote against preparing a factual record regarding this submission. This
decision was highly criticized during the JPAC meeting on December 2000
because the Council did not give any particular reasons for the decision.

This decision to not open a factual

record despite the

Secretariat’s

recommendation can be considered a step back for the NAAEC’s credibility.
Previous commentators had thought that the possibility of not opening a factual
record after a Secretariat’s recommendation would be “highly unlikely in practice,
given the voting procedure and the expectations raised by previous public input
into

the

process.”291 However,

contrary

to

what

many

authors

and

environmentalist opined, the Council decided to not open a factual record and
opened the door to suspicion of political deals and cover-ups.

In order to prevent the public losing confidence in the citizen submission process
all the decisions should be made as open as possible. This can be achieved by
permitting the public to known the reasons behind any decisions to open or not

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

127

open a factual record or by allowing them to request clarification of the
Secretariat’s or the Council’s activities or decisions.

Another important lesson learned form this submission is that it is necessary to
establish deadlines for the Secretariat, the Party accused and especially the
Council to reach its decisions or perform its activities. The Council took almost
seven months to reach a controversial decision in this case. Seven months is too
long to reach any given decision, especially regarding environmental matters. It
is necessary to establish strict deadlines for such decisions

4.5.2.3 Submission 98-007 on an Abandoned Lead Smelter in
Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico.

On October 23,1998, the Comite Ciudadano pro Restauracion del Canon del
Padre y Servicios Comunitarios, A.C., filed a submission against Mexico, alleging
that the government failed to enforce its environmental laws with respect to an
abandoned lead smelter in Tijuana in the State of Baja California.292 The
Submitters stated that Metales y Derivados, failed to repatriate to the United
States the hazardous waste that it generated in Tijuana and that its owners and
operators abandoned their company and left behind approximately 6000 metric
tons of lead slag, by-product waste piles, sulphuric acid and heavy metals from
292 See CEC webpage SEM-98-007 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=44
SEM-98-007.
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battery recycling operations.293 The Submitters asserted that Mexico had failed
to enforce its environmental laws through its failure to criminally prosecute the
owner and through its lack of efforts to contain or neutralize the hazardous
waste.294

On March 5,1999 the Secretariat issued determinations under Articles 14(1) and
14(2) and requested a response from Mexico295, On June 1,1999 Mexico filed its
response. However its response was submitted as confidential. Although Mexico
is encouraged by Guideline 17.3 to provide the CEC with a summary of its
response and an explanation of its claim of confidentiality, it does not appear that
Mexico did so.

The Secretariat on March 6, 2000 recommended to the Council to elaborate a
factual record, and on May 16, 2000 the Council decided in a unanimous
decision to instruct the Secretariat to elaborate a factual record regarding the
submission.296 However as of October 25, 2001 the Secretariat has not
elaborated the factual record. Again the lack of deadlines is evident.

Between November 1999 and July 2000, as an environmental lawyer in Mexico I
had the opportunity to advise a company that had a facility where Metales y
Derivados had a facility during the late 70’s early 80's. While preparing to vacate

293 ibid.
294 ibid.
295 Ibid.
296 Ibid.
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the property, the company performed a phase I and II analysis of the soil, and
they found after digging down through one concrete layer, through more soil and
then through a second concrete layer, waste that included lead slag and residues
of piles and sulphuric acid.

When they unofficially reported their findings, the Mexican authority said that the
company must clean up the land despite the fact that they did not generate the
waste. It was clear at that moment that the authority knew that Metales y
Derivados was responsible but they were trying to avoid further involvement with
Metales y Derivados. Not only did the Mexican authorities fail to enforce its
environmental law but also the American authorities failed to notify Metales y
Derivados that the hazardous materials temporally exported to Mexico must be
returned to the United States for its final disposal, nor did the United States do
any follow up. It remains to be seen if the American authorities will be accused in
the future.

4.6 Conclusion.

The citizen submission process marks an advance in the protection of the
environment because it allows citizen participation, albeit limited. Chapter 5 will
discuss further criticisms of the process and suggest changes to improve it.
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CHAPTER 5: SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS.

5.1 Introduction.

The NAAEC is an important step toward achieving a balance between free trade
and the protection of the environment. However, finding the appropriate balance
between sometimes contradictory matters is not easy. Nevertheless, the drafters
of the agreement tried to find a balance by allowing some limited participation of
the general public in the protection of the environment in North America and by
creating a special dispute resolution process where environmental matters can
be considered. Neither approach is perfect and both can be improved.

The NAAEC as an international agreement was negotiated by governments, and
therefore is not easy to modify, since the parties and their respective legislative
bodies must approve any modifications. Nevertheless, as part of this thesis the
author suggests several ways to improve the citizen submission process.

First, it is necessary to perform an analysis and critique of the process.

5.2 The Lack of Deadlines in the Citizen Submission Process.

The citizen submission process timeline has been too long. The process lacks
deadlines to move the process forward or deadlines for providing a final decision

130
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at each of the mandatory stages set out in Articles 14 and 15. This problem is
particularly significant because time plays an important role in the protection of
the environment and the enforcement of environmental legislation.

In the case of Article 14 (1) the agreement states that the Secretariat may
consider a submission from any non-governmental organization or person
asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law if the
Secretariat finds that the submission meets all the criteria established in
paragraph 1. However, there is no specific deadline that the Secretariat must
comply with to verify the relevant criteria. It is clear that given the complexity of
the submissions the Secretariat may need a significant period of time to study it.
However, that period should be limited.

For example, in the case of the submission SEM-01-001 filed on February 14,
2001 by the Academia Sonorense de Derecho Ambiental A.C. (submission
known as Cytar II), the Secretariat determined that the submission met the
criteria established by Article 14 (1) on April 24 2001. It took only two months to
make this decision. However in the case of the submission SEM-00-01 filed by
the Maria Rosa Escalante de Fernandez (submission known as Molymex I), filed
on January 27, 2000 the Secretariat took more than two months to determine
that the submission did not fulfill the criteria established in Article 14. The
Secretariat did not reach its decision until April 25, 2000.

However, in the
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Cozumel Pier submission the Secretariat only took 20 days to reach a decision
about Article 14 (1).297 The timeline is entirely different in each case.

As a result of this review, it is clear that the time to reach a decision about Article
14 (1) was between 20 to 60 days. It is important to mention that it is to be
expected that some decisions would take more time than others due to
complexity or the amount of information available. Nevertheless, it is important to
establish a deadline for the Secretariat to determine whether a submission fulfills
the Article 14(1) criteria.

Further, as established in Article 14 (2), where the Secretariat determines that a
submission meets the criteria set out in paragraph 1, the Secretariat shall
determine whether the submission merits requesting a response from the Party.
Again, there is no deadline for the Secretariat to reach such a decision. Similarly,
there is no time limit on the Secretariat’s internal review of any response received
from a Party. For example, in the case of the Great Lakes submission SEM-98003 the Secretariat received the response from the United States on November
15, 2000 and took almost eleven months to decide to not open a factual
record.298

Even when the Secretariat has reached the decision to recommend opening a
factual record, the Council can take up to six months to decide on the
297 A complete review of the status of the submission can be seen at www.cec.org, visited on
September 2,2001.
298 The Secretariat reached its decision on October 5 2001.
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recommendation, as in the case of the Quebec Hog Farms where the Secretariat
suggested opening a factual record on October 29,1999, and the Council did not
reach its decision until May 16, 2000.299 That is more than six months. The time
to reach a decision of this importance should not be that long, because of the
significant ramifications.

The procedure can only be effective if it resolves all submissions without delay.
The results of the CEC’s activities regarding the citizen submission process have
been mixed. The Secretariat resolved the first six submissions, filed in 1995 and
1996, promptly within a few months. In the only case in which the Secretariat
recommended the preparation of a factual record, SEM-96-01, the Cozumel Pier
case, it did so only five months after the submission was filed. During 1995-1996,
only six submissions were filed. That may be the reason why these cases were
dealt with relatively promptly.

Nevertheless, during 1997 and 1998 fourteen submissions were filed and the
pace of processing the submissions slowed considerably. On September 1998
the Secretariat created a separate unit on submissions and in 1999 only two
submissions were received, allowing the Secretariat to work on those previously
submitted. By September 2000, the Secretariat’s decision on whether to

299 As mentioned by Gustavo Aianis-Ortega and Ana Karina Gonzalez on Comentarios del Centro
Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental, A.C. (CEMDA) sobre las Lecciones Aprendidas en Relacion
con las Peticiones Ciudadanas Contenidas en los Articulos 14 y 15 del Acuerdo de Cooperacion
Ambiental de America del Norte,(Written Comments on the Public History of Submissions made
under Articles 14 and 15 of the North Agreement on Environmental Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, Montreal Canada, December 6, 2000)
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recommend a factual record on submissions SEM Nos. 97-02, 98-04 and 98-05
was still pending.300

It is important to mention that the delay is not only because of Secretariat
inactivity, but also because of delay by the parties and Council. In the case of
SEM-97-02, Mexico delayed its response to submit additional information for
more than one year. It is clear that one reason for the delays is that the
defendant Party is often slow in submitting its response and stricter deadlines
should therefore be imposed to accelerate the process. However in the case of
SEM nos. 97-03 and 97-06, the Council delayed its decision to open a factual
record seven and ten months respectively, after the Secretariat had made the
request. It is essential to establish deadlines for the Council’s activities also.

As mentioned, there is no time limit for the Secretariat to prepare a factual
record.301 The lack of a deadline and the eventual delay may have severe
consequences on the environment. For example, in the Cozumel Pier case, the
Secretariat’s delay in elaborating a factual record allowed the owner of the pier to
finish its construction, and eventually harming the coral reef. By the time the
factual record was published, the project was already finished.302 As mentioned

300 As mentioned by Carla Sbert Legal Officer Submissions on Enforcement Matters Unit during
the Public Workshop held on Montreal on December 6 and 7 2000. In the case of the submission
SEM-98-03 as of September 2001, the decision to whether to open a factual record is still
pending. See the CEC web page at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?varlan=espanol&submissionlD=41
(as visited on September 2,2001).
301 NAAEC Article 15(1).
302 The Cozumel Project's first phase was finished by mid summer 1996 and is still functioning.
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by some commentators, over half of the active submissions remained pending for
approximately two years303 or more.

In the case of submission SEM-97-003,

three years elapsed between the time the submission was filed and Council’s
decision not to develop a factual record.304

Moreover, there is a requirement that a Secretariat recommendation to the
Council and the information that it is based upon be withheld from the public for
30 days after its submission to the Council.305 However, this provision is
impractical and there is not a good reason for its existence, except to delay even
more the preparation of a factual record.

In order to prevent more delays in the submission process and to maintain
credibility with the public and to increase its effectiveness, the process must be
more timely. Reducing the timing required for reviewing, responding to and
processing a submission, and eventually for preparing a factual record is
essential. To accomplish this goal, the suggestions of this author are twofold.

First, it is necessary to establish a 45- or 60- day deadline for the Secretariat to
decide if the submission complies with the criteria established in Article 14, (1)

303 John H. Knox, “Comments on the Lessons from the History of the 14/15 Submissions
Procedure”, (Written Comments on the Public History of Submissions made under Articles 14 and
15 of the North Agreement on Environmental Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
Montreal Canada, December 6,2000).
304 Herve Pegot, “ Comments on the Mechanism for Citizen Submissions on Enforcement
Matters, A Report by the Quebec Environmental Law Centre, (Written Comments on the Public
History of Submissions made under Articles 14 and 15 of the North Agreement on Environmental
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Montreal Canada, December 6,2000)
Guidelines 10.2.
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and (2).

There should also be a stricter deadline for a defending Party’s

response to the Secretariat about a submission. Although Article 14 (3)
establishes a 30-day and 60- day deadline in some cases, that deadline is not
always respected. If a Party does not respond within the deadline, the Secretariat
should be able to continue with the next step of the process. In other words, the
Secretariat should be able to suggest to the Council the preparation of a factual
record. This will force the Party accused to submit its response promptly in order
to avoid the opening of a factual record.

It is also necessary to establish a strict deadline for the Council for voting on
whether or not to open a factual record or to make the final factual record public.
In general, the Council should be able to authorize or decline to develop a factual
record within 60 days and in exceptional circumstances within 90 days. This will
give the Secretariat nine months from the decision to open a factual record to
prepare and develop it. This deadline will permit the reduction of the timeline
from between 18 and 38 months to an average of between 14 and 18 months.

Second, it is necessary not only to establish such deadlines but also to give more
resources to the Secretariat to comply with these deadlines. Two staff members
in the Secretariat assigned to the submissions unit are not enough, and if the
popularity of the process continues to grow, two persons will not be able to
handle the process expeditiously. It is clear that the human and financial
resources assigned to the Secretariat must increase. The Secretariat must have
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adequate resources to attract and retain consistently high-quality staff and
specialized consultants. With enough resources the Secretariat will be able to
fulfill it responsibility and be able to meet its deadlines.

Reducing the timelines will create an expedited citizen submission process and
will maintain the CEC’s high level of credibility in the international community,
since the international community will believe that the Secretariat is doing its
activities in a prompt and diligent way.

5.3 Transparency and Openness of the Process.

The citizen submission process is not characterized by its transparency and
access to the public. Once the submission is filed, all the activities, decisions and
votes are kept behind closed doors and secret from the Submitter and other
citizens that may be interested. The lack of transparency and openness in the
process may harm the credibility of the process and therefore its future.

Once the submission is filed, during its development to the eventual publication
of a factual record, it is not open either to the general public or the Submitter.
Only the Secretariat, the Council, and the Party accused have access to the
information. Moreover, the Party accused has access to a draft factual record
and may even provide comments on the accuracy of the draft.306 Even if the
submission involves a third Party, as in the case of submission SEM-96-001
306 NAAEC Article 15 (5).
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where the allegations involved the developer of the Cozumel Pier, the third Party
is not allowed to submit any allegations to the Secretariat.307

Article 15 (7) establishes that the Council may, by a two-thirds vote, make the
final factual record publicly available, normally within 60 days following its
submission. However one question arises: What are the possible reasons that a
factual record will be kept secret? The factual record might contain confidential
information, such as industrial secrets or infromation related to national security.
However even if that were the case this confidential information could be omitted
and the balance of the factual record made public. Apart from concerns about
confidentiality, it is difficult to suggest any persuasive reasons for not making a
factual record public. If not made public, the factual record has no purpose. Once
a factual record is elaborated, all the records should be public. If this not done,
the record has little or nor purpose.

Another part of the NAAEC that is directed more to keeping the process behind
closed doors than to promoting its transparency is the Council's power to not give
any particular reason for not opening a factual record. Many of those involved
and other interested persons, are concerned about this lack of transparency.

For example, during the Public Workshop on the Public History Submissions on
Enforcement Matters under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation held in Montreal, on December 7 and 8, 2000,
307 Bugueda supra note 239 at 1604.
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members of the Quebec Environmental Law Centre requested several times to
be given a reason why the Council decided not to open a factual record308 on the
submission SEM-97-003 filed before the CEC.

The Council’s power to not open a factual record, a power that appears absolute,
is one of the major criticisms that the citizen submission procedure received
during the Montreal workshop. As mentioned by the Quebec Environmental Law
Centre, this absolute power raises several questions309: Should the Council have
the last word? While Council does direct NAEEC, should it be permitted to
disregard the Secretariat’s conclusions? Is not the Secretariat, which examines
and analyzes submissions, better placed to decide whether a factual record
should be developed? It seems difficult to find any good reason to not open a
factual record. However, I would amend the agreement to make it mandatory for
the Council to give reasons for not opening a factual record. This would prevent
the suspicion of cover ups.

It is clear that any decision from the Council to not open a factual record or
certain other decision-making points within Article 14(1) and (2) should be open
to the public and all its decisions should be reasoned and informed. In order to
maintain the confidence in the process, the parties, the Council and the
308 In the case of submission SEM-97-003, the Council decided, contrary to the Secretariat's
suggestion, to not prepare a factual record and did not give any reason for its decision. See
Council Decision 00-01 dated May 1 6,2000.See
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=240.
Date accessed November 20,2001.

309 Quebec Law Centre supra note 28 at 11.
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Secretariat must act openly and on a reasoned basis.

During the submission

process the Secretariat should allow the Submitters to submit rebuttal or
additional information, and permit the submitting of information or comments on
the preparation of a factual record. All Secretariat recommendations to open a
factual record should be made public as soon as the recommendations are
made.

Moreover, it is especially important to avoid any complex or intricate
requirements that make it difficult to file submissions. The Guidelines should be
reformed to simplify and clarify the process. They should not be reformed with
the intention to require additional information or create additional conditions to
filing a submission. An example of such additional and unnecessary conditions is
the creation of a page limit on a submission or creating a 30-day period after the
Secretariat submits a recommendation to the Council to open a factual record.
These requirements should be eliminated.3’0

It is also important to mention that the Secretariat, its members and the Council
should try to work in a more independent manner without looking for guidance
from the parties. An independent Secretariat is necessary for the credibility of
the process and especially so that it will not be perceived as biased in favour of
either Submitters or Parties. All Secretariat decisions should be based on
carefully reasoned legal interpretations of the Agreement or any Party’s
environmental law rather than the fear of possible adverse reactions or
310 Alanis supra note 299.
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favouritism by one side or the other. The Secretariat must continue to be
independent and work to improve the independence of its staff.

5.4 Effectiveness of the Factual Record.

When the Council authorizes the Secretariat to open a factual record, the
Secretariat shall consider any information furnished by a Party and may consider
any relevant technical, scientific or other information that is publicly available,
submitted by the interested non-governmental organizations or persons, by the
JPAC, or developed by the Secretariat. After gathering all the information
submitted, the Secretariat shall submit a draft factual record to the Council and
any Party may provide comments on the accuracy of the draft within 45 days
thereafter.311

According to Article 12 of the Guidelines a draft and final factual records
prepared by the Secretariat will contain:

(a)

a summary of the submission that initiated the process:

(b)

a summary of the response, if any, provided by the concerned
Party;

(c)

a summary of any other relevant factual information: and

311 NAAEC Article 15 (4) and (5).
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(d)

the facts presented by the Secretariat with respect to the matters
raised in the submission.

The final factual record will incorporate, as appropriate, the comments of any
Party. The final factual record may be public if the Council instructs the
Secretariat to make it public.312

The Agreement and the Guidelines can be criticized on several grounds. First, it
is important to mention that during the Public Workshop313 many commentators
criticized how the decision to open a factual record is reached, and the content of
the factual record.

The decision to open a factual record has been highly

criticized314 because the fact that the Party accused of not enforcing its
environmental law can vote in such decisions is contrary to the principles of
natural justice. As mentioned by Baron “ a decision to not open a factual record
will invariably lead to suspicion of cover-ups and political deal-making that could
seriously undermine the Commission’s credibility315”. By allowing the Party
accused to vote on whether or not to prepare a factual record, the Agreement is
allowing possible political cover-ups or the appearance of a cover-up.

312 Ibid.
313 See generally Written Comments supra note 283.
3™ See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
Baron supra 191 at 611.
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The content and how the information is gathered have also been criticized.
Although the Secretariat can prepare the factual record only from the information
submitted by the parties, the JAPAC, NGO'S or interested persons, it does not
have subpoena power to obtain information. There is no obligation to submit any
information and the Secretariat depends on the good will of the Party or Parties
and others to cooperate with them.

The Party involved in the investigation is not compelled to respond to the
Secretary’s request for more information needed for the preparation of a factual
record. Any information submitted is voluntary. Since much of the information
gathered by the Secretariat is submitted voluntarily this could prevent the
Secretariat from determining whether a violation had occurred. As mentioned by
some authors316, the Party accused could submit information of a vague and
unsatisfactory nature in order to complicate the investigation and make it
impossible to evaluate the facts alleged in a submission. Even worse, Article 21
provides that a Party may notify the Council that any request for information from
the Secretariat is excessive or otherwise unduly burdensome or can even refuse
to submit information by simply providing to the Secretariat written reasons.

On the other hand, the Submitter and third parties involved, such as the owner of
the project involved in the submission, are not allowed to participate or submit
information unless the Secretariat requests it. Neither have they the opportunity

316 Sandra L Priol-Vrejan, T h e NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement and the Power to
Investigate Violations of Environmental Laws”, (1995) 23 Hofstra Law Review 483 at 502.
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to comment on the Party’s response or the draft of the factual record. The lack of
power to initiate its own investigation does not allow the Secretariat to ensure
that the Parties are enforcing their environmental laws. Since the Secretariat
depends on the information submitted by the public and relies only on the
information publicly available or submitted voluntarily by the Parties or the public,
it is susceptible to personal and political agendas.317

Another criticism of the process has been the content of the factual record. As
mentioned by NAAEC Article 15 and Guidelines Article 12, the factual record will
contain only summaries of the submission, and the response, if any of the Party
and also a summary of other relevant information and the facts presented by the
Secretariat with respect to the matter. However, the factual record cannot include
an evaluation or judgment by the Secretariat. There is no recourse to an
arbitration panel or the imposition of any fines.318 The elaboration of a summary
of the submission can hardly be considered a true sanction.

Once the factual record is prepared, the Council must decide whether to make
the factual record public. Even if the factual record is made available to the public
there is no requirement to actually publish the factual record in a newspaper or
anywhere else. The Council’s obligation is to make the factual record available to
the public. However, since the only “sanction” to a Party for not enforcing its

317 Ibid, at 511.
318 Jared Brumfield, ‘1994: The year that Regional Environmental Enforcement Gets Tough? An
Analysis of NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement and Maastrich Treaty",(1993) 16 Int’l. Envtl.
Rep. 959 at 963.
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environmental law is to attract the attention of the general public, how can this be
accomplished if the factual record is not published? If the factual record is not
published it seems very unlikely to generate the public pressure necessary to
force a Party to properly enforce its environmental legislation.

The effectiveness of the factual record was also criticized during the Public
Workshop319. The factual record is only effective because of the impact that this
record may have on the public and the pressure that the public may have on the
Party responsible to enforce its environmental legislation or to change its policy.
Even more, the possible use of a factual record to initiate the formal dispute
resolution process also seems difficult, if not impossible, since this mechanism is
limited to situations involving a trade relationship. Therefore the factual record
appears to be only a symbolic sanction.

Many suggestions have been submitted to the CEC to modify the process. Some
have suggested that the Council should consider a factual record in light of the
CEC’s environmental cooperation programs in order to address possible
solutions to the factual record as established by NAAEC’s Article 10 section 2.320
Another suggestion is to create a mechanism that will permit the Council to
suspend a project at the time the Council instructs the Secretariat to prepare a
factual record.321

Another more aggressive suggestion is the imposition of

319 Public Workshop supra note 283.
320 See Chapter 2 section 2.2.3.1 and accompanying text.
321 Alanis supra note 283.
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monetary penalties322, but this will require a modification to the Agreement,
something that the Parties are unlikely to do. Monetary penalties would create a
hostile and confrontational process, which is not desirable.323

The suggestion of this author is the creation of a follow- up program after the
publication of the factual record. In other words, after the Council has decided to
open a factual record, the Council should invite the Party accused to submit
within six months or a year after the publication of the factual record a program to
address the problem or periodical information on how the problems are being
addressed. This will permit the Council to follow up the case and avoid any
possible restriction on the sovereignty of the parties or interference by the CEC.

Since the Council will invite the Party involved in the factual record to participate,
the decision to participate or not will be voluntary. This will avoid any interference
by the CEC on any internal environmental decisions or policies. After this
invitation, the general public and NGOS need to create the necessary pressure
on the Party to submit a solution plan or to submit annual or bi-annual reports of
the situation. This modification will allow a more active participation from the
general public.

323 As mentioned by Hector Sepulveda of the Confederation Patronal de la Republica Mexicans
(COPARMEX) at the Montreal Public Workshop which was attended by the author.
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In order to permit such follow up, it will be necessary to modify Article 15 of the
NAAEC to permit the Council to invite the Party involved to participate in the
factual record. This modification is not as difficult as some have suggested since
it leaves the enforcement of environmental laws to the Parties and not to the
private citizens or NGOS. It also respects the sovereignty of every Party to
decide how to address problems of lack of enforcement and whether they want to
participate with the CEC. At the same time it will permit private citizens and
NGOS to play their roles by bringing social pressure to bear within their own
territory.

Another important modification that should be made is to allow the use of a
factual record in the Parties Dispute Resolution Process established in NAAEC’s
section Five. As it stands now, to start the Parties Dispute Resolution Process,
first it is necessary that one Party request its initiation. However, this process is
limited to “situation^] involving workplace, firms, companies, or sectors that
produce goods or provide services.” 324 It is therefore limited to disputes related
to trade and the environment. However, the citizen submission process is open
only to cases where there is no trade relationship. Therefore, the use of a factual
record in the parties dispute resolution process is difficult since the two
processes are based on divergent principles.

This should be modified. The NAAEC and its guidelines should permit the use of
a factual record as proof in a dispute resolution process or even to initiate the
324 See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
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process itself. Any Party that decides to start the dispute resolution process
should be able use a factual record in order to prove that the Party accused is
failing to effectively enforce its environmental law. This will give the factual record
a real and tangible effect, rather than simply affording temporary public exposure
and perhaps bringing pressure to bear on a government.
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CONCLUSIONS
In order to address the environmental concerns raised by the existence of a
continent-wide free trade zone, Canada, United States and Mexico created an
environmental side agreement, the NAAEC. Although imperfect, the NAAEC
embodies several processes which were innovative and which have the potential
to resolve difficult conflicts that arise when countries try to maximize trade
without sacrificing the environment. The key innovation is the Citizen Submission
Process, a process that allows citizens and NGOs to make submissions to the
Secretariat asserting that a Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental
laws. This is a tremendous advance, which for the first time in the history of such
agreements allows public participation in the enforcement of international
environmental law.

In general, the process has been well received and praised by environmentalists,
academics and others. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the
process has several important flaws. First the participation of the Submitter is
limited to the presentation of the submissions, not allowing any further
involvement. Only the Secretariat and the Party accused are entitled to
participate during the first phase of the process and in the last phase of the
process the other Parties of NAFTA are allowed to participate, but not the
Submitter or any third person that may have an interest, such as the owner of the
industry or project under review.
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Second, the process is not sufficiently transparent. All the proceedings and
decisions are made behind closed doors. The lack of openness and transparency
in the process fosters distrust and suspicion of political deal-making and coverups. Also, since the Council has several ways to control the Secretariat’s
activities and in general to control and direct the CEC, the decisions of the CEC
could be subject to political and economic influences brought to bear by the
Council.

Third, the process takes too long. There are not strict deadlines for the
Secretariat, the Party accused or the Council’s activities. Given that time is often
of the essence when dealing with the environment, this is a significant flaw.
Decisions should be made quickly in order to prevent further damage to the
environment. Another flaw is the lack of effectiveness of the factual record. After
the publication of the factual record, which temporally creates social pressure on
the Party accused, there is no other significant effect. The factual record itself
does not bring with it any legal consequences, and it can’t be used in the Dispute
Resolution Process.

It is necessary to improve the process in order to reach NAAEC ‘s goals and fulfill
the Parties’ commitment to the environment. First, it is important to increase the
participation of the Submitter. During the submission process, the Secretariat
should allow the Submitter to submit rebuttals or additional information, as well
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as to permit the submitting of information or comments on the preparation of a
factual record.

Second, it is necessary to improve the transparency of the process. All the
Secretariat’s and Council’s activities and decisions must be made openly.
Reasons should always be given and made public. Third, the Secretariat, its staff
and the Council must try to work more independently and base their decisions on
the facts and the Agreement and avoid any political or economic influences in
favour of any Party or Submitter.

Fourth, the process should have strict deadlines for all the parties involved, the
Submitter, the Party accused, the Secretariat and especially the Council. Fifth, it
is important to improve the effectiveness of a factual record. The mere
publication of a factual record is not enough. It is necessary to create a follow-up
plan in order to verify the actions taken by the Party accused to address the
environmental problems set out in the factual record.

Despite its flaws, the Citizen Submission Process was a groundbreaking
innovation and is a model for public participation in any environmental
agreement. The participation of the public in general and the NGO’s in particular
could help the Parties to identify its flaws and improve their enforcement activities
as well as to create a stronger environmental conscience among the citizens of
the three countries.
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The Citizen Submission Process in the NAAEC is likely to remain the same as it
is for the next few years. However, with the discussions of a new Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas, and the concerns about the environment these
discussions have raised, a new agreement may contain a better and more
effective citizen submission process.
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Appendix 1: CONSULTATION AND RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
(a) Consultation and Resolution o f Disputes— Consultations
(b) Consultation and Resolution o f Disputes— Burden o f Proof
(c ) Consultation and Resolution o f Disputes— Initiation o f Procedures
(d ) Consultation and Resolution o f Disputes— Request for an A rbitral Panel
(e ) Consultation and Resolution o f Disputes— Implementation o f Final Report
( f ) Consultation and Resolution o f Disputes— Review o f Implementation
(g ) Consultation and Resolution o f Disputes— Further Proceeding

(a)

Consultations

Step 1
art.22

Deliverance to other
Parties and Secretariat
Art. 22:3

Request o f consultation
Art.22:1

Step 1
art.22

60 days
End

Yes < r

Request of consultation
Art.22:1

Step 1
art.22
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Appendix 1 (b)

Table 2. Criteria for Request of Consultation and Resolution of Disputes
Burden of proof
Persistent pattern of failure

by other Party
to effectively enforce

its environmental laws

Means
The complaining Party must establish
that the ineffective enforcement began
after January 1st, 1994, and that it
formed a consistent pattern over a
certain period of time.
The complaining Party must
demonstrate, if the legislation in
question allows for discretion as to
compliance matters, that such
discretion was exercised unreason
ably by the public authorities o f the
Party complained against.
If the defense it to the effect that nonenforcement is due to allocation of
resources, then the complaining Party
must prove that such allocation does
not follow from a bona fide decision
by the public authorities of the Party
complained against,
The complaining Party must establish
that the primary purpose of the law,
regulation, or provision is the
protection of the environment.
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Appendix 1(c)

CONSULTATION AND RESOULUTION O F DISPUTES
Initiation of Procedures

Step 2
Art. 23

Deliverance to
other parties
and Secretariat

Request o f special
session o f Council
Art. 23:1
20 days
Council convenes to try to
resolve matter
Art. 23:3

possibilities

Council makes
recommendations
A rt. 23:4

Council refers
the matter to
other
Agreement
Art. 23:5

2/3 vote o f Council
60 days
End
Yes
No resolution

Recommendation
is made public art.
23:4

See
step 3
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Appendix 1 (d)

CONSULTATION AND RESOULUTION O F DISPUTES
Request for an Arbitral Panel

Step 3
Art.-24

End

No

Need a 2/3 vote o f Council
Matter relate to trade of
goods or services
At. 24:1

Request for
Arbitral Panel
Art. 24:1

Yes
15 days
Vote o f the parties for
chairing o f panel
Art. 27:1 (b)

15 dayi i f two parties
30 days i f more than two p a rtie s __
_i
f
30 days

Yes

180 days

20 days
The parties may
establish panel’s
term o f reference

Each party selects 2
panelists
Art. 27:1 (c)

Presentation o f panel’s
Initial report
Art. 31:2

Parties may
submit written
comments

60 days
Presentation o f panel’s
Final report
Art. 32:1
15 days
Transmission to Council by
Parties o f Final report + written
views
Art. 32:2
5 days

Publication o f Final
report
Art. 32:3
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Appendix I (e)

CONSULTATION AND RESOULUTION O F DISPUTES
Implementation of Final Report

Step 4
Art. 33

Following Final report, Parties
try to agree on an action plan
Art. 33

No

Yes

60 days
Shall the panel be
reconvened?
See Step 5

Shall there be review o f
implementation?
See Step 5
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Appendix 1 (f)

CONSULTATION AND RESOULUTION OF DISPUTES
Review of Implementation

Step. 5
Art. 34

A request under (a) shall be
made within 60 to 120 days
after Final report.
A request under (b) may be
made no earlier than 180
days after action plan.

(a) Parties did not
agree on action plan
(b) Parties can’t agree
on whether the plan is
fu lly implemented

Request that the panel be
reconvened because:
Art. 34:1

possibilities^^^

Panel is reconvened
u nd er(b)

Panel is reconvened under (a)
No
90 days
-Determination o f
appropriate action plan
-Panel may assess
monetary enforcement

End

•
Complaining
Party
may
suspend the application of
N A FT A benefits (36:1)

or
I f alleged Party is
C A N A D A Commission
shall file in Court the
panel’ s determination

60 days

r -----

i

I f Party fails to pay
i
within 180 days
I f Party fails to pay
■
within 180 days ■

i

- 1

-Determination as to
whether the Party is
enforcing action plan
- I f not, panel may impose
monetary enforcement
assessment

i

i _

Complaining party may
suspend the application o f
N A F T A benefits (36:1)
or
I f alleged Party is
C A N A D A Commission
shall file in Court the
panel’s determination

Further
proceeding
see step 6
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Appendix 1 (g)

CONSULTATION AND RESOULUTION O F DISPUTES
Further Proceeding
Step. 6
Art. 35

Following panel’s
determination by virtue o f
34:5(b)

r -----

no earlier than
180 days

i__
i-----

Request that the panel be
reconvened
determine
whether the party complained
against is fully implementing
the action plan.

on delivery o f the
requpst
f
Council shall reconvene the
panel

60 days

Party is fully implementing
the action plan

Legend
C a n a d ia n d o m e s tic

Panel’s determination

Party is not fully
implementing the action
plan
The complaining party may
suspend the application to that
party o f the N A FT A benefits

(36:2)

e n fo r c e m e n t a n d
c o lle c tio n p ro c e s s

A t the request o f a
party. Commission
may file a copy o f
panel’s determination
in Court - Annex 36 A

180 days
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Appendix 2: THE CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS

(h) Submissions on Enforcement Matters and Factual Records
(i) Requirements for Article 14 Private Submissions

Appendix 2 (a)

PRIVATE SUBMISSIONS ON ENFORCEMENT MATTERS AND FACTUAL RECORDS
| Submission to Secretariat |

End

End

Information
provided to the
Party

no—

whether to consider
submission

no—

whether to request a response

See criteria
Article 14

See criteria
Article 14

yes

lays
Production o f a defense
Whether to request a factual record

End

no—

no
guidelines

res

End

no

2/3 vote by the
council

yes

± ________________
Prpnaratinn o f the factual rernrri hv the S e c re ta ria t

---------------------y -----------------------

yes

V
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Appendix 2 (b)

Table 1. Requirements for Private Submissions
Requirements as to form
1. RESIDENCE (14:1 (f))
Submitter must be a person or an organization residing or established in the
territory325 of any Party.

2. LANGUAGES (14:1 (a))
Submitter must have notified the Secretariat of the language to be used in the
submission.

3. IDENTIFICATION (14:1 (b))
The submission must “clearly identify” the person or organization making the
submission. Requirements as to content.

4. COMMUNICATION TO PARTY (14:1 (e))
The submission must contain proof that the matter has been communicated
to the relevant authorities of the Party complained against and indicate its
response if any.
5. INFORMATION (14:1 (c))

325 For a definition of territory see NAAEC’s Annex 45 regarding country-specific
definitions.
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The submission must provide sufficient information including documentary
evidence to “allow the Secretariat to review the submission.”
6. INDUSTRIAL HARASSMENT (14:1 (d))
The submission must appear to be aimed to promote enforcement rather than
at harassment of industry.
7. HARM (14:2 (a))
The Secretariat will consider whether the Submitter alleges harm to itself.
8. PURSUING PRIVATE REMEDIES (14.2(c))
The Secretariat will consider whether the Submitter pursued private remedies
available in the Party’s domestic forum.
9. MASS MEDIA REPORT (14:2 (d))
Another factor considered is whether the submission is “drawn exclusively
from mass media reports.”

Objectives
10. ADVANCING THE GOALS OF THE AGREEMENT (14:2 (b ))
The Secretariat will consider whether the submission alone or combined with
other submissions “raises matters whose further study in this process would
advance the goals of the Agreement.” N.B. The objectives pursued by the
Agreement are set out in Article 1 (a-j).
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APPENDIX 3: COMPLAINTS SUBMITTED TO THE NAAEC

3.1 Submission 95-001 on the United States’ Endangered Species Act.

The Biodiversity Legal Foundation, along with four other NGOs, including
Mexico’s Consejo Asesor Sierra Madre, filed before the Secretariat the first
submission on June 30,1995 against the United States.326

The Submitters alleged that the enactment of the 1995 Rescissions Act resulted
in a failure to effectively enforce the Endangered Species Act (ESA) because the
new law expressly prohibited the United States Fish and Wildlife Service from
listing new endangered species under the Act during the 1995 fiscal year.327 The
Submitters alleged that the Act contained an unrelated amendment known as the
“Hutchinson Rider” or “ESA Moratorium” and because of that the Fish and
Wildlife Service determined that the Rider affected its enforcement of the ESA’s
listing provision in two ways.

First the Rider prohibited the agency from making final determinations for species
or critical habitat designations for the remainder of fiscal year 1995. Second, the
Rider rescinded $1.5 million from the budget allocated to the program and

326 It is ironic that the first complaint was made against the United States and not against Mexico,
as many NGO’s thought would happen.
327 See CEC webpage SEM-95-001 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=1
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prevented it from offsetting the loss from other programs. The Submitters alleged
that the Rider should not be constructed as an amendment to the ESA, but as a
suspension of the ESA’s enforcement provision, thus violating the NAAEC
provision requiring each party to effectively enforce its environmental laws and
regulations.

The Secretariat noted that although the 1995 Rescissions Act may have
amounted to a breach of the obligation to maintain high levels of environmental
protection, this breach did not provide an appropriate basis for an Article 14
submission, which must be based on a “failure to effectively enforce”
environmental laws.328 The Secretariat held that the phrase “failure to effectively
enforce” referred only to action or inaction by agencies or agency officials, and
not to legislative decisions to limit or suspend enforcement. 329Accordingly, on
December 11, 1995, the Secretariat terminated the process, concluding: “Article
14 was not intended to create an alternate forum for legislative debate.”330

By determining that a Party can diminish environmental legislation through a
legislative decision, the CEC failed to take into consideration Article 3 which
recognizes the right of each Party to set its own level of environmental protection
but also establishes that the Parties should further commit to maintaining high
levels of environmental protection and strive to continue to improve those laws
and regulations. The Secretariat decision in this case is seen by some authors as
328 Ibid.
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a setback in the environmental movement and a rejection of the spirit of the
NAAEC.331

3.2 Submission 95-002 on the United States’ Salvage Logging Rider.

On August 30, 1995, the Sierra Club, together with 27 other NGOs, filed a
submission against the United States.332 The Submitters alleged that passage of
the 1995 Salvage Logging Rider (the Rider) resulted in a failure to enforce all
environmental laws mentioned within by eliminating private enforcement
remedies for salvage timber sales.333 Specifically, the Rider provided that
salvage timber sales would not be subject to administrative review and would
automatically satisfy all federal environmental and natural resource laws. 334The
Submitters

asserted

that

the

Rider’s

language

erected

potentially

“insurmountable obstacles to citizen enforcement of these environmental laws”335

331 Coatney, Jason, “The Council on Environmental Cooperation: Redaction of "Effective
Enforcement "Within the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation”, (1997)
Tulsa L.J. 32 823-42 at 835.
332 See CEC webpage SEM-95-002 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=2
The other co-Submitters were Alaska Center for the Environment, Ancient Forest Rescue,
Friends of the Earth, Headwaters, Hells Canyon Preservation Council, Idaho Conservation
League, Inland Empire Public Lands Council, Institute for Fisheries Resources, Klamath Forest
Alliance, National Audubon Society, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northcoast
Environmental Center, Northwest Ecosystem Alliance, Oregon Natural Resources Council,
Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Pacific Rivers Council, Pilchuck Audubon
Society, Portland Audubon Society, Seattle Audubon Society, Southern Rockies Ecosystem
Project, Western Ancient Forest Campaign, The Wilderness Society, Earthlife Canada
Foundation operating as BC Wild, Environmental Resource Centre of Alberta, Centro Mexicano
de Derecho Ambiental, Grupo de los Cien, and Red Mexicana de Accidn Frente al Libre
Comercio.
333 Ibid.
334 Ibid.
335 Ibid.
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and essentially eliminated “the most effective (and often only) judicial remedies
for [such] violations ....’,336

In a decision similar to that regarding the Endangered Species Act discussed
above, the Secretariat held that “the enactment of legislation which specifically
alters the [operation] of pre- existing environmental laws in essence becomes a
part of the greater body of laws and statutes on the books, This is true even if
pre-existing law is not amended or rescinded.”337 The Secretariat concluded that
the “deemed to satisfy” language in the Rider did not constitute a “failure to
enforce” under Article 14 of NAAEC. Thus, the Secretariat terminated the
process on December 8 ,1995.338

3.3 Submission 96-002 on Wetlands Protection in Alberta, Canada.

On March 20, 1996, Mr. Aage Tottrup, a Canadian citizen, filed a submission
against Canada and the province of Alberta, alleging that they had failed to
effectively enforce water pollution laws in wetland areas 339 Tottrup asserted that
this non-enforcement had resulted in significant adverse impacts on the habitat of
fish and migratory birds.340

339 See CEC webpage SEM-96-002 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=4
340 Ibid.
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In considering whether the submission merited a response from Canada or
Alberta, the Secretariat reviewed Article 14(2) of the NAAEC. 341 Article 14(2)
provides, in relevant part, that uin deciding whether to request a response, the
Secretariat shall be guided by whether...private remedies available under the
Party’s law have been pursued.... 1,342 The Secretariat pointed out that Mr.
Tottrup had already initiated proceedings against the Canadian federal
government in the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, Judicial District of
Edmonton, and that the outcome of that suit was still pending. 343 Accordingly,
the Secretariat determined, pursuant to Article 14(2), to take no further action in
this matter, pending outcome the judicial proceeding in Canada.344

3.4 Submission 96-003 on Environmental Assessment of Fisheries in
Canada.

The Friends of the Oldman River (FOR) a Canadian organization filed the fifth
complaint on September 9, 1996, a submission against Canada.345 The
Submitter alleged that the Government of Canada was failing to enforce the
Canadian Fisheries Act (CFA) and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act
(CEAA). Specifically, the Submitter stated that there are very few prosecutions
under the habitat provisions of the Fisheries Act, and the prosecutions that do
341 Ibid.
342 NAAEC Article 14(2).
343 Ibid.
344 Ibid.
345 See CEC wepage SEM-96-003 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=5
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occur are very unevenly distributed across the country. In fact, the Submitter
alleged that there has been a de facto abdication of legal responsibilities by the
Government of Canada to the inland provinces, and that the provinces have not
done a good job of ensuring compliance with or enforcing the Fisheries Act.346

The Secretariat determined that the FOR submission satisfied the criteria under
Article 14(1) of the NAAEC, and requested a response from Canada.347 In its
response, Canada asserted that a second environmental organization, Friends of
the West Country Association (FWCA), had filed suit in the Trial Division of the
Federal Court of Canada in Alberta on November 7, 1996 sixty days after the
filing date of the submission at issue. According to Canada, the allegations
contained in FOR’s submission were essentially the same as those raised in
FWCA’s lawsuit. As such, Canada contended that the Secretariat was required to
terminate the review process until FWCA’s case was resolved.348

The Secretariat began evaluating Canada’s response by noting that, pursuant to
Article 45(3) of the NAAEC, the term “judicial or administrative proceeding’’ only
refers to actions brought by the Government, not by private parties such as

348 Ibid. Canada based its argument on Articles 14(2) and 14(3) of the NAAEC. As discussed
above in the summary of Mr. Aage Tottrup’s submission, Article 14(2) provides, in relevant part,
that “in deciding whether to request a response, the Secretariat shall be guided by
whether...private remedies available under the Party’s law have been pursued..." Article 14(3)
provides that if "the matter is the subject of pending judicial or administrative proceeding, [ ] the
Secretariat shall proceed no further.”
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FWCA.349 Accordingly, the Secretariat rejected Canada’s argument that Article
14(3) mandated that the review process be terminated. 350 Nonetheless, the
Secretariat determined that Article 14(2) did provide discretionary authority to
terminate the review process in a case such as this, even if an organization
separate and distinct from a Submitter had filed the pending lawsuit. The
Secretariat concluded that the matters raised in the submission bore a close
resemblance to the issues then before the Federal Court of Canada.351 As such,
the Secretariat was “reluctant to embark on a process which might unwittingly
intrude on one or more of the litigant’s strategic considerations - considerations
which weigh in favour of allowing the domestic proceeding to advance without
risking duplication or interference by considering parallel issues under the
[NAAEC].”352 Accordingly, the Secretariat terminated the review process on April
2, 1997. 353

3.5 Submission 96-004 on Military Base Expansion by the United States
Army.

349 See NAAEC Article 45(3). Specifically, Article 45(3) provides that “judicial or administrative
proceeding” means “a domestic judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative action pursued by the
Party in a timely fashion and in accordance with its law. Such actions comprise: mediation;
arbitration, the process of issuing a license, permit or authorization; seeking sanctions or
remedies in an administrative or judicial forum; the process of issuing an administrative order.”
350 Ibid.
351 Ibid.
352 Ibid.
353 Ibid.
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On November 14, 1996, the Southwest Centre for Biological Diversity (SCBD),
an American NGO, filed a submission against the United States.354 The
submissions concerned the United States Army’s expansion of Fort Huahuca in
the state of Arizona. The Army prepared an environmental impact assessment in
connection with the proposed base expansion, but it did not address “cumulative
impacts”, such as the effect of the expansion on regional water resources and
the San Pedro River basin ecosystem.355 SCBD contended that the Army’s
failure to assess these cumulative impacts constituted a failure to enforce and
comply with the National Environmental Policy Act “NEPA”.356 SCBD originally
filed a claim in a domestic court, but were barred by the statute of limitations
under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.

The Secretariat found that the petition met the requirements of Article 14 (1) and
Article 14 (2) and merited a response from the United States.357 The United
States responded with several arguments. First, the United States argued that
the alleged non-enforcement of NEPA occurred before the NAAEC entered into
force and, thus, was not subject to an Article 14 challenge because the NAAEC
was not intended to apply retroactively.358 Second, the United States maintained
that the Army’s environmental impact assessment was consistent with the
requirements of NEPA.359 Third, the United States contended that SCBD had

354 See CEC webpage SEM-96-004 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=8
355 Ibid.
356 Ibid.
357 Ibid.
328 Ibid.
359 Ibid.
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failed to pursue private remedies under domestic law because the NEPA lawsuit
had been untimely.360 Finally, the United States responded that the development
of a factual record by the CEC could adversely affect SCBD’s pending judicial
appeal of the dismissal of a suit brought under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA).361 According to the United States, the ESA lawsuit was based on facts
that were then the subject of its Article 14 submission.362

In its response the United States also cited the Secretariat’s determination in
SEM-95-001, stating that the Article 14 process is not intended to be a forum for
challenging legislative changes to the nature and scope of a Party’s
environmental laws. Due to the United States response the SCBD withdrew their
petition on June 6, 1997.363

3.6 Submission 97-001 on Impact of Canadian Hydroelectric Dams on Fish
in British Columbia.

On April 2, 1997, the British Columbia Aboriginal Fisheries Commission (AFC),
filed a submission against the Government of Canada, alleging a failure to
enforce the Canadian Fisheries Act and National Energy Board Act.36* According
to the AFC, the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and the

Article 14.1 provides that “ [l]f a Submitter informs the Secretariat in writing that it no longer
wishes to have the submission process continue with respect to its submission, the Secretariat
will proceed no further with the submission
” Articles 14 and 15 Guidelines.
364 See CEC webpage SEM 97-001 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=9
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National Energy Board (NEB) had failed to protect the fish and fish habitat on
British Columbia’s rivers from ongoing environmental damage caused by
hydroelectric dams.365 The AFC alleged that the DFO had refused to impose
fines against private hydropower companies for damage to fish habitat and the
NEB had refused to investigate the environmental impacts of hydropower
generation.366 On May 15, 1997, the Secretariat determined that AFC’s
submission satisfied the criteria of Article 14(2) and requested a response from
the Canadian Government.367

On July 21, 1997, the Canadian Government filed its response with the CEC368,
and in its response, Canada agued that a factual record should not be prepared
for the following reasons: (1) the enforcement of the Fisheries Act was the
subject of pending judicial and administrative proceedings; (2) the DFO’S and
NEB’s actions were consistent with the agencies discretionary authority under
Canadian environmental law: and (3) the non-enforcement alleged by the AFC
took place before the NAAEC went into effect.

The Secretariat concluded that Canada’s arguments did not warrant terminating
the Article 14 review process. Accordingly, the Secretariat recommended that the
Council order the preparation of a factual record. On June 24, 1998, the Council
adopted the recommendation and instructed the Secretariat to prepare a draft

365 Ibid. at 119.

366
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factual record369 and on June 11, 2000 the Council authorized the publication of
the factual record.

3.7 Submission 97-002 on Water Pollution in Sonora, Mexico.

On March 15, 1997, the Comite Pro Limpieza del Rio Magdalena (PLRM) filed a
submission against Mexico. The submission alleged that the municipalities of
Imuris, Magdalena de Kino, and Santa Ana, located in the Mexican State of
Sonora, were discharging untreated wastewater into the Magadalena River.370
The CPLRM maintained that these discharges violated the Federal General
Ecology Law, as well as Sonora’s Ecology Law and Sonora’s Water Law. 371 On
June 2, 1997, the Secretariat asked the CPLRM to provide additional information
regarding claims that Mexico and the State of Sonora had “failed to enforce” the
mentioned law s372

On October 6, 1997, the Secretariat determined that the submission complied
with Article 14(1) of the NAAEC.373 Seven months later, the Secretariat issued an
Article 14(2) determination and requested a response from Mexico.374

369 Ibid.
370 See CEC webpage SEM-97-002 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=14
371 Ibid.
372 Ibid.
373 Ibid.
374 Ibid.
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Mexico filed its response on July 29, 1998.375 Mexico argued that most of the
facts contained within the submission occurred prior to the date the NAAEC
came into force and therefore the Secretariat could not legally consider such
facts. Mexico also contended that CPLR failed to exhaust available legal
remedies prior to filing its submission. In response to the statutory violations
alleged by CPLRM, Mexico asserted that it is effectively enforcing its
environmental laws.376

On 13 September 1999, the Secretariat requested additional information from
Mexico under Article 21 (1 )(b), concerning SEM-97-002. The Secretariat has not
received a response. Pursuant to Article 15(1), the Secretariat is reviewing the
submission in light of the Party's response of 29 July 1998 to determine whether
a factual record is warranted.

3.8 Submission 97- 004 on Canada’s East Coast Fisheries.

On May 26, 1997, the Canadian Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) filed a
submission against Canada, the Submitter alleges that the Canadian government
has failed to enforce its law requiring environmental assessment of federal
initiatives, policies and programs. In particular, the Canadian government failed
to conduct an environmental assessment of The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy
375 Ibid.
376 See CEC webpage SEM-97-003 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=15
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(TAGS), as required under Canadian law. By its failure to do so, it is alleged that
the Canadian government has jeopardized the future of Canada’s East Coast
fisheries. Specifically, the EDF asserted that the Canadian government violated
the

Environmental Assessment and Review Process

Guidelines Order

(EARPGO) when it approved and implemented TAGS without first performing an
environmental assessment.377 According to the EDF, at the time that TAGS was
introduced in May 1994, EARPGO was the governing federal law for
environmental assessment. Therefore, TAGS was subject to EARPGO’s
requirements and Canada had no discretionary authority to avoid an
environmental assessment.378

In evaluating the EDF submission, the Secretariat looked to the language in
Article 14(1) of the NAAEC. 379 The Secretariat found significant the fact that the
language in Article 14(1) only refers to situations in which a Party “is failing to
effectively enforce its environmental law.” 380 As such, the Secretariat concluded
that the Article 14(1) submission procedures are not available to private parties
alleging non-enforcement that occurred wholly in the past.

In the written determination on the matter, published on August 11, 1997, the
Secretariat stated that:

377 See CEC webpage SEM-97-004 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=16
378 Ibid.
379 Ibid.
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“The submission refers to an action, inaction or decision, which has already been
completely acted upon over three years ago, with nothing about the decision left
open or unfinished. The submission, filed three years after the decision on, and
the entry into force of, the government’s strategy, provides no indication that the
Party’s failure is continuing or recent. The Secretariat is not aware of any reason
that would have prevented the Submitter from filing its submission at the time it
became aware of the government’s alleged failure to enforce.”381

Therefore the Secretariat stated that the submission couldn’t solely allege a past
failure to enforce environmental law; rather it must allege an ongoing and present
failure to enforce environmental law. Second, if a Submitter does not file a
submission in a “timely manner” , the submission may be deemed inconsistent
with the “temporal requirements” of Article 14(1). Accordingly, the Secretariat
terminated the review process on August 25,1997. 382

3.9 Submission 97-005 on the Biodiversity Convention under Canadian
Law.

On July 21, 1997, three Canadian organizations, the Animal Alliance of Canada,
the Council of Canadians, and Greenpeace of Canada, filed a submission
against the government of Canada. The Submitters alleged that Canada had a

381 ibid.
382 Ibid.
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serious and growing endangered species problem, and that it has failed to enact
federal legislation designed to protect endangered species. It also alleges that
Canada's failure to enact such legislation has implications for the other signatory
countries to the NAAEC. Specially by failing to enforce its regulations in ratifying
the Convention on Biological Diversity signed at the Rio Earth Summit on June
11, 1992 and subsequently ratified by Canada pursuant to an Order-in-Council
on December 4, 1992.383

According to the Submitters, pursuant to an Order-in-Council, the Convention on
Biological Diversity (Biodiversity Convention) is now a legally binding regulation
under Canadian la w .384 However, the Submitters alleged that Canada had failed
to enforce Article 8 (k) of the Biodiversity Convention, which requires that each
country must “develop or maintain necessary legislation and/or other regulatory
provisions for the protection of threatened species and populations.385

On May 26, 1998, the Secretariat issued the Article 14(1) determination. 386 The
Secretariat began by addressing the issue of whether the Ratification Instrument
constituted “environmental law” for purposes of the NAAEC.387 The Secretariat
acknowledged that the term “environmental law” should be interpreted

383 See CEC webpage SEM-97-005 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=17
304 Ibid.
365 This submission represented the first time that the Article 14 process was used to seek
enforcement of an international environmental treaty
386 Ibid.
387 See Determination Pursuant to Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation for the SEM-97-005 dated May 26,1998. Visibly at:
http://www.cec.org/templates/registrytest.cfm ?varlan=english&documentid=159&format=2.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

178

expansively. Nevertheless, the Secretariat found that the Submitters failed to
make a critical distinction

between

‘international’ and

‘domestic’ legal

obligations.388

Based on Canada’s long-standing constitutional principle that the ratification
process does not import international obligations into domestic law absent
implementation by way of statute and/or regulation, the Secretariat concluded
that the Ratification Instrument could not be considered an “environmental law” of
Canada for purposes of Article 14(1). Instead the Ratification Instrument simply
evidenced and constituted “a one time administrative act by a representative of
the executive branch of the Canadian government....” 389

Therefore the

submission was precluded and the Secretariat terminated the process on May
2 6 ,1998.390

3.10

Submission 97-006 on Environmental Assessment of Fisheries in

Canada.

On October 4, 1997, The Friends of the Oldman River (FOR), a Canadian
organization began anew the Article 14 process on its previous submission. 391

388 Ibid.
389 Ibid.
390 Ibid.
391 See Letter from Martha Kostuch, Vice President, The Friends of the Oldman River to Victor
Lichtinger, Executive Director, Commission for Environmental Cooperation, dated Oct. 4, 1997
http://www.cec.org/templates/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=145&format=2>
[hereinafter FOR Re-Submission Letter].
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Six months earlier, the Secretariat had determined that FOR’s submission did not
warrant developing a factual record because legal issues similar to those rose in
the submission were pending before the Federal Court of Canada.392 That case,
brought by The Friends of the West Country Association (FWCAO against the
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and the Attorney General of Canada, was
apparently dismissed in September of 1997. 393 FOR stated that FWCA had
abandoned its application based on information it received post filing.394

On May 8,1998, the Secretariat requested a response to FOR’s submission from
the Government of Canada. 395 Canada submitted its response on July 13,1998.
396 Canada maintained that the matter continued to be the subject of active
litigation because appeals could still be considered397 and also argued that it was
effectively enforcing its environmental laws and that the method by which it
enforced Section 35 of the Fisheries Act and its implementing Directives was “ a
legitimate exercise of its regulatory and compliance discretion.” 398 Canada
stated that the pattern of program implementation and enforcement across the

Ibid. Also see NAAEC Article 15(1)).
393 See FOR Re-Submission Letter, at the CEC webpage at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=5
394 Ibid. The information indicated that of the 21 stream crossings contemplated by the project-inquestion, 19 had never been the subject of authorizations or letters of advice and the remaining
two would undergo an environmental assessment pursuant to the Navigable Waters Protection
Act.
395 See Secretariat determination on Article 14(2) dated May 8,1998,
at:<http://www.cec.org/templates/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=153&format=2>.
396 See Response of the Government of Canada to Submission on Enforcement Matters Under
Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Co-Operation (NAAEC),
Submission No. SEM-97-006, October 4,1997 By Friends of the Old Man (sic) River at:
http://www.cec.org/templates/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=163&format=2>.
397 Ibid.
398 Ibid.
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country was appropriate and that cooperation with provinces increased
enforcement resources and allowed for more effective enforcement.399

On July 19, 1999, the Secretariat recommended that the Council order the
preparation of a factual record.400 However, almost one year later, on 16 May
2000, the Council decided to defer consideration of the Secretariat’s notification
with respect to SEM-97-006, and to direct the Secretariat to review expeditiously
any relevant assertions of facts about other cases that the Submitter may
provide, after having given Canada an opportunity to provide a response to those
assertions and to convey its recommendation to Council for a decision. The
Council

has

not

yet

voted

on

whether

to

adopt

the

Secretariat’s

recommendation401 and there are not any reasons for the two year delay in this
submission.

3.11 Submission 97-007 on the Hydrological Basin of the Lerma Santiago
River, Lake Chapala, Mexico.

On October 10, 1997, the Institute de Derecho Ambiental (the Institute for
Environmental Law or IDA) filed a submission against the Government of Mexico,
alleging that authorities had failed to handle properly an administrative citizen
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complaint by ID A .402 IDA filed a popular denounce, which sought a declaration of
a state of emergency in the Lake Chapala ecosystem, on September 23, 1996.
403 According to IDA, the Procuraduria Federal de Proteccidn al Ambiente (the
Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection or “PROFEPA”) failed to follow the
procedure required by the General Law on Environmental Equilibrium and
Environmental Protection (LGEEPA) with respect to IDA’S popular denounce.404

On October 2, 1998, the Secretariat requested a response from Mexico. 405
Mexico filed its response on December 16, 1998. 406 Mexico responded that it
processed the citizen complaint at issue in accordance with the LGEEPA. 407
Mexico also took the position that the function of the complaint is merely to
inform an environmental authority of potential issues that might be investigated
by that authority.408 Mexico further asserted that IDA’S petition was not properly
before the Secretariat because IDA had failed to exhaust the administrative
recourse provided under Mexican law. 409 In addition, Mexico stated that since
IDA failed to state how the government’s alleged omissions affected or
endangered the environment410 the submission dealt purely with procedure and

402 See CEC webpage SEM-97-007 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=19
403 Ibid.
404 Ibid.
405 Ibid. The Secretariat’s Determination under Article 14(2) is not available for public viewing.
406 Ibid. Mexico’s response is not for public viewing, but it is summarized in the registry.
407 Ibid.
408 Ibid.
409 Ibid.
410 Ibid.
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not the environmental state of Lake Chapala, which was the focus of the citizens’
complaint.411

On July 14, 2001 the Secretariat determined that because Mexico had notified
the Submitter of the existence of an internal decision regarding its popular
denounce two years after they filed the submission the case was still open before
the Mexican environmental authorities, and therefore the Secretariat cannot
review the submission, and decided to terminate the submission.

3.12 Submission 98-001 on Explosions in the Reforma Sector of the City of
Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico.

On January 9, 1998, IDA, together with some of the citizens affected by a series
of explosions in Guadalajara, Mexico on April 2, 1992, filed a submission alleging
that the Federal Attorney General and the Federal Judiciary failed to duly enforce
the LGEEPA in relation to the explosions.412 The explosions, which occurred as
a result of the presence of hydrocarbons and other highly explosive substances
in the underground sewer, killed 204 people, injured 1,460 people, and destroyed
or damaged roughly 1100 buildings. 413 The submission is based on a resolution
dated 28 January 1994, which stayed the proceedings, and on a decision dated 8
February 1994, through which the 6th district criminal court magistrate ruled that

411 Ibid.
412 See CEC webpage SEM-98-001 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=39.
413 Ibid.
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the resolution, against which there is no recourse, had definitively ended the
case.

On September 13, 1999, the Secretariat rejected the initial submission in part
because it failed to connect the incident with a violation of environmental law .414
The Secretariat found that the dismissal of the criminal proceedings did not
constitute a failure to enforce environmental law. 415 As provided by Guideline
6.2, the Submitters filed a revised submission on 15 October 1999. The revised
submission again failed to meet the requirements of Article 14(1) for the same
reasons the original submission did not meet such requirements. The Secretariat
pointed out that Article 14 of the NAAEC provides the “exclusive” process for
NGOs and individuals alleging that a Party is not effectively enforcing its
environmental law s.416 Thus, NGOs and individuals cannot seek enforcement of
Articles 5(1)(j)(1), 6 and 7 via a submission under Article 14 417 and reached the
same conclusion regarding the second submission and terminated the process
on January 11, 2000. 418

3.13

Submission 98-002 on Forestry Operations in El Taray, Jalisco,

Mexico.

414 Ibid.
415 Ibid. Interestingly enough, however, the Secretariat did not reach the issue of whether the
dismissal constituted a failure to enforce against the nine defendants, nor whether failing to
prosecute others constituted a failure to enforce.
*'6 lbid.
417 Ibid.
418 Ibid.
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On October 14, 1997, Hector Gregorio Ortiz Martinez (Martinez) filed a
submission against the Secretaria de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y
Pesca (the Secretary of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries or
“SEMARNAP”) and the PROFEPA, alleging various procedural violations in
processes relating to forestry operations in El Taray.419 This submission, like the
previous one, found its origin in the filing of a denuncia popular (a popular
denounce).420

The Submission noted that further to the order of a "technical audit" to be carried
out at the above-mentioned site, an "inspection visit" was performed, from which
there arose penalties imposed on both the respondent named in the citizens’
complaint and the Submitter, who was found to be jointly responsible. The
Submitter alleged that neither the technical audit nor the inspection visit
constitute an adequate response to the citizens’ complaint filed. 421

The Secretariat found that Martinez’ complaint was more focused on the
management of commercial natural resources - a subject that, under Article
45(2)(b) of the NAAEC, is excluded form the definition of “environmental law.” 422
The Secretariat concluded that the submission failed to meet the requirements
419 See CEC webpage SEM-98-002 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=40
420 See Ibid. Determination in Accordance with Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement for
Environmental Cooperation (June 23,1998)
<http://www.cec.org/templates/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=165&format=2>.
421 Ibid. Determination in Accordance with Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement for
Environmental Cooperation (June 23,1998)
<http://www.cec.org/templates/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=165&format=2>.
422 Ibid.
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established in Article 14(1). 423 The Secretariat issued a final determination and
terminated the process on March 18, 1999. 424

3.14 Submission 98-003 on Solid Waste and Medical Waste Incinerator Air
Pollution and the Great Lakes.

On May 27, 1998, the Department of the Planet Earth, together with eight other
NGOs, filed a submission against the United States.425 The Submitters alleged
that certain EPA regulations and programs to control airborne emissions of
dioxin, mercury and other toxic substances from solid waste and medical waste
incinerators violated and failed to enforce various domestic laws and treaties with
Canada. 426 They jointly alleged that the US EPA incinerator regulations
specifically conflict with the 'virtual elimination of persistent toxic substances' and
'zero emission' standards for Great Lakes pollution control of the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement. The Submitter argued that ratified treaties also
constitute laws of the land by virtue of ratification by the US Senate. According to
the Submitters, the regulations also violated provisions of the Clean A ir Act. 427

423Ibid.
424 Ibid.
425 See CEC webpage SEM-98-003 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=41.
The other NGOs were: Sierra Club of Canada; Friends of the Earth; Washington Toxics Coalition;
National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides; WASHPIRG; International Inst. Of Concern
for Public Health; Dr. J. Cummins, Genetics, U. of Western Ontario; and Reach for Unbleached.

426 Ibid.
427 Ibid.
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On December 14, 1998 the Secretariat determined that the issues raised in the
submission could not be reviewed under the Article 14 process because the
Party’s conduct did not qualify as “enforcement.” 428 The Secretariat determined
that enforcement does not include government standard setting because the
NAAEC’s purpose is not to set environmental standards for the P arties.429 The
Secretariat found support for this determination in Article 3, which recognizes the
right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental
protection 430 and Article 5, which contains an illustrative list of government
actions that constitute enforcement activities.431

On January 14, 1999, the Submitters amended their petition.432 The thrust of
their argument was that the International Joint Committee (IJC) had “taken the
point of view that ‘standard - setting’ approaches for persistent toxic substances
are inappropriate and unworkable.”433 The Submitters maintained that although
end-of-the-pipe emission controls and best available technologies for such
controls are standard-setting methods, none of the alternative programs
contemplated by their submission involved standard setting. 434 Accordingly, the
CEC should not be precluded from considering their submission.

428 See Article 14(1) Determination (December 14,1998) visible at:
<http://www.cec.org/templates/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=188&format=2>.
429 Ibid.
430 Ibid.
431 Ibid.
432 See Revised Submission (January 5,1999) at:
<http://www.cec.org/templates/registrytext.cfm?&varlan=english&documentid=201&format=2>.
433 Ibid.
434 Ibid.
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In its second Article 14(1) and 14(2) determination, the Secretariat reminded the
Submitters that according to both Article 45(2), and the Secretariats previous
determination, an international obligation must be imported into domestic law by
way of statute or regulation before the Secretariat may consider it. 435 The
Secretariat ultimately determined, however, that two of the Submitters’ three
issues warranted a response from the United States. Accordingly, the Secretariat
requested that United States respond only to the first two issues.

In its response, the United States asserted that the Submitters’ allegation
concerning the EPA’s inspection and monitoring activities did not meet the
NAAEC’s requirements because the Submitters failed to: (1) identify which law
the United States was failing to enforce; (2) give the United States an opportunity
to respond to the allegations; and (3) pursue available domestic remedies.436 The
United States also asserted that the Submitters’ allegation concerning Section
115 of the Clean Air Act misstates the law’s requirements.437 The response
states, finally that the United States is taking significant action to reduce
atmospheric deposition of dioxins and mercury from municipal waste combustors
and medical waste incinerators, including deposition to the Great Lakes
ecosystem.438

435 Ibid.
436 See Response of the United States of America to Submission on Enforcement Matters 98-003
Made by the Department of the Planet Earth, Inc., et al. under Article 14 of the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, accessible from the SEM-98-003.
437 Ibid.
438 Ibid.
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On October 15, 2001 the Secretariat decided to conclude this submission since
in the opinion of the Secretariat there was not any sign of lack of enforcement,
since all the incinerators had been visited and tested by the EPA and the EPA
exercised its discretionary powers in a legal manner, and because there were not
signs of any significant or repeated violations to the Clean A ir Act

3.15 Submission 98-004 on the Impact of the Mining Industry on Fisheries
in British Columbia.

On June 29, 1998, the Sierra legal Defence Fund, on behalf of the Sierra Club of
British Columbia, the Environmental Mining Council of British Columbia and the
Taku Wilderness Association, filed a submission against the Government of
Canada.439 The Submitters alleged that the Canadian government had
systematically failed to enforce a law that protects fish and fish habitat from the
environmental impacts of the mining industry in British Columbia.440

On November 30, 1998 the Secretariat deemed the submission to have satisfied
Article 140).441 Seven months later on June 25 1999, the Secretariat determined
that the submission merited a response from the Canadian government.442
Canada filed its response on September 8 , 1999.443

439 See CEC webpage SEM-98-004 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=42.
440 See submission dated June 29,1998.
441 See determination under Article 14 (1) November 30 1998.
442 See determination under Article 14 (2) June 25 1999.

443Ibid.
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Canada contended that it was effectively enforcing its environmental laws and
was in full compliance with its NAAEC obligations.444 Canada also alleged that:
1) the assertions in the submission were the subject of pending administrative
proceedings; 2) the Submitters failed to provide Canada with a reasonable
opportunity to respond to the claims raised in the submissions; 3) the Submitters
were attempting to apply the NAAEC retroactively; 4) the Submitters failed to
pursue private remedies; and, 5) that the development of a factual record would
not further the objectives of the NAAEC.445

On May 11, 2001 the Secretariat submitted to the Council its recommendation to
elaborate a factual record. However as October 2001, the Council has not
reached a decision on whether to open a factual record for this submission.

3.16 Submission 98-005 on Hazardous Waste Landfills in Hermosillo
Sonora, Mexico.

On July 23,1998, Domingo Gutierrez Mendevil, President of the Academia
Sonorense de Derechos Humanos, A.C., filed a submission against the
government of Mexico446 in which he alleged that Mexico, through its
authorization of the operation of a hazardous waste landfill less than six

444 See Response of the government of Canada to a Submission on Enforcement matters under
Article 14 and 15 of the North American agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
http://www.cec.org/templates/06-res.cfm ?format=2.
445 Ibid.
446 See CEC webpage SEM-98-005 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=43

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

190

kilometres away from Hermosillo Sonora, had failed to effectively enforce
Mexico's environmental laws and specifically Mexican Official Standard NOMCPR-004ECOL/1993 that set the appropriate distance at a minimum of 25
kilometres.447

The Submitter alleged that the authorities intended to close the current landfill
and build a new one, known as Cytrar in the territory of Sonora448, Moreover, the
Submitter asserted that the authorities would simply abandon the current landfill
without any remedies or clean-up actions required for contaminated areas.449
Finally, the Submitter contended that the SEMARNAP, the State of Sonora, and
the Municipality of Hermosillo had gotten approval without previously consulting
the public in violation of the LGEEPA450

The Secretariat requested a response from Mexico on April 9.1999.451 Mexico
filed its response, part of which it designated as confidential, on July 12 1999.452
In its response, Mexico countered that the Submitter failed to exhaust all the
administrative procedures available before filing his submission, and also
asserted that the allegations in the submission were the subject of pending
judicial or administrative action.453

Mexico

also

maintained that the

environmental laws were issued after the establishment of the landfill, and cannot

447 Ibid.
448 Ibid.
449 Ibid.
450 Ibid.
451 ibid.
452 Ibid.
453 Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

191

be applied retroactively and they also asserted that the Mexican government had
not yet determined the location of a new site.454

On October 26, 2000455, the Secretariat determined that in light of the response
of the Party, it was clear that the legal provision on which the Submitter founded
his petition concerning the alleged lack of enforcement by the Mexican
government was not in force when the site was authorized. Principally in view of
that fact, in accordance with Article 15(1) of the NAAEC, the Secretariat found
that Submission SEM-98-005 does not warrant the development of a factual
record, and terminated the process in accordance with paragraph 9.6 of the
Guidelines.

However on February 14, 2001, the Petitioners submitted a new revised
submission regarding the same Cytrar landfill.456 In this submission knows as
Cytrar II, the Submitter alleged the landfill was established without an
environmental impact authorization, does not comply with the regulations for the
construction of this type of confinements and received hazardous waste from an
American company, activity that is prohibited by the LGEEPA. On June 4, 2001
Mexico submitted a response to the petition requesting to terminate the petition
since this landfill is part of an international arbitration between the Mexican

456 Submission SEM-01-001 visible a t :
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=63.
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government and a Spanish company regarding an international agreement
between Mexico and Spain.

As result of Mexico’s response, the Secretariat decided on June 13, 2001 to give
Mexico 30 days more to submit additional information to prove whether the
submission is the same case as the alleged international arbitration.

3.17 Submission 98-006 on Shrimp Farms in Isla del Conde, Municipality of
San Bias, Nayarit, Mexico.

On October 20, 1998, the Grupo Ecologico Manglar, A.C. filed a submission
alleging that Mexico was failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws with
respect to the establishment and operation of Granjas Aquanova S.A., a shrimp
farm in Isla del Conde457 in the Mexican State of Nayarit. Specifically, the
Submitter alleged that the Mexican authorities failed to enforce provisions
regarding: (1) protecting jungles and tropical rainforests;

(2) regulating

wastewater discharge; (3) preventing and controlling water use and pollution; (4)
relating to fisheries and the introduction of non-native species; and (5)
environmental impact assessments requirements.458 The Submitter further
alleged that Mexican authorities failed to prosecute Granjas for its environmental
offences and did not follow up the administrative procedures contained within an
agreement between the authorities and Granjas to access damages and
457 See CEC webpage SEM-98-006 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=49.
458 Ibid.
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remediation measures.459 Lastly, the Submitter contended that Mexico failed to
protect migratory species and wetlands as mandated by three international
conventions.460

On March 17, 1999, the Secretariat made the requisite Article 14 (10) and 14 (2)
determinations and requested a response from Mexico.461 Mexico filed its
response on June 15, 1999. In its response Mexico argued that the Submitter
failed to exhaust all available legal remedies 462 Mexico reiterated that a popular
denounce is not a remedy and, at any rate, Mexico had not yet completed its
review of the one filed by the Submitter463 against Aquanova. Mexico maintained
that it was effectively enforcing its environmental laws and that some of the
provisions invoked by the Submitter were not applicable because they were not
in effect at the time of Granjas’ offences. Mexico also alleged that the Submitter
failed to cite the precise treaty provisions with which Mexico had failed to
comply.464

Despite the response made by Mexico to the submission, on August 4, 2000 the
Secretariat decided to recommend to the Council the elaboration of a factual
record in response to this submission. As of October 2001, more than a year
after the Secretariat’s recommendation, the Council has not decided whether to
open a factual record.
459 Ibid.
460 Ibid.
461 Ibid.
462 Ibid.
463 Ibid.
464 Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

194

3.18 Submission 99-001 on Underground Storage Tanks in the State of
California.

On October 18,1999, the Methanex Corportation (Methanex), a Canadian
methanol manufacturer, filed a submission against the State of California and the
United States.465 Methanex alleged that the state and the federal government
failed to enforce California’s environmental laws and regulations relating to
underground storage tanks or “USTs” and water resource protection.466
Methanex acknowledged, however, that not all USTs are regulated. Methanex
asserted that California had failed to properly enforce its environmental laws
related to environmental and water resource protection through its failure to
regulate all USTs.467

Methanex’s submission relied largely on a report issued by the California State
Auditor on December 17, 1998. The report heavily criticized state officials for
failing to adequately protect California groundwater and address contamination
from leaking storage tanks.468

On March 30, 2000 the Secretariat determined that the submission met Article
14(1) and (2) and requested a response from the United States. On May 30,
465 See CEC webpage for SEM-98-007 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=55
466 Ibid.
467 Ibid.
468 Ibid.
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2000 the United States submitted its response before the Secretariat. In its
response to the consolidated Methanex (SEM- 99-001) and Neste (SEM-00-002)
Submissions, the American government argued that the matter alleged in both
submissions is subject to a pending arbitration decision. Methanex is already
challenging California’s enforcement of its Underground Storage Tanks
regulations as part of its arbitration claim against the United States under NAFTA
Chapter 11. The U.S.A. claimed that, in accordance with Article 14.3(a) of the
NAAEC, the Secretariat should proceed no further with the consideration of the
submission. The Secretariat decided on June 30, 2000 not to proceed further and
concluded submissions SEM-99-001 and SEM-00-002 because they are subject
of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding under NAFTA chapter 11469

3.19 Submission 99-002 on Migratory Birds in the United States.

On November 11, 1999 the Alliance for the Wild Rockies, together with eight
other NGO’s from Canada, Mexico and the United States470, filed a submission
against the United States alleging that the government is failing to effectively
enforce Section 703 of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), which prohibits the
killing of migratory birds without a permit.471

470 See CEC webpage for SEM-99-02 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=56
The other eight NGO’s are: The Centre of International Environmental Law, Centro Mexicano de
Derecho Ambiental del Noreste de Mexico, the Centro Mexicano de Derecho Ambiental, The
Friends of the Earth, The Instituto de Derecho Ambiental, The Pacific Environment and
Resources Centre; the Sierra Club of Canada and the West Coast Environmental Law
Association.
471 Ibid.
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Specifically the Submitters alleged that the United States has refused to enforce
Section 703 as it relates to loggers, logging companies and logging contractors.
According to the Submitters the Fish and Wildlife Services “FWS”, the agency in
charge enforcing the MBTA has a longstanding, unwritten policy relative to the
MBTA that no enforcement or investigative action should be taken in incidents
involving logging operations.472 The Submitters contended that the relevant
statutes and regulations do not contemplate such exemption.

The Secretariat made the requisite determinations under Article 14(1) and 14(2),
and requested a response from the United States on December 23, 1999. The
United States submitted its response on February 29, 2000. On December 15,
2000, almost a year after the Secretariat requested a response by the United
States the Secretariat recommended to the Council the elaboration of a factual
record regarding this submission. The Council has not yet reached a decision.

3.20 Submission 00-001 on Air Pollution in Cumpas, Sonora, Mexico.

Rosa Maria Escalante de Feranandez filed the first submission of the year 2000
in January 27473. She alleged that the government of Mexico has failed to
effectively enforce the Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y la Proteccion a!

473 See CEC webpage SEM-00-001 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=57.
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Ambiente (LGEEPA) and certain Official Mexican Standards concerning
environmental health in relation to air pollution from the Molymex S.A de C.V.
plant in Campus in the Mexican State of Sonora. The Molymex plant produces
molybdenum trioxide from molybdenum sulphide. The Submitter asserted that
the pollution emitted by the plant causes irreversible and irreparable damage to
the residents’ health and the environment by increasing mortality rates and
affecting crops in Cumpas.474

On April 25, 2000 the Secretariat determined that the submission did not meet
the criteria of Article 14(1) and terminated the submission. The Submitters filed in
April 6, 2000 a new submission SEM-00-005 regarding the same matter. The
Submitters allege that Mexico has failed to effectively enforce the LGEEPA with
respect to: (i) operating without environmental impact authorization, (ii) land use
which is incompatible with the cattle raising and use in the area; (iii) preservation
and sustainable use of the land; (iv) zoning for contaminating industries in
Cumpas; (v) the return to the country of origin of hazardous waste generated
under the rules of temporary importation; and (vi) the importation of dangerous
materials without ensuring compliance with the LGEEPA.

On October 19, 2000 the Secretariat decided that the submission met Article 14
(1) and (2) criteria and requested a response from the Mexican government.
Mexico submitted its response on January 18, 2000 and alleged that since the
Molymex plant was established before the enforcement of the environmental
474Ibid.
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legislation it therefore did not need to execute an environmental impact
assessment. Also Mexico stated Molymex obtained and renewed several times
its functioning licenses and that they met all the air pollution standards. The
Secretariat is still reviewing Mexico’s response.

3.21 Submission 00-003 on Migratory Birds in Jamaica Bay.

On March 2, 2000 the Hudson River Audubon Society of Westchester, Inc. and
the Save Our Sanctuary Committee, submitted before the Secretariat a
submission alleging that the United States National Park Sen/ice475, is failing to
enforce, and proposing to violate the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which prohibits
the killing of migratory birds without a permit from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service. In addition they submitted that the U.S. is failing to enforce and
proposing to violate of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, which prohibits the
taking endangered and threatened species by proposing to construct a paved,
multi-purpose bicycle path through the Jamaica Bay Wildlife Refuge, which is
part of the Gateway National Recreational Area, located in Queens, New York.
The Submitters alleged the construction would create an important risk to the
habitat of several migratory birds.
On 12 April 2000, the Secretariat determined that SEM-00-003 does not meet the
criteria of Article 14(1) of the NAAEC and therefore concluded the process.

475 See CEC webpage SEM-00-003 a t :
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=59.
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3.22 Submission 00-004 BC Logging.

On March 27, 2000 the David Suzuki Foundation, Greenpeace Canada, Sierra
Club of British Columbia, Northwest Ecosystem Alliance and the National
Resources Defence Council submitted before the Secretariat a submission
alleging that Canada is failing to effectively enforce its environmental laws and to
provide high levels of environmental protection. They allege that the Fisheries
Act is “routinely and systematically violated by logging activities undertaken in
British Columbia.”476

Also, the Submitters alleged that the Canadian

environmental authority has been denied the right to bring private prosecutions
against violators of the Fisheries Act in violation of the obligation established in
Article 7 of the NAAEC.

The Secretariat decided that the submission met Article 14 (1) and (2) criteria
and requested a response from Canada on May 8, 2000. The Canadian
response was filed before the Secretariat on July 6,2000 and recognized only
three documented assertions of alleged failures to effectively enforce the
Fisheries Act.

In light of Canada’s response, the Secretariat recommended on

July 27, 2001 that the submission warranted the developing of a factual record.
The Council has not yet reached a decision.

476 See CEC webpage SEM-00-004 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=60.
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3.23 Submission 00-006 in the Indigenous Communities in the Sierra
Tarahumara.

The Comision de Derechos de Solidaridad y Defensa de los Derechos Humanos
submitted on June 19, 2000 a submission alleging a failure by Mexico to
effectively enforce its environmental law by denying access to environmental
justice to Indigenous communities in the Sierra Tarahumara in the State of
Chihuahua. In particular, they assert failures to effectively enforce environmental
law relative to the citizen complaint process, to alleged environmental crimes and
alleged violations with respect to forest resources and the environment in the
Sierra Tarahumara.477 The Secretariat is still reviewing whether the submission
meets the criteria of Article 14 (1).

3.24 Submission 01-002 the AAA Packaging Company.

On April 18, 2001 the Submitters, who asked to remain anonymous as
established in Article 11 (8) section (a) of the NAAEC, alleged that the Canadian
government is allowing the exportation to the territories of the other Parties a
pesticide or toxic substance whose use is prohibited within its territory pursuant
to Article 23(3) of the NAAEC 478 The Submitters assert that Canada has failed to
issue a prohibitory and/or injunctive order halting the export to the United States,
477 See CEC webpage SEM-00-006 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=62.
478 See CEC webpage SEM-01-002 at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/guides_registry/registryview.cfm?&varlan=english&submissionlD=66.
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by AAA Packaging, of products containing “isobutyl nitrite” which the Submitters
claim is a “banned hazardous substance”.

The Secretariat requested more

information and when the Submitters did not submit additional information, the
Secretariat on May 25, 2001 decided to terminate the submission.

3.25 Submission 01-003 on ground water contamination by the company
DERMET in Guadalajara, Mexico.

On June 14, 2001 a Mexican company called Mercerizados y Tenidos de
Guadalajara S.A de C. V submitted that in a civil trial Mexico refused to recognize
and give effect to a technical opinion issued by PROFEPA related to damages
caused to Mercerizados.

By doing so it was alleged that Mexico failed to

effectively enforce Article 194 of the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and
Environmental Protection ‘LGEEPA", and keep its commitments concerning
procedural guarantees and private access to remedies under Articles 5, 6 and 7
of the NAAEC.479

On September 19, 2001 the Secretariat decided that the submission did not meet
the criteria of Article 14 (1), since the final decision by the courts regarding the
civil suit did recognize and give effect to the technical opinion issued by
PROFEPA. Therefore the submission was terminated.

479 See CEC webpage SEM-01-003 at:
http://www.cec.org/news/details/index.cfm ?varlan=english&ID=2419.
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